Burrow SDK for Python
Read secrets from a self-hosted RatelKey Burrow with a machine identity.
- Single and structured secrets, and individual fields of a structured secret.
- The machine's own access map (
list_projects,list_secrets). - Certificate pinning, or standard CA trust (
TlsMode). - Live secrets that follow every change on the Burrow (
live,live_environment). - An encrypted copy of each read that answers when the Burrow can't be reached (
cache_enabled). - Certificates from a dynamic certificate secret, such as SSH logins, for a key made in memory (
get_certificate,live_certificate). - An OIDC token instead of a key (
Burrow.oidc).
Requirements
- Python 3.9+.
- One dependency:
cryptography(Ed25519 signing, the certificate pin, and the cache's encryption).
Install
pip install ratelkey-burrow-sdk
Bootstrap a machine
From the Burrow dashboard, Machines → Add machine, and run the install it gives you on the target host.
The identity lands at ~/.burrow/burrows/<slug>/identity.json.
Quick start
from ratelkey_burrow import Burrow
# The single machine identity on this host (under ~/.burrow, or $BURROW_HOME).
burrow = Burrow()
# A single-value secret:
api_key = burrow.get_secret("payments/prod/API_KEY").value
# A structured secret — one read, projected locally (no re-fetch):
db = burrow.get_secret("payments/prod/DATABASE")
everything = db.to_dict() # every field as name -> value
host = db.get_field("host") # one field
user, password = db.get_fields("username", "password") # in order
# What this machine can read:
for p in burrow.list_projects():
print(p.project, p.categories)
Point it at a specific identity by selector or path:
Burrow("burrow-a1b2c3d4e5f60718") # slug / name / machine id / URL
Burrow("/home/you/.burrow/burrows/burrow-a1b2c3d4e5f60718") # path (a burrow dir or identity.json)
Without ~/.burrow
For an app that manages its own key material:
import os
from ratelkey_burrow import Burrow
burrow = Burrow.connect(
burrow_url="https://burrow.internal:12010",
machine_id="...",
private_key_pem=os.environ["BURROW_MACHINE_KEY"], # PKCS#8 PEM
)
Live secrets
A live handle holds a secret's current value and follows every change on the Burrow as it happens.
db = burrow.live("payments/prod/DATABASE")
db.get_field("password") # always the current value
db.on_change(lambda next, prev: pool.reconnect(next))
burrow.live_environment("payments/prod") does the same for a whole environment: env.get("API_KEY"), and
on_change receives what changed, was added or was removed.
- The call returns after the first read. A missing secret or grant is refused there.
- All live handles on a client share one connection on a background thread. It reconnects on its own and re-reads anything that changed while it was down.
statusislive,reconnecting,revoked(access was taken away) orremoved(deleted on the Burrow). The last two are final, and the handle keeps its last value.- Listeners run on the SDK's threads. One that raises is reported to
on_error. burrow.close()closes every handle.- Needs a Burrow with live updates; an older one is refused at
live().
Fallback cache
The fallback cache keeps a copy of each secret the client reads, and answers with it when your Burrow can't be reached. It's off until you turn it on:
burrow = Burrow().cache_enabled(True)
Without cache_enabled, Burrow() uses the cache when ratel cache enable turned it on for the machine, and
cache_enabled(False) keeps it off. With Burrow.connect, it needs a pin_store_dir to keep the copies in.
Burrow.enroll and Burrow.oidc can't use it.
A read uses the cache only when it fails because your Burrow can't be reached or can't answer. A secret answered from the cache says when its copy was saved:
key = burrow.get_secret("payments/prod/API_KEY")
if key.cached_at:
log.warning("using the copy saved at %s", key.cached_at)
A live secret or environment doesn't answer from the cache. While your Burrow can't be reached it keeps the value it last read, and each read it makes keeps the copies up to date. When your Burrow refuses a read, because the machine was removed or disabled, lost access, or the secret is gone, the read fails as usual and the refused copies are deleted. A dynamic secret's login comes back as it was saved, so it may have expired.
