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replayguard

A determinism checker for AWS Lambda durable functions.

Durable functions re-run your handler from the top on every resume. Completed steps aren't re-executed; the SDK returns the checkpointed result and the handler fast-forwards back to where it suspended. This only works if the handler takes the same path every time, and AWS's docs are explicit about whose job that is:

Any code that is not inside a durable operation must be a pure function of the handler inputs and the results of completed operations.

No clocks, no randomness, no I/O, no writes to shared state outside a step(). Nothing enforces this. Break the rule and nothing throws, your tests stay green, and the bug surfaces whenever the workflow next resumes. An execution can suspend for up to 366 days, so that can be months later, in production. AWS's docs name double-charging as a possible consequence.

replayguard checks the rule two ways: statically, by analyzing handler source in Python, TypeScript, Java, and Rust, and dynamically, by running a handler twice under different clocks and diffing what it did.

Status

v0.1.0. Validated against 1,547 files of durable-function code written by other people; VALIDATION.md records what that established and what it didn't.

Two known gaps. Calls aren't followed across files, so a handler that reaches another module for its I/O passes clean. And three of the six rules have working detectors but no confirmed real-world finding yet, because published example code doesn't contain the mistakes they catch.

Reports from real codebases are the most useful thing anyone can contribute right now, in either direction: a finding it caught, or a false positive it shouldn't have raised.

Install

pip install replayguard

TypeScript, Java, and Rust need a parser:

pip install 'replayguard[all]'

Use

replayguard check src/
replayguard check src/ --explain
replayguard check src/ --format sarif -o replayguard.sarif

Exits non-zero when anything at or above --fail-on (default error) is found, so it can gate a build without extra wiring.

tests/fixtures/python/bad_handler.py
    25:17  error   RG001  `time.time` runs outside a durable step
    37:14  error   RG002  external I/O `requests.get` runs outside a durable step
    53:8   error   RG003  step body writes to a captured variable `receipts`
    43:7   error   RG004  branch condition depends on `datetime.datetime.now`
    68:4   error   RG005  `step` name is built from `time.time`
    71:17  note    RG900  could not resolve whether this code runs inside a step

In CI

SARIF output means findings render inline on the pull request that introduced them:

- uses: amrutp24/replayguard@v1
  with:
    path: src/

The job needs permissions: security-events: write for the annotations. Set fail-on: never to annotate without blocking the merge.

There is also a pre-commit hook:

- repo: https://github.com/amrutp24/replayguard
  rev: v0.1.0
  hooks:
    - id: replayguard

Rules

ID What it catches Why it breaks replay
RG001 Clock, random, or identity source outside a step Produces a different value on replay; everything derived from it diverges
RG002 Network or filesystem access outside a step Diverges, and repeats the side effect on every replay
RG003 A step body writing to state it doesn't own The write lands on the first run and is skipped on replay, so the outer state silently reverts
RG004 Control flow depending on a nondeterministic value Replay can take the other branch, so the operation sequence no longer matches the journal
RG005 A step name built from an unstable source Checkpoints match by name and order; a changed name can't be matched, so the step re-executes
RG900 Code whose region couldn't be resolved Not a violation. A coverage gap, reported so a clean run means something

replayguard rules --explain prints the rationale for each.

Language support

Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, and Java are the three runtimes with an official AWS durable execution SDK. Rust has no official SDK; the frontend targets pgdad/durable-rust, whose own documentation says its determinism rules are documented rather than enforced. Go and .NET have community proofs of concept only and are out of scope for now.

Runtime Parser
Python stdlib ast
TypeScript / JavaScript tree-sitter
Java tree-sitter
Rust tree-sitter

The SDKs differ in shape, not just syntax:

Handler Step
Python @durable_execution context.step(fn, name="x")
JS/TS withDurableExecution(fn) context.step("x", fn)
Java extends DurableHandler<,> ctx.step("x", Result.class, fn)
Rust param typed *Context ctx.step("x", || async { .. })

The step body sits in a different argument position in each, and Java has a two-argument overload besides, so bodies are located by kind rather than by position. Everything lowers to one shared IR and the rules are written once, with no knowledge of which language they're inspecting.

The semantic differences that matter are handled per-frontend, and RG003 is where they show up:

  • Python: a bare x = 1 in a nested function creates a local binding, so it can never be an outer write. Only mutation and global/nonlocal reach out.
  • JavaScript: the same assignment writes straight through to the enclosing scope, so RG003 has more ways to fire.
  • Java: captured locals must be effectively final, so reassigning one is a compile error and that violation class can't exist. What remains is collection mutation and field writes.
  • Rust: the narrowest of the four. Step closures are Send + 'static, so capturing a borrowed reference doesn't compile. What's left is interior mutability through a shared handle, like an Arc<Mutex<_>> locked and pushed to, or a static mut.

Design

source ──▶ frontend ──▶ IR ──▶ rules ──▶ findings ──▶ reporter
           (per-lang)  (shared) (shared)              text/json/sarif

This is AST analysis, not pattern matching, because the questions need scope resolution: RG003 has to know whether a mutated name belongs to the step body or an enclosing scope, and RG004 has to know whether a branch condition derives from a nondeterministic source. Neither can be answered by matching source text.

False positives get particular attention, since a linter that fires on correct code gets uninstalled. RG005 ignores computed step names unless they interpolate something genuinely unstable (`item-${index}` is the pattern AWS recommends), and RG900 reports unresolved regions instead of silently passing them.

What it doesn't do

Calls are not followed across file boundaries. Within a file they are, and findings name the route, but a handler that calls into another module for its I/O will pass clean. This is the largest known blind spot.

Static analysis also can't see nondeterminism inside a third-party library, data tainted several hops back, iteration order over an unordered collection, or concurrent completion order. Some of that the dynamic half can catch.

Dynamic replay-divergence

The static rules reason about what code might do. The dynamic harness runs the handler twice, once normally and once with the clock moved and entropy reseeded, and diffs the operation journals:

replayguard replay app.orders:handler --event '{"orderId": "A1"}'
replay-divergence: 1 divergence(s) found.

  operation 0: operation name changed -- checkpoints match by name
    control   : step(op-1787442395)
    perturbed : step(op-1787489626)

Or as an assertion next to the handler, so a determinism regression fails the build instead of surfacing on a resume months later:

from replayguard.dynamic import assert_deterministic

def test_handler_is_deterministic():
    assert_deterministic(handler, {"orderId": "A1"})

The harness needs no rule for the source of nondeterminism. A clock inside a library, an iteration order, a value tainted many hops back: it measures the effect, not the cause. On 51 AWS conformance handlers it produced zero false alarms; on a handler whose step order comes from random.sample, which no static rule covers, it diverges.

It can't prove determinism, only fail to disprove it, and the report says so. Handlers that suspend on a callback can't be checked locally.

Validation

VALIDATION.md records what has been tested against whose code: which rules have confirmed real-world findings, which are still unproven, the false positives that were found and fixed, and the bugs the validation found in the tool itself. Read it before relying on a clean run.

Developing

pip install -e ".[dev]"
python scripts/verify.py

verify.py runs five gates: import, lint, tests with a coverage floor, the CLI's exit codes and output formats, and a canary asserting the known-good fixtures produce zero findings in every language. The canary matters most; a false positive is a worse failure here than a missed bug.

Prior art

Temporal's workflowcheck does this for Temporal workflows, so the category is proven; it just didn't exist for AWS's primitive. durable-viz statically analyses durable handlers to draw flowcharts, but performs no validation.

License

MIT

Metadata

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