Many agents. One repo. No collisions.
raidlock locks the files each agent may change, enforces it at edit time across Claude Code, Codex and Gemini, and accepts work only after the tests pass in a sandbox and another provider reviews it.
🔒 File-level edit locks · ✅ Tested and cross-reviewed before done · ⚔️ Live raid board
Run Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, shell scripts and people on one board. Each piece of work is a card. Claiming a card leases the exact paths it may touch, and hooks refuse edits anywhere else. One lead closes cards, and only after a signed verify receipt exists for the commit and, on a mixed-provider board, a reviewer from another provider has approved. You can follow who is doing what in the terminal or in a raid-themed web UI.
Why
Run two coding agents on one repo and the same things go wrong: they overwrite each other's files, one says "tests pass" and nobody checks, and a stalled session keeps writing after someone else took over. raidlock prevents each of these:
- No overwrites. A card leases the exact paths an agent may change; the hooks refuse edits anywhere else, across every project and clone on your machine.
- No stale writers. When a card changes hands, the old owner's writes are refused.
- No unproven "done". Only the lead closes a card, and only after its check passed in a sandbox on that exact commit and, with mixed providers, an agent from another provider approved it.
- No off-board work. Every edit and every subagent needs a card first, so the board always shows who is doing what.
- Local and light. No server, no runtime dependencies; the Claude Code plugin adds about 190 tokens per session (benchmark).
How it compares
| Tool | Great at | What raidlock adds |
|---|---|---|
| claude-squad, ccmanager, vibe-kanban | running many agent sessions | raidlock doesn't run sessions; it coordinates whichever ones you run, and works alongside these |
| Claude Code agent teams | native Claude task lists and claims | enforcement on code paths, not just task claims, and it spans Claude, Codex and Gemini |
| beads | a dependency-aware issue graph for agents | path leases enforced at edit time, plus a verify-and-review gate |
| mcp_agent_mail | rich agent messaging and file reservations | lead-only done with signed receipts and cross-provider review |
More detail: Overview.
Install with your agent
Paste this into Claude Code, Codex or another terminal coding agent:
Install or update raidlock by following
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/agi1clj/raidlock/main/AGENT_INSTALL.md
The agent installs or upgrades to the latest release, adds the Claude Code plugin, runs raid doctor, creates a board and explains the board-first rule back to you. It never reads the lead secret.
Install by hand
uv tool install raidlock # or: pipx install raidlock
raid doctor
In Claude Code, add the plugin (hooks, skill and the raid-worker agent):
/plugin marketplace add agi1clj/raidlock
/plugin install raidlock@raidlock
Needs Python 3.11 or newer on Linux or macOS. On Windows, use WSL2 (expected to work, not yet tested). Codex and MCP setup: Install.
Quickstart
Lead terminal:
mkdir -p ~/demo/shop && cd ~/demo/shop
raid quickstart --demo # a board, a demo repo acme-shop/, and you as the lead
LEAD_SECRET_FILE="<the path it printed>"
raid --lead-secret "$LEAD_SECRET_FILE" new "Reject empty carts" --id checkout \
--locks acme-shop/src/checkout --verify-cmd "python3 -m unittest"
Worker terminal:
cd ~/demo/shop/acme-shop
raid up --join --agent worker-1 --card checkout --runtime human # then run the source line it prints
raid claim checkout --checkout "$PWD" # then paste the two export lines
raid ui --open # http://127.0.0.1:8765
worker-1 now holds acme-shop/src/checkout, and any other agent editing there is refused. Getting started finishes the card: edit, commit, review, verify, done.
How coordination works
One lead, many agents, one project. The lead splits work into cards with narrow, disjoint locks. Each worker claims one, posts notes and hands it back to review. The lead verifies and closes it:
raid --lead-secret "$LEAD_SECRET_FILE" new "Paginate orders" --id orders \
--locks acme-shop/src/orders --verify-cmd "python3 -m unittest"
raid claim orders --checkout "$PWD" # worker
raid note orders "pagination added; tests pass" # worker; renews the lease
raid --lead-secret "$LEAD_SECRET_FILE" msg --to worker-1 --card orders "keep page size at 50"
raid move orders review --note "python3 -m unittest: 9 passed" # worker
raid --lead-secret "$LEAD_SECRET_FILE" verify orders # signed receipt on the commit
raid --lead-secret "$LEAD_SECRET_FILE" done orders
Many projects. Each workspace has its own .board/, and every board registers in one lease index under ~/.raidlock. A path locked from one workspace is locked in all of them. raid ui shows every workspace on its realm page, with tabs for Guilds, Tavern chatter and Treasury.
