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mcp-redteam

It doesn't tell you where your walls are thin. It walks through them.

Tests PyPI License: MIT OWASP MCP Top 10 Claude Code Plugin Python 3.10+ Downloads


I build MCP connectors and AI automation for businesses. 70+ connectors deployed across client projects. Some of them started acting up — dropping connections, config conflicts, servers I forgot to remove still sitting in config eating resources.

Went looking for something to audit this. Found mcp-scan — only reads tool descriptions, doesn't touch source code. Cisco's scanner — 78% false positives. Nothing that actually reads the server code and says "line 42, you have exec() with unsanitized input."

Built my own. Ran it on 106 public MCP servers. 7 had remote code execution. One of them had 25K GitHub stars.

Open-sourced because if my connectors had these problems, so do yours.


Two modes of operation:

  • Claude Code plugin — reads source code, probes tools, detects behavioral mismatches, maps cross-server attack chains. Interactive HTML report.
  • Standalone CLI — deterministic scan. 25 Semgrep rules + 6 config health checks, SARIF output. Works in CI/CD without Claude.

What works today

Feature Status How
Config health scanner Working Dead servers, scope conflicts, credential exposure, supply chain, CVE checks
Semgrep code analysis Working 25 rules (Python + JS/TS): injection, traversal, SSRF, eval, secrets, stdout
SARIF output Working GitHub Security tab integration
JSON output Working Machine-readable for CI/CD
Terminal output Working Rich colored tables with risk scores
CI exit codes Working --fail-on critical returns exit 1
LLM behavioral analysis Working Anthropic SDK, behavioral mismatch detection (optional)
Self-security audit Working 10 vulnerabilities audited — 8 fixed, 1 mitigated, 1 accepted
Claude Code plugin Working AI-driven deep audit with HTML report
HTML report output Working --format html generates self-contained terminal-styled report
177 tests Passing Unit, security, stress, edge cases, Hypothesis fuzzing
Audit history Working JSONL baseline storage, cross-run comparison (new/confirmed/fixed)

What doesn't work yet

  • Cross-server chain detection in CLI (exists in Claude Code plugin only)
  • Auto-fix in CLI (exists in Claude Code plugin only)
  • MCPTox benchmark validation
  • Community rule contributions

Install

Claude Code plugin (deep AI-native audit):

# Clone to your projects directory
git clone https://github.com/m0rvayne/mcp-redteam.git
cd mcp-redteam

# The CLAUDE.md file activates as a skill automatically
# From any project with MCP servers connected:
/mcp-redteam

Standalone CLI (deterministic, CI/CD ready):

pip install redteam-mcp
mcp-redteam scan ./your-mcp-server --no-llm

Remote MCP server (via URL, OAuth or token):

pip install 'redteam-mcp[remote]'
mcp-redteam scan-remote https://your-server.com/mcp --token <bearer>

Requires Python 3.10+. Semgrep installed separately for code analysis: pip install semgrep.

CI/CD Integration

Add to your GitHub Actions workflow:

# .github/workflows/mcp-security.yml
name: MCP Security Scan
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      security-events: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: m0rvayne/mcp-redteam@v0.4.1
        with:
          path: ./your-mcp-server
          fail-on: critical

Results appear in GitHub's Security tab. See action.yml for all options.

More examples:

# HTML report
mcp-redteam scan ./server --format html -o report.html

# Fail CI on critical findings
mcp-redteam scan ./server --fail-on critical --format sarif -o results.sarif

# Generate shields.io security badge
mcp-redteam badge ./your-server

# Use a different LLM model for behavioral analysis
MCP_REDTEAM_MODEL=claude-haiku-4-5 mcp-redteam scan ./server

Example

$ mcp-redteam scan ./my-mcp-server --no-llm

Phase 0: Config validation...
  2 config issues found
Phase 1: Semgrep analysis...
  5 code findings

┌──────────┬────────┬───────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┐
│ Severity │ Rule   │ File:Line         │ Title                            │
├──────────┼────────┼───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
│ CRITICAL │ MRT001 │ server.py:42      │ Shell Injection                  │
│ HIGH     │ MRT002 │ handlers.py:15    │ Path Traversal                   │
│ HIGH     │ MRT003 │ api.py:88         │ SSRF                             │
│ MEDIUM   │ MRT012 │ .mcp.json         │ Unpinned Package                 │
│ MEDIUM   │ MRT010 │ settings.json     │ Scope Conflict                   │
└──────────┴────────┴───────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────┘

7 findings (1 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 0 low)
Risk score: 60/100

What it checks

Config Health (deterministic)

Dead/disconnected servers, scope conflicts (same server in multiple scopes), credentials in git-tracked config files (CVE-2025-59536), unpinned npx/uvx packages (supply chain), enableAllProjectMcpServers bypass (CVE-2026-21852), orphaned MCP processes.

