pyefris
Python client for the URA EFRIS (Electronic Fiscal Receipting and Invoicing Solution) system-to-system API, per Interface Design for EFRIS v24.0.1.
Features:
- Full wire protocol:
{data, globalInfo, returnStateInfo}envelope, one POST endpoint,dataDescriptionencryption flags per interface. - Online-mode crypto exactly as URA requires:
content = base64(AES-ECB/PKCS7(json)),signature = base64(SHA1withRSA(content)), T104 session-key unwrap (RSA/PKCS1), auto-refresh on returnCode401/402. - Offline-mode payload profile (base64 content, empty signature).
- ACID outbox: every submission is recorded atomically in a SQLite
(WAL,
synchronous=FULL) store before it goes on the wire — idempotent retries, crash-safe replay, append-only audit log. - Typed pydantic v2 models for the core ~40 interfaces;
client.call(code, ...)generic escape hatch for the rest of the 74-code registry. - Sync
EfrisClientandAsyncEfrisClient(httpx). - Python ≥ 3.10. Dependencies:
httpx,pydantic>=2,cryptography.
Install
pip install -e . # local
pip install -e ".[dev]" # with test/lint tooling
Quickstart
from pyefris import EfrisClient, EfrisConfig
cfg = EfrisConfig(
tin="1000029771",
device_no="TCS9e0df01728335239",
private_key_path="keys/taxpayer_private.pem", # RSA-2048, registered w/ URA
environment="test", # or "prod"
store_path="pyefris.db",
)
with EfrisClient(cfg) as client:
client.sync_clock() # T101: requestTime within ±10min
result = client.invoicing.upload_invoice(invoice, reference_no="INV-0001")
doc = result.model.exist_invoice_list[0]
print(doc.invoice_no, doc.antifake_code, doc.qr_code)
Domain services: client.session (T101–T105), .taxpayer (T119/T137/T138/T180),
.dictionary (T115/T123–T126/T134/T146), .goods (T127/T128/T130/T144),
.stock (T131/T139/T145/T147–T149/T160), .invoicing
(T106–T114/T116–T118/T120–T122/T129). Unmodeled interfaces:
client.call("T167", {...}).
ACID guarantees
| Property | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Atomicity | intent (PENDING) + sealed envelope (SEALED) written in one BEGIN IMMEDIATE tx before network I/O; outcome + audit row in a second tx |
| Consistency | UNIQUE(tin, device_no, interface_code, reference_no) blocks double-fiscalization; CHECK on status enum |
| Isolation | WAL + busy_timeout; claims are compare-and-swap UPDATE ... WHERE status=? — threads/processes can't double-send |
| Durability | synchronous=FULL; sealed envelope persisted before send; append-only audit_log (triggers forbid UPDATE/DELETE) |
Recovery: client.relay_pending() re-sends the byte-identical stored
envelope (same dataExchangeId, signature) so URA can dedupe. Run it on a
schedule or client.start_worker() for a background thread. Retries use
exponential backoff (RetryPolicy) for transport failures; business
rejections (EfrisReturnCodeError) are terminal by design.
result = client.invoicing.upload_invoice(inv, reference_no="INV-1") # raises on dup
result = client.invoicing.upload_invoice(inv, reference_no="INV-1",
on_duplicate="return") # returns stored record
Config reference
EfrisConfig(tin, device_no, private_key_pem|_path, environment="test"|"prod", mode="online"|"offline", endpoint=..., store_path=..., timeout_seconds=30, retry=RetryPolicy(...), server_public_key_pem=...). Also EfrisConfig.from_env()
reads PYEFRIS_* variables. CLI: python -m pyefris server-time|login| sync-dictionaries|relay|call.
Security notes
- SHA1withRSA signatures and AES-ECB are required by the URA spec, not a design choice of this package.
- The decrypted AES session key is cached in the SQLite
kv_statetable — protect the store file with filesystem permissions. RedactingFilter(pyefris.logging) scrubs keys/blobs from log records.- T102's white-box
clientPriKey/keyTabledecryption is AP01-only and not implemented (S2S/AP04 uses your own registered keypair).
Spec caveats captured in code
passowrdDes,buyerPlaceOfBusi,VehichleNokeep the spec's spellings.- T113/T114/T105/T120/T122 return unencrypted responses even though the request is encrypted.
InvoiceUploadallows spec additions viaextra="allow"— unknown fields round-trip instead of being dropped.
Development
python -m pytest tests/ # 50 tests, no network needed
python -m ruff check src tests
python -m mypy src/pyefris # strict mode
See AGENTS.md for architecture notes.
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