Skip to main content

ringivo

The Python client for the Ringivo fax API: send a fax, read one, list them, cancel one, fetch its pages, manage your customers' fax accounts, register the webhooks that tell you what happened, and verify what arrives.

pip install ringivo

Python 3.10 or newer. Two runtime dependencies: httpx, and typing-extensions (4.10 or newer) on every supported interpreter — the generated types use TypedDict(closed=True), which no version of the standard library's typing carries.

There are two clients: Ringivo and AsyncRingivo. They take the same arguments and have the same methods; the async one awaits them. Pick the one that matches your program and do not mix them: each client's authentication refuses the other's transport rather than quietly sending your requests without a token, so an httpx.AsyncClient handed Ringivo's auth — or an httpx.Client handed AsyncRingivo's — raises NotImplementedError naming the reason.

Your base URL and your credential

There is no default host, and none is compiled in. Your provider gives you the API root, a client id, a client secret, and the id of the tenant your credential acts for; everything in this README uses https://api.yourprovider.example where yours goes.

with Ringivo(
    base_url="https://api.yourprovider.example",
    client_id="0198c4a1-1f2e-7a3b-9c40-5f6e7d8a9b01",
    client_secret="9tK2xr4mQ7vBnZ1sD5hL0pWfC8jY3aE6",
    tenant="0198c4a1-3d4e-7f50-a1b2-c3d4e5f6a7b8",
    scopes=["fax:read", "fax:write"],
) as client:
    ...

On the first call the client sends all of that in one request and gets back a bearer token that lasts about a quarter of an hour. It caches the token, mints a new one a minute before that one expires, and mints another if the platform ever refuses one — you never handle the token.

Ask for the scopes you need. The client refuses to construct without scopes=, and raises ValueError naming the fix: a request that asks for no scopes authorises nothing, so the platform refuses it — a 400 you would otherwise meet on your first call rather than on the line that caused it. Ask for more than your credential was granted and the extra is dropped rather than refused, as long as one scope survives, so a call can still fail later at the resource. The scopes this client's calls need are fax:read and fax:write for faxes, and fax-accounts:write for opening, changing or deleting a fax account — a reseller-tier scope, so a credential issued for one customer cannot hold it however it is asked for. The webhook calls need webhooks:read and webhooks:write, except on an endpoint scoped to one fax account: a fax:* token already reaches those.

A client that provisions accounts and then reads them asks for both:

with Ringivo(
    base_url="https://api.yourprovider.example",
    client_id="0198c4a1-1f2e-7a3b-9c40-5f6e7d8a9b01",
    client_secret="9tK2xr4mQ7vBnZ1sD5hL0pWfC8jY3aE6",
    tenant="0198c4a1-3d4e-7f50-a1b2-c3d4e5f6a7b8",
    scopes=["fax:read", "fax-accounts:write"],
) as provisioning:
    account = provisioning.fax_accounts.create(
        customer="0198c4a1-4d5e-7f60-a172-3c4d5e6f7081",
        name="Front desk",
    )
    print(account.id, account.retention_days)

tenant= is required, and it is a required argument rather than a checked one: leave it out and Python refuses the constructor by name. There is no inference behind it — a mint that names no tenant is refused.

Pass customer= as well when your credential was issued for one customer inside that tenant. Both selectors NAME a grant your provider already wrote for your credential; they never widen one, and a selector no grant covers is refused with a 400 however good your credentials are.

Send a fax

from pathlib import Path

from ringivo import Ringivo

with Ringivo(
    base_url="https://api.yourprovider.example",
    client_id="0198c4a1-1f2e-7a3b-9c40-5f6e7d8a9b01",
    client_secret="9tK2xr4mQ7vBnZ1sD5hL0pWfC8jY3aE6",
    tenant="0198c4a1-3d4e-7f50-a1b2-c3d4e5f6a7b8",
    scopes=["fax:read", "fax:write"],
) as client:
    fax = client.faxes.send(
        fax_account="0198c4a1-3c4d-7e5f-9061-2b3c4d5e6f70",
        to="+13025556789",
        file=Path("chart-4471.pdf"),
        client_reference="chart-4471",
    )

    print(fax.id, fax.status)   # 0198c4a1-… queued

send() returns as soon as the fax is accepted. The render and the call happen afterwards, so status is queued here — read the fax again to see how it ended:

    finished = client.faxes.get(fax.id)
    print(finished.status, finished.pages_transferred)

Point at pages instead of uploading them with urls=[...] (up to five https links). Uploads and URLs cannot be mixed in one request.