Code Security (Semgrep, 25 rules)

Rule What it detects Languages
Shell injection subprocess + shell=True with user input Python
Path traversal open()/Path() without realpath check Python, JS/TS
SSRF HTTP requests with user-controlled URL Python, JS/TS
Eval injection eval()/exec()/new Function() with user input Python, JS/TS
Hardcoded secrets API keys, tokens, passwords in source Python, JS/TS
Stdout pollution print()/console.log() in stdio handlers Python, JS/TS
Missing error handling Tool functions without try/catch Python, JS/TS
Credential in response API keys/tokens in tool return values Python, JS/TS
Missing signal handler Server without SIGTERM/SIGINT Python
Blocking sync calls requests.get() inside async functions Python
OAuth over-privilege Excessive OAuth scopes (gmail.modify, admin) Python
No timeout on HTTP httpx/requests/fetch without timeout Python, JS/TS
No timeout on subprocess subprocess/spawn without timeout Python, JS/TS
Dangerous parameter names Tool params named cmd, exec, eval, code JS/TS
Env secrets without rotation API keys from os.getenv used directly Python

Based on 48+ CVEs, OWASP MCP Top 10, and research from Invariant Labs, Trail of Bits, Palo Alto Unit 42, OX Security, and Snyk.

LLM Behavioral Analysis (optional, requires API key)

  • Behavioral mismatch: tool description claims X, code does Y
  • Hidden operations: undeclared network requests, file writes, subprocess calls
  • Credential mishandling: secrets logged, leaked in errors, stored insecurely

How it compares

mcp-scan (Invariant Labs) Cisco MCP Scanner mcp-redteam
Approach Static description scan YARA + LLM-as-judge Semgrep taint + LLM behavioral
Reads source code No Python only Yes — Python + JS/TS
Config validation No Config discovery Yes — 6 checks, CVE detection
Behavioral mismatch No No Yes (LLM layer)
SARIF output No No Yes
CI exit codes Yes No Yes
Self-tested Unknown Unknown 177 tests, self-security audit
Cloud dependency Invariant Labs API Cisco API (optional) No — fully local in deterministic mode. LLM mode uses Anthropic API

Why not just use mcp-scan?

mcp-scan reads what a server says about itself — tool descriptions. mcp-redteam checks what a server actually does — source code analysis + behavioral analysis.

A server with clean descriptions but leaky code: mcp-scan passes it. We catch it.

Real findings mcp-scan cannot detect (they live in code, not descriptions):

  • Trello API keys in .env committed to git
  • Instagram session cookies stored in plaintext
  • AppleScript injection via unescaped clipboard input
  • Google OAuth tokens with permissions 644

Audit History

Each scan saves a JSONL baseline to ~/.mcp-redteam/baselines/. Subsequent runs compare results and classify findings as new, confirmed, or fixed — turning LLM non-determinism into an advantage.

Architecture

 /mcp-redteam
      |
 +-----------------+
 | Phase 0: Config |
 +-----------------+
      |
 +-----------+
 | Discovery |
 +-----------+
      |
      |   1 server = 1 agent
      |
 +----------+ +----------+ +----------+ +----------+
 | Agent-01 | | Agent-02 | | Agent-03 | | Agent-N  |
 | youtube  | | trello   | | instagram| | server-N |
 | health   | | health   | | health   | | health   |
 | arch     | | arch     | | arch     | | arch     |
 | complete | | complete | | complete | | complete |
 | security | | security | | security | | security |
 +----+-----+ +----+-----+ +----+-----+ +----+-----+
      |            |            |            |
      +------+-----+-----+------+
             |
 +-------------------------+
 | Chain analysis + report |
 +-------------------------+
             |
    +----------------+
    | HTML + Fix     |
    +----------------+

Tests

177 tests across 13 test files:

  • test_semgrep.py — each vulnerable fixture detected, each benign fixture clean
  • test_self_security.py — 21 tests: our own code audited for vulnerabilities
  • test_stress.py — 1000/10000 findings, concurrent scans, unicode
  • test_fuzzing.py — Hypothesis property-based: any input, no crash
  • test_edge_cases.py — corrupt JSON, missing files, null bytes, timeouts
  • test_models.py + test_formatters.py — unit tests for core logic
  • test_cli.py — 11 tests: CLI argument parsing, output formats, exit codes
  • test_config_scanner.py — 13 tests: config health checks, scope conflicts, credential detection

Current Limitations

  • Plugin requires Claude Code with connected MCP servers
  • CLI requires semgrep for code analysis (graceful skip if not installed)
  • LLM analysis requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
  • Destructive tests intentionally skipped — read-only probing only
  • Source code analysis works for local servers; pip/npm packages may have limited access
  • Plugin report quality scales with model capability (Opus > Sonnet > Haiku)
  • False positive rate not yet measured on production MCP servers

Known False Positive Patterns

  • SSRF rule triggers on httpx.get() with URL built from config, not user input
  • Path traversal rule triggers on open() where path is validated but validation isn't recognized as sanitizer
  • Stdout pollution flags print() in __main__ block (safe, not in MCP handler)

Docs

The docs/ folder is useful independently:

References

License

MIT

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