rootsign 0.1.1

RootSign — tamper-evident provenance logging for AI agents (powered by Providex AI)

RootSign

Tamper-evident provenance logging for AI agents.

RootSign is a Providex AI product — the agent capture layer of the Providex AI Agent Accountability Platform.

What is RootSign?

When AI agents take actions in production — calling tools, hitting APIs, writing to databases — there is no built-in audit trail. If something goes wrong (a wrong refund, a leaked PII record, a malformed deployment), there is no way to prove what the agent did, in what order, on whose authorization, or whether the record has been tampered with after the fact.

RootSign solves this. Each agent action is captured as an Action record containing a SHA-256 hash of the previous action — a cryptographic hash chain that makes the record tamper-evident. Modify any record after the fact and rootsign verify detects it.

Compliance-grade audit trails. Zero changes to your agent code.

Status

Phase 1 MVP — v0.1.1. LangGraph + CrewAI integrations, rootsign verify CLI, PII redaction, human-in-the-loop checkpoints, and opt-in decision capture (PRD-19 / ADR-008) are all shipping.

Phase	Scope	Status
0	Data model + storage + ingest handler	✅ Complete
1	Python SDK — @rootsign.trace, LangGraph + CrewAI, rootsign verify CLI, redaction, HiTL checkpoint, opt-in decision capture	✅ v0.1.1
2	Hosted ingest backend + compliance dashboard	Planned
3	Policy enforcement + incident workflow	Planned
4	Cross-platform governance	Planned

Quickstart — LangGraph

1. Install

Python 3.11 or 3.12 recommended. RootSign itself supports 3.11+, but the [crewai] extra currently lags on 3.13/3.14 wheels. If you hit No matching distribution found for crewai, switch to Python 3.12 and reinstall.

pip install rootsign[langgraph]

Start PostgreSQL + TimescaleDB locally and apply the schema:

rootsign-admin start-db   # docker run timescale/timescaledb:latest-pg16
rootsign-admin init       # alembic upgrade head

start-db wraps a single docker run so you don't need to clone the repo. If you have cloned it, docker-compose up -d db is the equivalent developer path. Both reuse the same rootsign-timescaledb container name and rootsign_pgdata volume — pick either, not both.

2. Register your agent (one-time setup)

import asyncio
from rootsign import register_agent, AgentEnvironment, AgentRiskTier, AgentFramework

agent = asyncio.run(register_agent(
    name="my-invoice-agent",
    owner="platform-team",
    environment=AgentEnvironment.PRODUCTION,
    risk_tier=AgentRiskTier.HIGH,
    framework=AgentFramework.LANGGRAPH,
))
print(agent.agent_id)

3. Instrument your tools

import rootsign
from rootsign import LocalIngestClient
from rootsign.database import AsyncSessionLocal
from langchain_core.tools import tool
from langgraph.prebuilt import ToolNode

@tool
def send_invoice(customer_id: str, amount: float) -> str:
    """Send an invoice to a customer."""
    return "sent"

async def run_graph(agent_id):
    async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
        client = LocalIngestClient(db=db)
        async with rootsign.session(agent_id=agent_id, client=client) as ctx:
            tools = rootsign.wrap_tools([send_invoice], ctx=ctx, client=client)
            tool_node = ToolNode(tools)
            # ...build and run your graph as normal
        await db.commit()

Every tool call now produces a tamper-evident Action record on the hash chain.

4. Verify the chain

$ rootsign verify 660e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001
VALID ✓  —  3 records, chain intact
  Session:  660e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001

Exit code is 0 for VALID, 1 for TAMPERED. Use --local <path.jsonl> for offline JSONL session files (no DB required).

If a record was modified, the verifier names the broken link:

$ rootsign verify 660e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001
TAMPERED ✗  —  chain broken at record #2
  Detail:   self_hash mismatch on action <action_id>
  Session:  660e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001
WARNING: This session log may have been tampered with.

See docs/framework-support.md for the version matrix and integration notes.

Decision capture (opt-in)

Record the why before each tool call — foundational for Phase 2 session replay. Off by default; opt in deliberately with ROOTSIGN_CAPTURE_DECISIONS=true.

import os
os.environ["ROOTSIGN_CAPTURE_DECISIONS"] = "true"

async with rootsign.session(agent_id=agent.agent_id, client=client) as ctx:
    # Record what the agent decided before calling the tool.
    await ctx.record_decision(
        selected_action="send_invoice",
        reasoning_summary="Amount within policy; recipient verified.",
        confidence=0.97,
        ingest_client=client,
    )
    tools = rootsign.wrap_tools([send_invoice], ctx=ctx, client=client)
    await tools[0].ainvoke({"customer_id": "acme", "amount": 1500.0})
    # The Action record now carries decision_id linking it to the reasoning above.