Many sessions. Separate Claude Code or Codex sessions join the same board with raid up --join, each in its own clone or worktree. Leases map through the git remote, so every checkout of a repo shares one lock space.
Mixed providers. When an agent from a second provider joins, raidlock turns on the verify gate and the cross-provider review gate and records the change. Values you set yourself with raid config set are kept.
Board-first enforcement, on by default. The Claude Code hooks deny edits outside the card you hold, and that includes the lead: a lead edit inside a git repo needs a card the lead holds (require_card_for_lead_edits). A Task or Agent launch is denied unless its prompt names an open card as card <id> (board_first_subagents). Turn either off with raid --lead-secret FILE config set <key> off. The git commit guard checks other agents' leases either way.
Full version: Orchestration.
Two ways to run agents
| Workstreams | Sandboxed agents | |
|---|---|---|
| What | Sessions you run yourself: Claude Code, Codex, you | raid delegate CARD --to codex|claude|gemini|shell runs an agent CLI for you |
| Where | Your own clone or worktree; claim with raid claim CARD --checkout "$PWD" |
A throwaway clone with no remote and a cleared environment |
| Guard | Lease, edit hooks, git guards | Lease, a diff check against the card's locks and a secret scan; the lead applies the returned patch |
| Cleanup | Yours | The clone is deleted on done, close or cancel; logs and the patch stay |
Use a workstream for a session you watch, and raid delegate for unattended or less trusted runs. Details: Workstreams and sandboxed agents.
Features
| Feature | Guide |
|---|---|
| Path leases with expiry and fencing, across clones, worktrees and workspaces | Concepts |
| Board-first hooks, git pre-commit and pre-push guards, runner diff | Hooks |
| Lead-only done, signed verify receipts, cross-provider review | Verification |
raid delegate and raid land (apply, verify and hand back a delegated patch in one command), raid next routing on plan headroom, raid duel, raid resume, opt-in raid resurrect |
Orchestration |
Import a checklist or a spec tool's tasks.md, lock suggestions, merge-conflict foresight, a lessons vault |
Planning |
| Pull requests from a verified commit; merged PRs close cards through the gates | Pull requests |
| Spend per card, model, agent and day; delegation budgets | Operations |
Live web UI on 127.0.0.1: Needs you first, quest log, chatter, cost, dependency graph, lease map, replay, a first-run tour |
Web UI |
| Notification bell across every project (rings, desktop alerts) and an in-app notice when a new release is out | Web UI, Upgrade |
CLI with --json and stable exit codes; an MCP server that never acts as lead |
Commands, MCP |
Optional hardened container image for raid ui, raid mcp and sandboxed verify |
Docker |
Gemini runs only through raid delegate --to gemini, and that adapter is tested against recorded events, not a live Gemini CLI.
Documentation
- Start: Install, Getting started, Concepts
- Run a board: Lead playbook, Worker rules, Claude Code plus Codex, Orchestration
- Reference: Commands, Protocol, Hooks, Verification, Web UI, MCP server
- More: Planning, Operations, Agent Teams and Codex hooks, Docker image, Overview, FAQ and alternatives, Examples
If you are an agent, start with skills/raidlock/SKILL.md.
Why "raid"
Running several agents feels like leading a raid in an MMO such as World of Warcraft: a raid leader assigns the party, each member holds a role, big quests become bosses, and nobody loots until the boss is down. raidlock borrows that vocabulary for the web UI (guilds, quests, raid frames, boss board, feats). The CLI and the docs use plain terms. raidlock is not affiliated with or endorsed by Blizzard Entertainment.
Security
raidlock keeps cooperating agents out of each other's way. It is not a sandbox. Tokens, the lead secret and the verify signing key are files under your user account, readable by any process running as you. raid verify runs only under bubblewrap on Linux or sandbox-exec on macOS. The UI listens on 127.0.0.1 and answers GET only. Threat model and reporting: SECURITY.md. Limits: Security and limits.
Contributing
See CONTRIBUTING.md and the Code of Conduct.
License
MIT. The web UI bundles the Cinzel font under the SIL Open Font License 1.1. raidlock is an independent project, not affiliated with or endorsed by Anthropic, OpenAI or Google. Claude, Codex and Gemini are trademarks of their respective owners.
Metadata
Release files for raidlock 0.2.3
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Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
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| raidlock-0.2.3.tar.gz | 13.8 MB | With provenance | Details for raidlock-0.2.3.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| raidlock-0.2.3-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for raidlock-0.2.3-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 14.2 MB
Release files / raidlock-0.2.3.tar.gz
| Download URL | raidlock-0.2.3.tar.gz |
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| Size | 13.8 MB |
| Tags | Source |
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