Retrying a send safely

Every send carries an Idempotency-Key, and the client invents one when you do not pass it. If you intend to retry a send whose response you never saw — a timeout, a dropped connection — pass your own key and reuse it. The server replays the first fax instead of sending a second, and tells you it did:

    fax = client.faxes.send(
        fax_account=account_id,
        to="+13025556789",
        file=pdf_bytes,
        idempotency_key="chart-4471-attempt-1",
    )

    if fax.idempotent_replay:
        print("this was already sent")

Read, list, cancel, download

    fax = client.faxes.get(fax_id)

    page = client.faxes.list(direction="inbound", read=False, tags={"clinic": "north"})
    for fax in page:
        print(fax.id, fax.from_, fax.pages_total)

    if page.next_cursor:                       # newest first; follow the cursor
        page = client.faxes.list(after=page.next_cursor)

    client.faxes.cancel(fax_id)                # before the far end answers

    pdf = client.faxes.media(fax_id)           # the document's bytes
    Path("received.pdf").write_bytes(pdf)

media() mints a short-lived download link and follows it for you. Use media_link() instead if you want the URL and its expiry — but do not cache it or pass it on: anyone holding it reads that document.

Walking the whole collection

A page holds 25 rows by default, up to a ceiling of 100 with page_size=. To backfill every fax matching a filter, follow next_cursor — the server's own cursor — until it comes back None:

    faxes = []
    after = None
    while True:
        page = client.faxes.list(direction="inbound", after=after)
        faxes.extend(page)
        if page.next_cursor is None:            # the last page
            break
        after = page.next_cursor

after= walks forward; before= walks backward from a cursor instead — how you poll for rows that arrived since your last read.

Fax accounts

A fax account is a customer's container: the numbers routed to it, the faxes sent and received on it, and the settings that govern both. Opening, changing and deleting one is client.fax_accounts.

    account = client.fax_accounts.create(
        customer="0198c4a1-4d5e-7f60-a172-3c4d5e6f7081",
        name="Front desk",
        header_text="ACME VETERINARY",
        retention_days=365,
    )

    page = client.fax_accounts.list(customer="0198c4a1-4d5e-7f60-a172-3c4d5e6f7081")
    for account in page:
        print(account.id, account.name, account.status)

    for number in client.fax_accounts.numbers(account.id):
        print(number.e164, number.status)

    client.fax_accounts.update(account.id, status="suspended")   # receive only
    client.fax_accounts.delete(account.id)

An account belongs to one customer for its whole life. Every fax it holds carries the customer it was sent or received for, so there is no way to move it and no argument that would try.

Numbers are attached through the routing API, not here. A number points at one destination, and that rule belongs to the number: POST /v1/phone-numbers/{id}/routing with target_type: fax, through client.request(). numbers() reads back what is pointed at this account — all of them, walking the pages for you, because a half-list of a fax account's numbers looks exactly like a full one.

Retention: two rules, either of them off

Retention here DELETES; it never holds anything back.

Setting What it does Off
retention_days Delete a fax's pages once they are older than this many days. None — kept for ever
retention_pages Keep only this many of the newest pages on the account. None — no page limit

A new account gets your provider's defaults — a year, and no page limit, at the time of writing — because this client sends nothing for an argument you did not name.

    client.fax_accounts.update(account.id, retention_days=90, retention_pages=5000)
    client.fax_accounts.update(account.id, retention_days=None)     # keep for ever

Deleting a FAX is never blocked by retention: DELETE /v1/faxes/{id} removes its pages now.