Certificates
A dynamic certificate secret, such as an SSH user secret, gives each machine that asks a short-lived certificate of its own. The SDK makes a new Ed25519 key in memory for each one and sends only its public half.
login = burrow.get_certificate("api/prod/DEPLOY_SSH")
login.private_key # the OpenSSH private key
login.certificate # its certificate (ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com ...)
login.principals # the logins it signs in as
login.host # where the secret says to connect, or None
login.valid_before # when it stops being accepted (UTC)
Hand the key and certificate to your SSH library, or write them to id_ed25519 (mode 600) and
id_ed25519-cert.pub for ssh -i. validity=timedelta(minutes=5) (or a number of seconds) asks for one that lasts
less than the secret allows.
live_certificate keeps one current:
login = burrow.live_certificate("api/prod/DEPLOY_SSH")
login.current # the certificate and key to use now
login.on_change(lambda next, prev: connections.use_key(next))
login.renew() # a new one at once, e.g. after a host refused it
- It renews once two thirds of the certificate's time have passed, and as soon as the secret's settings change. Each renewal makes a new key.
- Revoking one certificate from the dashboard sends no event;
renew()gets a new one. get_secreton a certificate secret raisesBurrowServerError(409) namingget_certificate.
In-memory identity
Enroll with a machine token's code. The key is generated in memory and never written to disk; the code sets how the Burrow's certificate is trusted.
import os
from ratelkey_burrow import Burrow
with Burrow.enroll(os.environ["BURROW_ENROLL_CODE"]) as burrow:
api_key = burrow.get_secret("payments/prod/API_KEY").value
The machine is enrolled on the first read. Shortly before it expires, the SDK enrolls a fresh one with the same code and retires the old one. close() (or leaving the with block) expires the machine at once.
Burrow() enrolls from BURROW_ENROLL_CODE when the host has no identity under ~/.burrow. A one-time invitation code is refused; use a machine token.
OIDC
import os
from ratelkey_burrow import Burrow
burrow = Burrow.oidc(
burrow_url="https://burrow.example.com",
fingerprint=os.environ.get("BURROW_FINGERPRINT"), # omit for a publicly-trusted certificate
)
api_key = burrow.get_secret("payments/prod/API_KEY").value
audience defaults to burrow_url. GitHub Actions requires permissions: id-token: write. GitLab CI/CD (gitlab.com) requires the job to declare its token as RATEL_ID_TOKEN:
id_tokens:
RATEL_ID_TOKEN:
aud: https://burrow.example.com
Bitbucket Pipelines requires the step to list the Burrow as an OIDC audience:
- step:
oidc:
audiences:
- https://burrow.example.com
Certificate trust
from ratelkey_burrow import Burrow, TlsMode
burrow = Burrow(tls=TlsMode.SystemTrust)
Without an explicit tls, the SDK uses the trust chosen when the machine was added: encrypted by default (works everywhere), or verified against the Burrow's own key or a CA if that was selected.
TlsMode.Pinned— trust-on-first-use, stored at~/.burrow/burrows/<slug>/known_cert.TlsMode.PinnedTo("aa:bb:...")— a fixed fingerprint (from the Burrow's network settings).TlsMode.SystemTrust— CA + hostname verification, for a Burrow on a custom domain or Let's Encrypt.TlsMode.Insecure— no verification; accepts any certificate. Opt-in only, for a network you already trust. Shortcut:Burrow().insecure_tls(True).
Webhooks
Verify a delivery from a Burrow's Signed webhook. Needs only the webhook's signing secret, not a machine identity.
import os
from flask import Flask, request
from ratelkey_burrow import verify_webhook
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.post("/hooks/burrow")
def burrow_hook():
event = verify_webhook(request.get_data(), request.headers, os.environ["BURROW_WEBHOOK_SECRET"])
print(event.event, event.data.summary)
return "", 204
Pass the raw body, before JSON parsing (request.body in Django). A retry of the same event carries the same event.id, so keep the ids you've handled to ignore repeats.
Errors
Every failure is a BurrowError: BurrowAuthError (401), BurrowForbiddenError (403, no grant),
BurrowNotFoundError (404), BurrowServerError (5xx, or 409 when a secret refuses the request),
BurrowCertificateError (pin mismatch),
BurrowTransportError (unreachable / unparsable), BurrowIdentityError (no/ambiguous/invalid identity),
plus two projection errors on the result handle — SecretShapeError (e.g. .value on a structured secret)
and FieldNotFoundError. The message carries the Burrow's own reason. verify_webhook raises
BurrowWebhookError for a missing or wrong signature.
Metadata
Release files for ratelkey-burrow-sdk 1.4.0
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