ragleap-ansible
Ansible roles that prepare a fresh Ubuntu 22.04 server for the RagLeap Helm charts. Version 0.1.0 covers the server base only. It does not install k3s, Helm or the charts yet.
What works today
| Part | Status |
|---|---|
ragleap_base: packages, deploy user with key-only login, passwordless sudo, unattended-upgrades |
Tested in a throwaway Ubuntu 22.04 container, run twice, second run changes nothing. Also run twice on GitHub-hosted Ubuntu 22.04 and 24.04 runners (real systemd, privilege escalation through sudo): second run changed nothing (CI run 40378770112) |
sshd hardening (opt-in ragleap_base_harden_ssh) |
Effective settings checked with sshd -T, idempotent, bad config rolled back, all in a container. On GitHub-hosted Ubuntu 22.04 and 24.04 runners the running sshd offered publickey,password before hardening and only publickey after, and a key login as the deploy user still worked (CI run 40378770112). Weakening the role made that check fail: a drop-in that sorts after the cloud image's 50-cloud-init.conf left password login on (run 40465088911), and skipping the sshd reload left the running daemon unchanged (run 40465114601) |
firewall (opt-in ragleap_base_enable_firewall) |
Rules and defaults checked in a container, idempotent, sshd port always opened. On GitHub-hosted Ubuntu 22.04 and 24.04 runners the role ran twice (the second run changed nothing), ufw came up active with deny-incoming and allow-outgoing and ports 22 and 8082 open, a port that was not opened was blocked from a container on the Docker bridge, and the job survived (CI run 40630611316). Before 0.1.2 the role failed on Ubuntu 24.04 when SSH hardening had not run (run 40466686432). Not tested: reboot persistence, IPv6, Docker published ports, SSH hardening together with the firewall |
| Helm, k3s, installing the charts | Not implemented yet |
Usage
cp inventory.example.ini inventory.ini # then list your server under [ragleap_servers]
echo 'ragleap_base_deploy_ssh_public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA... you@host"' > vars.yml
ansible-playbook -i inventory.ini playbooks/bootstrap.yml -e @vars.yml
Pass the key through a vars file or JSON. A plain -e name=value splits at spaces and would cut the key short, which the role now rejects.
The playbook targets only the group ragleap_servers, never localhost by default.
Hardening SSH (opt-in)
ragleap_base_harden_ssh: true turns off password logins and, by default, root logins without a key. It is off by default because a mistake can lock you out of the server.
- It needs
ragleap_base_deploy_ssh_public_key. The role refuses to run without one. - Keep one session open while you run it, and log in as the deploy user from a second terminal before closing the first.
ragleap_base_ssh_permit_root_logindefaults toprohibit-password. Set it tonoonly after switchingansible_userto the deploy user, or the next run cannot connect.- The change is a drop-in file,
/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-ragleap.conf. The whole configuration is checked withsshd -tbefore sshd is reloaded, and if the check fails the file is removed again.
Firewall (opt-in)
ragleap_base_enable_firewall: true installs ufw, denies incoming traffic by default, allows outgoing traffic, and opens the ports in ragleap_base_firewall_allow_tcp (for example [80, 443]).
- The ports sshd really listens on are always opened first, read from
sshd -T, so the firewall cannot block your own login. Without sshd the role opens 22. - Keep one session open while you run it, and test a new login before closing the first.
- k3s needs extra rules for its pod and service networks, which this version does not add.
- The role only adds rules. It never removes one, so a port opened earlier (for example an old ssh port) stays open until you remove it with ufw.
Tests
bash tests/container_test.sh # needs Docker; changes nothing on the host
Known limitations
- Ubuntu 22.04 is the target; the real-host runs also covered 24.04. Both were GitHub-hosted runners, which are disposable VMs; the CPU architecture was not recorded. No other host has been tried.
- A container cannot run systemd, sshd or a firewall, so those parts cannot be proven that way.
Metadata
Release files for ragleap-ansible 0.1.2
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ragleap_ansible-0.1.2.tar.gz | 8.8 kB | With provenance | Details for ragleap_ansible-0.1.2.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ragleap_ansible-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for ragleap_ansible-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 17.1 kB
Release files / ragleap_ansible-0.1.2.tar.gz
| Download URL | ragleap_ansible-0.1.2.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 8.8 kB |
| Tags | Source |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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| Download URL | ragleap_ansible-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl |
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| Size | 8.3 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
7f7387299f14b9c6882b9f7f84bf3220ba0afd67be057f69d6dff5ad1dd34bea
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Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
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Transparency logSecurity for ragleap-ansible 0.1.2
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