Changing one setting changes one setting

update() is a sparse PATCH: it sends only the arguments you pass, so suspending an account leaves its retention rules exactly as they were. None is a value rather than an omission — it clears a nullable field.

    client.fax_accounts.update(account.id, default_from_e164=None)   # clears it
    client.fax_accounts.update(account.id)                           # ValueError

Deleting an account

delete() DESTROYS the stored pages of every fax on the account and cannot be undone — download anything worth keeping first. The account then leaves your listings and the people granted it lose access; the fax records themselves survive as the billing and audit evidence, and nothing bills after the delete.

It is refused while any number still routes to the account:

    try:
        client.fax_accounts.delete(account.id)
    except ApiError as refusal:
        if refusal.code == "fax_account_has_routed_numbers":
            print("move or release its numbers first")

Branch on code, not on the 409: a fax that cannot be cancelled is a 409 too, and it carries no code at all.

Who may read an account's faxes

Holding the account write permission lets somebody manage an account without being granted it. A GRANT is how you hand ONE account's faxes and pages to somebody who holds no such permission — a customer-facing staffer who should see this customer's faxes and no others. That is client.fax_account_users.

    grant = client.fax_account_users.create(
        fax_account=account.id,
        user="0198c4a1-7081-72a3-d4a5-6f7081920314",
    )

    for row in client.fax_account_users.list(fax_account=account.id):
        print(row.user_email, row.user_id)

    client.fax_account_users.delete(grant.id)     # withdraw it

A grant is a pair and a fact — this user, this account — and it holds no settings, so there is no update(): you withdraw one by deleting it and re-make it by creating another. Withdrawing takes nothing else with it, and somebody who reaches the account by permission rather than by a grant still reaches it.

Listing and reading grants needs fax:read; making and withdrawing them needs fax-accounts:write. The account you grant may be one you hold no grant on yourself — administering an account is permission-gated while reading its content is grant-gated, so somebody has to be able to add the first member.

Webhook endpoints

An endpoint is where the platform calls you, and what it calls you about. Registering one is client.webhook_endpoints; checking what arrives is webhooks.verify(), further down this page.

    endpoint = client.webhook_endpoints.create(
        url="https://hooks.acme-vet.example/faxes",
        scope_type="fax_account",
        scope_id=account.id,
        events=["fax.received", "fax.delivered"],
    )

    # whsec_… — the only time this is readable. Put it where your
    # receiver can find it; no call reads it back.
    secret = endpoint.secret

The signing secret is in that answer and nowhere else, ever. Store it before you do anything else. Every later read of the endpoint publishes secret=None, and that is the platform saying it keeps no readable copy, not this client failing to find one. Lose it and your only way back is rotate_secret().

scope_type is tenant, customer or fax_account, and scope_id names the one you mean. The three are a containment order, so a reseller-wide endpoint and a per-account one both hear about the same fax. Neither scope_type nor scope_id can be changed afterwards: the delivery record is the evidence of what that scope was told, so a different scope is a new endpoint.

events is the list you want, and None or [] both mean every event in scope. An event name the platform does not publish is a 422 — a typo would otherwise subscribe you to silence.

Registering needs webhooks:write, or fax:write for a fax_account-scoped endpoint only. Naming a customer or tenant scope with a fax:* token is a 422. Reading needs webhooks:read, and a fax:read token lists fax-account-scoped endpoints alone — the wider ones are absent from its page rather than refused, so an empty result under a fax:* token says nothing about whether a wider endpoint exists.

Adding an event to an endpoint you already have

update() is a sparse PATCH, like fax_accounts.update(): it sends only the arguments you pass. So the fix for "we registered for fax.received and the outbound events never arrived" is one call, and it leaves the URL and the switch exactly as they were:

    client.webhook_endpoints.update(
        endpoint.id,
        events=["fax.received", "fax.sending", "fax.delivered", "fax.failed"],
    )

The list is REPLACED, not merged — send every event you want, not just the new ones. events=None (or []) asks for every event in scope instead.

Switching an endpoint off keeps it and its events, and stops the fan-out:

    client.webhook_endpoints.update(endpoint.id, active=False)   # deaf, not gone
    client.webhook_endpoints.delete(endpoint.id)                 # gone

delete() stops the fan-out at once and keeps the delivery record — "why did our integration stop hearing about faxes?" is answered by the deliveries of the endpoint somebody removed. Both need webhooks:write, or fax:write on a fax-account-scoped endpoint.

