quickjs-rs 0.2.0

Sandboxed JavaScript execution for Python, via wasmtime + rquickjs.

quickjs-rs

Sandboxed JavaScript execution for Python.

JS runs inside a WebAssembly sandbox: quickjs-ng (a QuickJS fork) via rquickjs is compiled to wasm32-wasip1 and driven by wasmtime. The package is pure Python - one universal wheel that bundles the guest .wasm; the only runtime dependency is wasmtime. ES modules resolve through a host loader callback; inline TypeScript is type-stripped via oxidase.

[!WARNING] quickjs-rs is experimental. Before putting this in production, you should read the Security guide.

Install

pip install quickjs-rs
uv add quickjs-rs

Ships as a single universal pure-Python wheel (py3-none-any) — the bundled guest is platform-independent WebAssembly, and wasmtime supplies the per-platform runtime. Requires Python 3.11+; runs anywhere wasmtime has a wheel (Linux, macOS, Windows; x86_64 + arm64).

Quickstart

from quickjs_rs import Runtime

with Runtime() as rt:
    with rt.new_context() as ctx:
        assert ctx.eval("1 + 2") == 3

        # Register a Python callable as a JS global.
        @ctx.function
        def greet(name: str) -> str:
            return f"hi {name}"
        assert ctx.eval("greet('world')") == "hi world"

Async + top-level await:

import asyncio

async def main():
    with Runtime() as rt:
        with rt.new_context() as ctx:
            @ctx.function
            async def fetch_thing() -> str:
                await asyncio.sleep(0.01)
                return "from python"

            result = await ctx.eval_async("await fetch_thing()")
            assert result == "from python"

asyncio.run(main())

ES modules

Supply modules through a host loader callback pair: normalize(base, specifier) resolves an import to a canonical name, and load(name) returns the source. The host owns all resolution policy — there is no built-in scope model.

import posixpath
from quickjs_rs import Runtime

sources = {
    "@agent/config": "export const MAX_RETRIES = 3;",
    "@agent/utils": "export { slugify } from './strings.js';",
    "@agent/utils/strings.js":
        "export const slugify = s => s.toLowerCase().replace(/ /g, '-');",
}

def normalize(base, spec):
    if not spec.startswith("."):
        return spec                       # bare name → canonical name
    base_dir = base if "." not in posixpath.basename(base) else posixpath.dirname(base)
    return posixpath.normpath(posixpath.join(base_dir, spec))  # relative → joined

with Runtime() as rt:
    rt.set_module_loader(normalize=normalize, load=sources.get)
    with rt.new_context() as ctx:
        assert await ctx.eval_async("""
            const { slugify } = await import("@agent/utils");
            const { MAX_RETRIES } = await import("@agent/config");
            slugify("Hello World") + '/' + MAX_RETRIES;
        """) == "hello-world/3"

normalize is where sandboxing lives — return None to refuse a specifier.

TypeScript

Module sources whose canonical name ends in .ts, .mts, .cts, or .tsx are type-stripped (in the guest, via oxidase) before evaluation. Enums, namespaces, and parameter properties are transformed; plain type annotations erase. No type checking — run tsc --noEmit separately for that.

# A canonical name ending in .ts/.tsx is stripped before QuickJS sees it.
ts_sources = {
    "util.ts": """
        export enum Mode { Strict = 1, Loose = 2 }
        export function slug(s: string, mode: Mode): string {
            return s.toLowerCase().replace(/ /g, mode === Mode.Strict ? '_' : '-');
        }
    """,
}

with Runtime() as rt:
    rt.set_module_loader(load=ts_sources.get)
    with rt.new_context() as ctx:
        assert await ctx.eval_async(
            "const { slug, Mode } = await import('util.ts');"
            "slug('Hello World', Mode.Strict)"
        ) == "hello_world"

A TypeScript parse error surfaces as a module-load error rather than at eval.

Snapshots

A snapshot captures the entire guest heap — every object, the atom table, the job queue, closures, and pending promises — as a flat image, and reconstitutes it into a fresh context. Because it's the whole VM memory, aliasing and closure state survive exactly.

from quickjs_rs import Runtime, Snapshot

with Runtime() as rt:
    with rt.new_context() as ctx:
        ctx.eval("""
            const shared = { count: 1 };
            const a = shared, b = shared;
            const counter = (() => { let n = 0; return () => ++n; })();
        """)
        payload = ctx.create_snapshot().to_bytes()

with Runtime() as rt2:
    with rt2.new_context() as ctx2:
        rt2.restore_snapshot(Snapshot.from_bytes(payload), ctx2)
        assert ctx2.eval("a === b") is True       # aliasing preserved
        assert ctx2.eval("counter()") == 1        # closure state preserved

A snapshot must be taken at a quiescent point (no in-flight eval_async, no pending async host calls); create_snapshot_async() is the async-context form. Restore validates a fail-closed header — including a build_id that rejects a snapshot taken from a different guest build — before writing the image. Treat snapshot bytes as trusted input (see Security).

snap = await ctx.create_snapshot_async()
rt.restore_snapshot(snap, other_ctx, inject_globals=True)

Security

• The WebAssembly sandbox is the isolation boundary. JS executes inside the guest's wasm linear memory; quickjs-ng never sees a host pointer and cannot read or write Python's address space. A bug in the JS engine is contained within the sandbox, not a path to host-memory compromise — this is the central reason JS runs in wasm rather than as a native extension.

• The residual runtime-escape risk is wasmtime itself. wasmtime executes the guest in-process, so a vulnerability in wasmtime / Cranelift (the JIT) is the one path that could cross the sandbox boundary. Keep wasmtime updated. For hostile multi-tenant workloads where you must defend against an active runtime-attacker, add process/container isolation on top and recycle on timeout/OOM — the sandbox raises the bar but does not replace defense in depth.

• Registered host callbacks are capability boundaries. Anything you expose to JS via ctx.register(...) is reachable by the sandboxed code; treat every such callback as privileged when running untrusted JS. The sandbox contains the engine, not the capabilities you hand it.

• Resource limits are enforced — Runtime(memory_limit=...) caps heap, a per-eval timeout interrupts runaway JS (the instance survives), and a runaway recursion is contained by the sandbox (it traps the wasm instance rather than the host; see the threat model for the wasi stack-check caveat).

• Each Context is its own isolated wasm instance — separate linear memory, no shared globals/modules. Still, use one Runtime per trust domain.

• Snapshots are trusted input. A whole-memory snapshot is an arbitrary guest heap image. Restore validates a fail-closed header (incl. a build_id that rejects a snapshot taken from a different guest build), but a same-build crafted image is not made safe by that check — do not restore snapshots from an untrusted source, and do not restore across guest builds.

Development

# Build the guest wasm (needs the Rust toolchain + the wasm target):
#   rustup target add wasm32-wasip1
python scripts/build_guest.py        # cargo build → quickjs_rs/_guest.wasm

# Dev install (pure-Python package; the wasm is bundled above).
pip install -e ".[dev]"

# Run tests, type-check, lint.
pytest
mypy quickjs_rs
ruff check

License

MIT. See LICENSE.