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revsec-sdk

Check each tool call your Python agent makes against your organization's RevSec policies before the tool runs, and record what happened. A blocked call raises RevsecBlocked and the tool body never executes.

Works with any Python function: a tool in your own agent loop, a tool you register with an agent framework, or a handler in your own MCP server. It can also check every call your agent makes to an MCP server, and register the agent itself, so it is listed under Agents and its calls follow its approval (see Register your agent).

Quick start: a blocked tool call in 15 minutes

You need:

  • Python 3.9 or newer.
  • Your RevSec SDK key: an organization API key for your RevSec organization (see Which key).
  • Access to the RevSec console for that organization, with a role that can create policies.

1. Install (1 minute)

pip install revsec-sdk

2. Point the SDK at RevSec (1 minute)

export REVSEC_API_KEY="<your SDK key>"
export REVSEC_BASE_URL="https://revsec.revt2d.com/fcc"

REVSEC_BASE_URL is the RevSec address followed by /fcc, with nothing after it.

3. Guard two tools (3 minutes)

Save this as quickstart.py:

import os
import uuid

from revsec import mcp
from revsec.mcp import RevsecBlocked

mcp.configure(
    api_key=os.environ["REVSEC_API_KEY"],
    base_url=os.environ["REVSEC_BASE_URL"],
)
mcp.set_session(str(uuid.uuid4()))  # groups this run's calls in RevSec


@mcp.guard(server="quickstart-agent", tool="lookup_order")
def lookup_order(order_id: str) -> dict:
    return {"order_id": order_id, "status": "delivered"}


@mcp.guard(server="quickstart-agent", tool="refund_order")
def refund_order(order_id: str, amount: float) -> dict:
    return {"order_id": order_id, "refunded": amount}


for name, call in [
    ("lookup_order", lambda: lookup_order("A-1001")),
    ("refund_order", lambda: refund_order("A-1001", 25.0)),
]:
    try:
        print(f"{name:13} allowed  {call()}")
    except RevsecBlocked as blocked:
        print(f"{name:13} BLOCKED  by '{blocked.decision.policy_name}'; the tool did not run")

server names the group the tools belong to (here, your agent). tool is the name policies match on.

4. Run it: both calls are allowed and recorded (1 minute)

python quickstart.py
lookup_order  allowed  {'order_id': 'A-1001', 'status': 'delivered'}
refund_order  allowed  {'order_id': 'A-1001', 'refunded': 25.0}

In the RevSec console, open MCP → Inventory. quickstart-agent is listed as Shadow (nobody has approved it yet). Open it; its Activity tab shows both calls.

5. Block the refund tool (5 minutes)

In the RevSec console:

  1. Open MCP → Policies and click Create Policy.
  2. Name: Block refunds (quick start).
  3. Enforcement: choose Enforce. Action on match: block.
  4. Under Target scope, add a Tool name regex pattern: ^refund_order$.
  5. Click Create policy.

6. Run it again: the refund is blocked (1 minute)

python quickstart.py
lookup_order  allowed  {'order_id': 'A-1001', 'status': 'delivered'}
refund_order  BLOCKED  by 'Block refunds (quick start)'; the tool did not run

The blocked call is listed under MCP → Violations. To undo, switch the policy off on MCP → Policies.

If refund_order is still allowed

  • The SDK printed RevSec refused the API key. The key is wrong for this address, so nothing is being checked and every call is allowed. See Which key.
  • The policy is in Monitor. Monitor records a violation but lets the call through. Edit the policy and choose Enforce.
  • REVSEC_BASE_URL is wrong. It must end in /fcc, without /api/v1. When RevSec can't be reached, the SDK allows the call (see When RevSec can't be reached).

If both calls are blocked in step 4

  • By Org posture · unapproved MCP server. Your organization lets only approved MCP servers run. Open MCP → Inventory, approve quickstart-agent, and run it again.

Register your agent

Register the agent once when it starts. RevSec lists it under Agents, in the same registry as every agent it finds, with what you declare: the models it uses, its tools and the data it can reach. Then pass its agent_id to every check, so its tool calls are tied to it and follow its approval.

import os

from revsec import agent, mcp

mcp.configure(api_key=os.environ["REVSEC_API_KEY"], base_url=os.environ["REVSEC_BASE_URL"])

me = agent.register(
    name="orders-agent",
    framework="langgraph",
    agent_type="tool_using_agent",
    autonomy="human_on_the_loop",
    models=["claude-sonnet-5-5"],
    tools=["lookup_order", "refund_order"],
    data_access=["orders"],
    owner_email="owner@yourcompany.com",
)
print(me.agent_id, me.status)   # e.g. "6f1c1f9e-…", "shadow"


@mcp.guard(server="orders-tools", tool="lookup_order", agent_id=me.agent_id)
def lookup_order(order_id: str) -> dict:
    ...
  • A new agent starts as Shadow, and an approval request is raised for it on the Agents page. Until someone approves it, its tool calls follow Agents → Enforcement posture: under Enforce they are blocked (Agent posture · agent not approved); under Monitor they run and are recorded. A quarantined or decommissioned agent is blocked under every posture.
  • Registering again with the same name and framework updates the same agent (its tools, models, data access and environment) and returns its current status. A different framework makes a second agent.
  • agent_type is one of single_agent (the default), sub_agent, multi_agent_orchestrator, tool_using_agent, coding_assistant, productivity_assistant. autonomy is one of human_in_the_loop (the default), human_on_the_loop, supervised, semi_autonomous, fully_autonomous, advisory_only. Agent policies match on these, so any other value is refused.
  • owner_email must be a person in your RevSec organization. Otherwise the agent is registered with no owner, and me.warnings says so (it is logged too).
  • agent_id must be the id register() returned. Anything else (the agent's name, a typo) is treated as an agent RevSec has no record of: blocked under Enforce (Agent posture · agent not registered), and the SDK logs a warning.
  • register() raises RegistrationFailed when RevSec refuses the key or the values, or can't be reached, so a mistake shows up at start-up rather than as unchecked tool calls. await agent.aregister(...) is the async form.