Rotating the secret

    rotated = client.webhook_endpoints.rotate_secret(endpoint.id)

    print(rotated.secret)                        # the new one, once
    print(rotated.secret_previous_expires_at)    # when the old one stops

A rotation does not replace the secret at once. It mints a new one and starts a 24-hour clock: the PREVIOUS secret goes on signing until secret_previous_expires_at, and during that window a delivery's header carries two v1 signatures, newest first. webhooks.verify() tries every one of them, so a rotation costs you no deliveries as long as your own copy is rolled before the deadline. Needs webhooks:write, or fax:write on a fax-account-scoped endpoint.

What we could not deliver

client.webhook_deliveries is evidence of failure, not a delivery history. A delivery that reaches your endpoint leaves NO ROW: a row appears when an attempt fails, moves along the retry ladder, and is removed the moment a later attempt succeeds.

    for delivery in client.webhook_deliveries.list(status="dead"):
        print(delivery.event_id, delivery.event_type, delivery.status_code)

So status="dead" is the query this collection exists for — what an outage cost you, and the only place that list exists. pending is everything still on the ladder. There is no delivered: the API answers 400 to it rather than handing back an empty page. An empty page for either real status is the good news.

Filter by endpoint= and event_type= too, and read one row with client.webhook_deliveries.get(delivery_id). The body that was POSTed is never published here — only payload_sha256, the digest of the exact bytes that were signed, so an integrator who kept what they received can prove it is what was sent. Reading needs webhooks:read; a delivery borrows its endpoint's reach, so a fax:read token sees the deliveries of fax-account-scoped endpoints alone.

The async client

AsyncRingivo is the same client for programs already running on asyncio. The constructor is identical, every method is awaited, and async with replaces with:

import asyncio
from pathlib import Path

from ringivo import AsyncRingivo


async def main():
    async with AsyncRingivo(
        base_url="https://api.yourprovider.example",
        client_id="0198c4a1-1f2e-7a3b-9c40-5f6e7d8a9b01",
        client_secret="9tK2xr4mQ7vBnZ1sD5hL0pWfC8jY3aE6",
        tenant="0198c4a1-3d4e-7f50-a1b2-c3d4e5f6a7b8",
        scopes=["fax:read", "fax:write"],
    ) as client:
        fax = await client.faxes.send(
            fax_account="0198c4a1-3c4d-7e5f-9061-2b3c4d5e6f70",
            to="+13025556789",
            file=Path("chart-4471.pdf"),
        )

        terminal = {"delivered", "partial", "cancelled", "failed"}
        while fax.status not in terminal:          # a rendered PDF needs one of these
            await asyncio.sleep(5)
            fax = await client.faxes.get(fax.id)

        if fax.status == "delivered":
            pdf = await client.faxes.media(fax.id)

asyncio.run(main())

Outside a context manager, release the connections with await client.aclose() — the async spelling of close().

Everything else reads the same. The exceptions are the same classes, the returned Fax, FaxPage and MediaLink are the same frozen dataclasses, and webhooks.verify() is the same function: it is pure computation with no network, so there is nothing to await.

Verify a webhook

Every delivery carries a Ringivo-Signature header. Check it before you trust the body — this needs no client and no network:

from ringivo import SignatureVerificationError, webhooks

@app.post("/hooks/fax")
def receive(request):
    try:
        webhooks.verify(
            request.body,                                  # the RAW bytes
            request.headers[webhooks.SIGNATURE_HEADER],
            secret="whsec_...",
        )
    except SignatureVerificationError:
        return Response(status=400)

    event = json.loads(request.body)
    ...
    return Response(status=202)

Two rules decide whether this works:

  • Give it the raw body. Parsing the JSON and re-encoding it before verifying will fail, and correctly so — key order, escaping and number formatting are free choices no two encoders make alike. Reach for your framework's raw-body accessor.
  • Answer any 2XX to accept. Deliveries are at-least-once: dedupe on event_id, because a retry carries the same one.

verify() returns None and raises SignatureVerificationError on any failure — a stale timestamp, the wrong secret, a malformed header. During a secret rotation the header carries two signatures and either secret verifies, so a rotation costs you no deliveries.

