pyplaypen-sandbox

One-shot subprocess sandbox for running Python inside a container.

Not a hostile-code sandbox. The container around this process is the accepted trust boundary. This library adds defense in depth inside that boundary; it does not hold against code that deliberately tries to escape it. For that, use gVisor, Firecracker, or a VM.

What it does

Each call to Sandbox.execute forks a fresh child, in its own process group, that:

• runs your code with a wall-clock timeout that kills the whole process group (os.killpg), not just the immediate child, so background descendants can't outlive the call
• applies POSIX rlimits pre-exec: CPU seconds, address space (memory), process count, max file size, open file descriptors
• drops from root to a dedicated non-root UID before running your code (Linux exempts root from RLIMIT_NPROC, so this matters if the parent runs as root)
• enables PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER on Linux so orphaned grandchildren still get reaped after the process group is torn down
• captures stdout/stderr bounded and SHA-256-hashed, and returns the child's final expression value as JSON (plain Python types only, by default — anything else needs a type_projector, see "Extending it")
• collects files written into the call's workspace as artifacts, rejecting symlinks and any path that would escape the workspace, with per-file, aggregate, and count byte limits
• logs a structured audit record per call including exactly what was enforced vs. best-effort vs. unsupported on the current platform (see _enforcement_map in supervisor.py)

For coding agents

For a single one-off call:

Use https://github.com/lkraider/pyplaypen-sandbox to run this Python
snippet in an isolated subprocess, capped at 5 seconds of wall time and
256 MB of memory, and return the result: <code>

For a project integration, read "Extending it" and "Lower-level building blocks" below first. The decision points are execute() vs. run_process(), whether a globals_provider or type_projector is warranted, and what Limits fit the workload. Write the integration the project needs instead of copying the examples verbatim.

Copy-paste to a coding agent, for a project integration:

Set up a process sandbox in this project using
https://github.com/lkraider/pyplaypen-sandbox. Read the README fully
first, then decide the integration this project needs.

Install

pip install pyplaypen-sandbox

No dependencies, required or optional. See type_projector below if you need numpy/pandas, or anything else, in a return value.

Usage

import asyncio
from pyplaypen_sandbox import run

async def main():
    result = await run("1 + 1", artifact_dir="./artifacts")
    print(result)  # {"status": "ok", "return_value": 2, ...}

asyncio.run(main())

For repeated calls, construct a Sandbox once (it runs a startup self-check and owns a concurrency semaphore) and reuse it:

from pyplaypen_sandbox import Sandbox, Context, Limits

sandbox = Sandbox(max_concurrency=4)
result = await sandbox.execute(
    code, Context(artifact_root=Path("./artifacts")), Limits(wall_seconds=10),
)

Result shape

{
    "status": "ok" | "error",
    "return_value": <JSON value or None>,
    "stdout": "<bounded, possibly truncated>",
    "error": None | {"type": "...", "message": "..."},
    "artifacts": [{"path": ..., "name": ..., "bytes": ..., "mime_type": ...}],
}

error.type is one of: syntax, runtime, serialization, timeout, memory_limit, process_limit, open_files_limit, artifact_limit, return_limit, busy, cancelled, crash, protocol, internal, extension.

Extending it

This library has no built-in helpers and no dependency on numpy, pandas, httpx, duckdb, or anything else sandboxed code might need. To let sandboxed code call out to something — an HTTP client, a query engine, whatever — give Sandbox an import path to a factory function. It runs inside the child, after the privilege drop, so an extension is bound by the same rlimits as user code, and its imports live in your module.