Which key

The SDK sends your key in the X-API-Key header (and, to register an agent, as Authorization: Bearer). RevSec accepts an organization API key there: the same kind of key the RevSec model gateway takes. Workspace keys that start with rsk_ are not accepted. With one, every call is allowed and the SDK logs RevSec refused the API key.

Keep the key in a secret store or an environment variable, never in code.

To check a different organization in the same process, pass api_key= to guard(), aguard(), evaluate() or scan_content(). The key decides the organization.

What the SDK calls

All calls go to REVSEC_BASE_URL with your key:

Request When
POST /api/v1/agent-security/sdk/register agent.register(), once at start-up. The key is sent as Authorization: Bearer. Timeout 10 s.
POST /api/v1/mcp-governance/evaluate Before each guarded call. Timeout 1.5 s.
PATCH /api/v1/mcp-governance/events/{id}/outcome After the tool returns, fails or is blocked. Timeout 1 s.
POST /api/v1/ai-data-flows/ingest Only when the content scan is on (dlp=True) or you call scan_content().

Async tools

Use @mcp.aguard for async def tools:

@mcp.aguard(server="internal-rag", tool="search_docs")
async def search_docs(query: str) -> dict:
    return {"results": [...]}

Positional and keyword arguments both reach RevSec by parameter name, so policies on arguments work however the tool is called. The wrapper keeps the tool's name, signature and docstring, which agent frameworks read to describe the tool to the model.

MCP servers your agent connects to

Wrap the MCP client your agent already uses, and every tool call it makes to that server is checked first. The server is reported the way RevSec recognises it, read from the connection: its address, the package it runs, and the name it gives itself. So it joins the server already on record (from a laptop, the gateway or another agent) instead of being listed twice. Only the package name is read from a launch command, never its arguments.

pip install "revsec-sdk[mcp]"
from mcp import ClientSession
from mcp.client.stdio import StdioServerParameters, stdio_client
from revsec import mcp_client

params = StdioServerParameters(command="npx", args=["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"])
async with stdio_client(params) as (read, write):
    async with mcp_client.guard(ClientSession(read, write), launch=params, agent_id=me.agent_id) as session:
        await session.initialize()
        await session.call_tool("create_issue", {"title": "Flaky test"})   # checked first

For a remote server pass url="https://…" instead of launch. agent_id is the id agent.register() returned: it links the server to your agent. A blocked call raises RevsecBlocked and never reaches the server; pass on_block="result" to get an error result that tells the model why instead.

When RevSec can't be reached

By default a call is allowed when RevSec can't be reached (fail open), so an outage never stops your agent. Change it for every call:

mcp.configure(api_key=os.environ["REVSEC_API_KEY"], failure_mode="fail_closed")

Without a setting, the SDK blocks only tools whose names start with a destructive verb (delete_, drop_, truncate_, exec_, rm_, destroy_, kill_) on servers outside a short list of well-known services, and allows everything else.

Scan what a tool sends out

Policies decide whether a tool may run. Set dlp=True to also scan the tool's input (the message, ticket or document it is about to send) for secrets and personal data, with the same data policies as the rest of RevSec. It is off by default: it adds one request per call and can newly block a write.

mcp.configure(api_key=os.environ["REVSEC_API_KEY"], dlp=True)


@mcp.aguard(server="slack", tool="post_message")
async def post_message(*, channel_id: str, text: str) -> dict:
    ...
# If `text` carries a secret a policy blocks, RevsecBlocked is raised
# before post_message runs: the payload never leaves your process.

A redact verdict on a write is treated as a block: RevSec returns the redacted text as one string, which can't be put back into the tool's structured arguments, so the write is withheld rather than sent with the secret in it. If the scan can't reach RevSec, the call goes ahead.

Scan any text yourself, for example a tool's response:

verdict = await mcp.scan_content(
    content=response_text, direction="inbound",
    server="slack", tool="get_channel_history",
)
if verdict.blocked:
    ...

Group a run into turns

set_session() groups one run's calls. Inside a run, set_turn() opens a turn: one thing the agent set out to do. Each guarded call is a step in the current turn.

mcp.set_session(str(uuid.uuid4()))

mcp.set_turn("Reconcile the overnight claims batch")
await fetch_ledger(...)        # step 1
await match_payments(...)      # step 2

mcp.set_turn("Post the reconciliation summary to Slack")
await post_message(...)        # step 1 of turn 2

The session id must be a UUID; another value is not kept. Write the turn as a short goal, not the prompt: it is stored as written, so keep secrets, customer data and prompt text out of it. It travels with the first call of the turn, so it costs no extra request. clear_turn() stops tagging steps.

Check without a decorator

decision = await mcp.evaluate(
    server="internal-rag",
    tool="delete_doc",
    args={"doc_id": "..."},
)
if not decision.allowed:
    raise PermissionError(decision.reason)

# After running the tool:
await mcp.record_outcome(
    event_id=decision.event_id,
    outcome="success",
    response_latency_ms=42,
)

What RevSec records

For every guarded call: the server and tool, the decision and the policy (and its version) that made it, the tool's arguments with long values shortened and secret-named fields (password, token, secret, api_key, key, authorization, auth, credential) masked, the outcome (success, error, timeout or blocked), how long the tool took and the size of its result.

Turn the SDK off

mcp.configure(api_key=..., enabled=False) allows every call without contacting RevSec.

License

Proprietary. RevUp AI, Inc.

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