When something is refused

from ringivo import ApiError, AuthenticationError

try:
    client.faxes.send(fax_account=account_id, to="not-e164", file=pdf)
except ApiError as error:
    error.status_code        # 422
    error.code               # "validation_failed" — the vocabulary to branch on
    error.errors[0].detail   # "The to field format is invalid."
    error.errors[0].source   # {"parameter": "to"}

AuthenticationError (a subclass) means the credential itself was refused — the client had already replaced its token and retried once by then. Connection failures, timeouts and TLS errors are httpx's own exceptions and are deliberately not wrapped.

What is in the box

Scope
Ringivo(base_url, client_id, client_secret, *, tenant, customer=None, scopes=None, timeout=30.0) — The client. A context manager, or call close(). tenant is required. scopes is spelled as a keyword but required too — an empty one raises.
AsyncRingivo(…same arguments…) — The asyncio twin. An async context manager, or await aclose(). Every method below is awaited.
client.faxes.send(*, fax_account, to, file=…|urls=…, …) fax:write Send one fax. Returns the accepted Fax.
client.faxes.get(fax_id, *, include=None) fax:read One fax, complete.
client.faxes.list(*, filters…, after=None, before=None, page_size=None) fax:read A FaxPage: iterable, with next_cursor. Default page size 25, ceiling 100.
client.faxes.cancel(fax_id) fax:write Withdraw a fax before it is answered.
client.faxes.media(fax_id, *, format="pdf") fax:read The document's bytes.
client.faxes.media_link(fax_id, *, format="pdf") fax:read The URL and its expiry, as a MediaLink.
client.fax_accounts.list(*, customer=None, status=None, after=None, before=None, page_size=None) fax:read A FaxAccountPage: iterable, with next_cursor.
client.fax_accounts.get(fax_account_id) fax:read One FaxAccount.
client.fax_accounts.numbers(fax_account_id) fax:read Every FaxAccountNumber routed to it, all pages walked.
client.fax_accounts.create(*, customer, name, header_text=…, default_from_e164=…, retention_days=…, retention_pages=…) fax-accounts:write Open an account for a customer.
client.fax_accounts.update(fax_account_id, *, name=…, header_text=…, default_from_e164=…, retention_days=…, retention_pages=…, status=…) fax-accounts:write A sparse PATCH: only what you pass.
client.fax_accounts.delete(fax_account_id) fax-accounts:write Delete the account and its pages. 409 while numbers route to it.
client.fax_account_users.list(*, fax_account=None, user=None, after=None, before=None, page_size=None) fax:read A FaxAccountUserPage of grants: iterable, with next_cursor. The two filters are "who can see this account?" and "what can this person see?".
client.fax_account_users.get(fax_account_user_id) fax:read One FaxAccountUser.
client.fax_account_users.create(*, fax_account, user) fax-accounts:write Grant this user access to this account's content. Both are required; neither can be changed afterwards.
client.fax_account_users.delete(fax_account_user_id) fax-accounts:write Withdraw the grant. The only way to undo one — there is no update route.
client.webhook_endpoints.list(*, scope_type=None, scope_id=None, active=None, after=None, before=None, page_size=None) webhooks:read A WebhookEndpointPage: iterable, with next_cursor. A fax:read token sees fax-account-scoped rows only.
client.webhook_endpoints.get(webhook_endpoint_id) webhooks:read One WebhookEndpoint. secret is always None here.
client.webhook_endpoints.create(*, url, scope_type, scope_id, events=…, active=…) webhooks:write Register an endpoint. The only answer that carries the signing secret — store it. fax:write for a fax_account scope.
client.webhook_endpoints.update(webhook_endpoint_id, *, url=…, events=…, active=…) webhooks:write A sparse PATCH: only what you pass. The scope cannot change.
client.webhook_endpoints.delete(webhook_endpoint_id) webhooks:write Remove it. The fan-out stops; the deliveries stay.
client.webhook_endpoints.rotate_secret(webhook_endpoint_id) webhooks:write Mint a new secret and start the 24-hour grace window.
client.webhook_deliveries.list(*, endpoint=None, event_type=None, status=None, after=None, before=None, page_size=None) webhooks:read A WebhookDeliveryPage of what is still owed or was given up on. status="dead" is the one to ask after an outage.
client.webhook_deliveries.get(webhook_delivery_id) webhooks:read One WebhookDelivery.
webhooks.verify(payload, header, secret, *, tolerance=300) — Raises unless the body is genuine and fresh.