Depth controls how much reasoning is persisted, via ROOTSIGN_REASONING_DEPTH:

Value	What's stored
minimal	selected_action + confidence only
summary (default)	+ reasoning_summary truncated to 500 chars
full	+ reasoning_summary truncated to 10,000 chars + alternatives_considered

Calling ctx.record_decision() when the flag is off is a silent no-op — safe to ship in capture-on and capture-off environments without conditionals at the call site. One Decision links to one Action; the pending slot is single and cleared after the next tool call consumes it. Decisions are not in the hash chain (ADR-008) — verify_chain is unchanged.

Quickstart — CrewAI

CrewAI integration is the same shape — wrap the tool list at construction time.

pip install rootsign[crewai]

import rootsign
from crewai import Agent
from crewai.tools import tool

@tool("send_invoice")
def send_invoice(customer_id: str, amount: float) -> str:
    """Send an invoice to a customer."""
    return "sent"

async def run_crew(agent_id):
    async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
        client = LocalIngestClient(db=db)
        async with rootsign.session(agent_id=agent_id, client=client) as ctx:
            wrapped = rootsign.wrap_crewai_tools(
                [send_invoice], ctx=ctx, client=client
            )
            agent = Agent(
                role="Invoicing assistant",
                goal="Send invoices",
                tools=wrapped,
            )
            # ...run your crew as normal
        await db.commit()

Tested against CrewAI 0.28, 0.40, and 1.x (see CI matrix).

Human-in-the-loop checkpoint

High-risk actions can be gated on a human decision. Pass require_approval=True to @rootsign.trace and the SDK blocks the tool from running until someone approves it via the CLI.

import rootsign

@rootsign.trace(
    ingest_client=client,
    session_context=ctx,
    require_approval=True,
    timeout_seconds=300,   # 5 minutes
)
async def wire_transfer(account: str, amount: float) -> str:
    # This runs ONLY after a human approves.
    return execute_transfer(account, amount)

When wire_transfer(...) is called, the SDK inserts an ACTION_RECORD with authorization_status='pending' and waits. An operator approves (or rejects) from another terminal:

$ rootsign approve --list
Pending approvals (1):
  <action-id>  wire_transfer  session=<session-id>  submitted=<timestamp>

$ rootsign approve <action-id> --reason "Verified with customer"
✓  Action <action-id> approved.

The decorated function returns normally. Rejection (--reject) raises HiTLRejectedError; a 5-minute timeout raises HiTLTimeoutError and the action's authorization status becomes 'timed_out' (a terminal forensic state distinct from 'human_rejected').

See ADR-007 for the design rationale (poll loop, timeout semantics, race tolerance).

PII redaction

RedactionConfig runs before hashing, so stored input_hash / output_hash values carry no PII signal. Three ready-to-use configs:

from rootsign import StandardPIIConfig, FinancialPIIConfig, HealthcarePIIConfig

# Standard: email, phone, US SSN, credit card, UK NI number
redaction = StandardPIIConfig()

tools = rootsign.wrap_tools(
    [send_invoice], ctx=ctx, client=client,
    redaction_config=redaction,
)

FinancialPIIConfig adds account / routing / IBAN patterns; HealthcarePIIConfig adds MRN / NPI / DOB. Each accepts extra_rules={...} for domain-specific patterns without subclassing. See ADR-006.

Architecture

• @rootsign.trace wraps a tool callable and emits an ACTION_RECORD envelope per call. LangGraph BaseTool and CrewAI tools are detected automatically.
• LocalIngestClient is the in-process ingest path for v0.1.x. A HttpIngestClient for the hosted backend lands in Phase 2.
• Hash chain is per-session: each Action carries prev_action_hash so reconstructing the chain detects any after-the-fact modification.
• HiTLCheckpoint is an async poll loop that opens its own DB session per cycle — see ADR-007 for the loop-binding rationale.
• Storage is PostgreSQL 16 + TimescaleDB 2.14. The actions table is a hypertable; the chain stays intact across chunks.

What's next

• Phase 2 cloud backend — HttpIngestClient + hosted compliance dashboard. Drop-in replacement for LocalIngestClient once available.
• Web UI for HiTL — approve/reject pending actions from a browser instead of the CLI.
• AutoGen integration — same duck-typing shape as CrewAI.

Watch the GitHub Issues for the active roadmap.

Contributing

We welcome contributions. See CONTRIBUTING.md for development setup, coding standards, and the PR process. By submitting a contribution, you agree to the CLA.

Open-source community channels and Discord coming soon — for now, GitHub Issues is the canonical place to file bugs and propose features.

License

Apache License 2.0 — see LICENSE and NOTICE.

Security

To report a vulnerability, see SECURITY.md. Do not open a public GitHub issue.