# yourpkg/sandbox_ext.py
def build_globals(ctx: dict) -> dict:
    import httpx  # your dependency, not pyplaypen_sandbox's
    def fetch(url: str) -> str:
        return httpx.get(url, timeout=ctx["extra"]["timeout"]).text
    return {"fetch": fetch}

sandbox = Sandbox(globals_provider="yourpkg.sandbox_ext:build_globals")
context = Context(artifact_root=Path("./artifacts"), extra={"timeout": 5.0})
result = await sandbox.execute('fetch("https://example.com")', context)

ctx is {"request_id", "workspace", "artifact_root", "extra"}. extra is whatever JSON-serializable config you passed on Context; this library never reads it. A bad provider (missing module, wrong return type) fails with error.type == "extension", not a user-code error type. With self_check=True (the default), that failure is caught when Sandbox() is constructed, before the first call.

The same mechanism extends what a return value can be. _project(), the function that turns your final expression into JSON, knows only plain Python types. Anything else needs a type_projector: one function that takes an unsupported value and returns something projectable (plain data, or another unsupported value, since it recurses):

# yourpkg/sandbox_ext.py
def project(value):
    if isinstance(value, YourType):
        return {"field": value.field}
    raise ValueError(f"no projection for {type(value).__name__}")

sandbox = Sandbox(type_projector="yourpkg.sandbox_ext:project")

numpy/pandas support lives in pyplaypen_sandbox.projectors as the shipped example of this mechanism, and works as-is:

sandbox = Sandbox(type_projector="pyplaypen_sandbox.projectors:project_numpy_pandas")
result = await sandbox.execute("import numpy as np\nnp.array([1, 2])", context)
# {"status": "ok", "return_value": [1, 2], ...}

Without a type_projector configured, returning a numpy array (or any other non-plain type) fails the same way any unprojectable value does: error.type == "serialization".

Lower-level building blocks

This library's guarantees don't stop at execute(). Two layers underneath it are public on purpose:

Sandbox.run_process(argv, cwd=...) — the argv twin of execute(). Same rlimits, UID drop, process-group timeout/kill, and subreaper reaping, but no JSON protocol: it runs an existing program (a script you already materialized on disk, a CLI, whatever) and gives you back exit status plus bounded stdout+stderr. Use this when your code doesn't speak the return-value protocol and you already have your own way of collecting output files, e.g. a fixed entrypoint script run per call:

result = await sandbox.run_process(
    [sys.executable, "entrypoint.py"], cwd=workspace, limits=Limits(wall_seconds=60),
)
# or just as well: ["./entrypoint.sh"], ["/usr/bin/some-tool", "--flag"], ...
# {"status": "ok" | "timeout" | "busy" | "cancelled" | "internal",
#  "returncode": int | None, "timed_out": bool, "stdout": str, "stderr": str}

argv accepts any process: a script, a shell command, a compiled binary.

Pass merge_output=True to fold stderr into stdout at the OS level, so the two interleave in one stream (in emission order) for an operator log that needs stderr in the context of the stdout around it — interleaving that has to be captured here and can't be reconstructed from the two separate strings. stderr is then "" and the merged stream is bounded by stdout_bytes. Ordering is best-effort (only writes within PIPE_BUF are atomic, and child buffering can still reorder).

pyplaypen_sandbox.privilege — the two primitives everything else is built from, with no dependency on Sandbox, asyncio, or anything else in this package:

from pyplaypen_sandbox.privilege import apply_resource_limits, drop_root_privileges

def preexec():
    apply_resource_limits({"cpu_seconds": 5, "memory_bytes": 2**30,
                            "process_count": 16, "file_bytes": 2**26,
                            "open_files": 256})
    drop_root_privileges(uid=65534)

subprocess.Popen(argv, preexec_fn=preexec)  # works with plain subprocess.Popen too

If you already run your own subprocess.Popen(preexec_fn=...) supervision and just want real rlimits and a real UID drop (the thing that makes RLIMIT_NPROC bind on Linux, where root is exempt from it), that's all this is. No need to adopt the rest of the library.

Compared to restricted-interpreter sandboxes (e.g. Monty)

Pydantic's Monty solves the same problem differently. It runs code in-process, in a restricted Python subset: sandboxed code can only call what you inject as external functions. There's no import os, no filesystem or network access, no arbitrary pip packages, because the interpreter doesn't support any of that. Its resource limits (allocation count, duration, memory) are counters inside its own runtime, not kernel rlimits. There's no process boundary.