Fax, FaxAccount, FaxAccountNumber, FaxAccountPage, FaxAccountUser, FaxAccountUserPage, FaxDocument, FaxPage, MediaLink, WebhookDelivery, WebhookDeliveryPage, WebhookEndpoint and WebhookEndpointPage are frozen dataclasses, and each keeps the JSON it was built from in .raw — so a field the API adds after this release reaches you without a new SDK.

NOT_GIVEN is the sentinel the create() and update() calls on fax_accounts and webhook_endpoints default every optional argument to. You never need to pass it; it exists so that None can mean "clear this field", or "every event in scope", rather than "I said nothing".

Reaching an endpoint this client does not wrap

The table above is the fax and webhook surfaces. For anything else the API offers, use client.request() — the same escape hatch in both clients, awaited on the async one:

response = client.request("GET", "/v1/sip-trunks")
trunks = response.json()["data"]

It carries your credential, your timeout, your User-Agent and the same typed errors, and it hands back the httpx.Response untouched: past that line the JSON is the API's own, not one of the frozen objects above.

spec/openapi.yaml in this repository is the reference for what those endpoints take and answer. The same shapes are generated into ringivo._generated_types as TypedDicts, which your type checker can read; that module is private, machine-written, and rewritten wholesale whenever the spec changes.

Licence

MIT.

Release files for ringivo 0.7.0

For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.

Source distribution (sdist)

Source distribution for ringivo 0.7.0
File Size Uploaded
ringivo-0.7.0.tar.gz 238.5 kB Details

Built distribution (wheel)

Table of built distributions (wheels) for ringivo 0.7.0
File Interpreter ABI Platform
ringivo-0.7.0-py3-none-any.whl Python 3 none any Details

Total release size: 328.4 kB

Release files / ringivo-0.7.0.tar.gz

Download URL ringivo-0.7.0.tar.gz
Size 238.5 kB
Tags Source
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
2d2b16f52da0c7ccd621065c841ae303336919f7c9aa2bde72d3fb0cc38fe89c
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
c1ced028097f269547f566bead30ab34020a47495243afbf313acfe49bff5375
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 14, 2026.

Transparency log

Release files / ringivo-0.7.0-py3-none-any.whl

Download URL ringivo-0.7.0-py3-none-any.whl
Size 89.8 kB
Tags Python 3
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
5cd034ebf24cb33c7b56f540a6d71b2b434fa084116ee12c21cda6193dd78d67
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
52b30096fbcf99e9cc6786da0f225e32db49529eaf6121001e6281178592cfb0
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 14, 2026.

Transparency log

Release history Release notifications | RSS feed

0.14.0

2 release files

0.13.0

2 release files

0.12.0

2 release files

0.11.0

2 release files

0.10.0

2 release files

0.9.1

2 release files

0.9.0

2 release files

0.8.0

2 release files

This release

0.7.0 This release

2 release files

0.6.0

2 release files

0.5.0

2 release files

0.4.0

2 release files

0.3.0

2 release files

0.2.2

2 release files

0.2.1

2 release files

0.2.0

2 release files

0.0.1

2 release files

Anthropic, PBC Visionary sponsor Bloomberg Visionary sponsor Hudson River Trading Visionary sponsor Meta Visionary sponsor NVIDIA Visionary sponsor Microsoft Sustainability sponsor Depot Continuous Integration AWS Cloud computing and Security Sponsor Datadog Monitoring Fastly CDN Google Download Analytics Sentry Error logging StatusPage Status page