These are two different strategies. Prefer pyplaypen-sandbox when code needs real CPython (numpy, pandas, any pip package, subprocesses of its own) or when you want kernel-enforced limits: a whole process tree killed on timeout, real RLIMIT_NPROC/RLIMIT_AS, a real UID drop, instead of an interpreter's internal bookkeeping, which can't see what a C extension or an injected function does with memory or subprocesses on its own.

Prefer Monty when call volume or latency matters (no subprocess per call), when the workload is a small fixed set of host capabilities rather than open-ended generated code, or when the threat model is closer to untrusted input than your own automation and there's no strong per-tenant container isolation underneath it. A restricted language is a stronger standalone safety claim than full CPython isolated by a container that remains the real boundary, which is what this library is.

Container reference

The repo's Dockerfile is the intended shape: a Linux image that creates a dedicated non-root UID and installs the package, with the parent free to stay root so each call drops to that UID — which is what makes RLIMIT_NPROC bind. Base your own image on it, or copy the pattern. If you instead run the container as a fixed non-root user (no root parent, no per-call drop), pair it with a container pids cap (docker run --pids-limit=N) so process_count is enforced at the container layer — otherwise the enforcement gate will refuse to start (see "Enforcement gate"). CI builds the test stage and runs the suite as root and as the dedicated non-root UID with --pids-limit, plus a step asserting the gate rejects an uncapped non-root container — so both deployment shapes and the gate are exercised on real Linux, not just where they no-op.

Enforcement gate

On Linux, Sandbox() fails at construction if any limit it accepts can't actually be enforced on this deployment. A limit that is set but silently does nothing gives no protection while looking like it does, so the gate refuses to start rather than let that through — the same way self_check=True bails on a broken runner.

The gate checks every limit, not one in particular. On Linux, process_count is simply the only limit whose enforceability depends on the deployment; every other limit is enforced either by the supervisor itself or by a per-process rlimit that always applies, so none of them can come up unenforced. A non-root container with no process cap can't enforce process_count, so that deployment is rejected until you fix it — run the container so the parent is root (each call drops to a dedicated UID, binding RLIMIT_NPROC to your value), set a container-level pids cap (docker run --pids-limit=N), or pass warn_only=True to acknowledge the gap and proceed anyway. The gate is Linux-only; on other platforms (dev hosts) it no-ops.

Sandbox.enforcement exposes the same truth as a dict — what each limit actually enforces here ("hard", "hard_per_user", "container", "unsupported", ...). Gate your own deploy on it if you want a specific guarantee:

sandbox = Sandbox()
assert sandbox.enforcement["process_count"] != "unsupported"

Platform notes

On macOS, cpu_seconds, file_bytes, and open_files are enforced natively, and the wall-clock timeout and process-group teardown apply everywhere. memory_bytes and process_count are reported "unsupported": Darwin has no honest primitive for either — RLIMIT_AS aliases the unenforced RLIMIT_RSS, and per-UID RLIMIT_NPROC needs a root-drop that isn't the supported shape. For full enforcement on a Mac, run the Linux image in a Linux VM (Apple container, Colima, or Docker) — the recommended route. Sandbox.enforcement reports which limits are real on the current host. Root-UID drop is a no-op if the parent isn't running as root.

process_count binds to your exact Limits value only when the parent is root and drops to a dedicated UID (RLIMIT_NPROC is per real UID, so it's only safe to set once this process owns its UID). A non-root container instead relies on a container-level pids cap (docker run --pids-limit, a Kubernetes pod pids cgroup, systemd TasksMax) — real enforcement, but at the operator's number, not your Limits.process_count. Sandbox.enforcement["process_count"] reports which you have: "hard_per_user" (root, your value), "container" (cgroup cap, operator's value), or "unsupported" (neither — the gate rejects this).