This release is a pre-release and may not be stable for production use.
runbound
Runbound is a policy boundary around the tools an AI agent can call. Declare a tool with one decorator and every call is checked before its body runs: against rules in your code and rules set in a console, against a quota, and, when you say so, against a person's approval. When the control plane is unreachable the consequential tools fail closed. Every call leaves one OpenTelemetry span.
Add one initialization line and one decorator per tool. No agent rewrites or policy code required. runbound sees tool names, argument hashes, timings and outcomes; it never stores, logs or sends a prompt, a reply or a result, and an argument leaves the process only when the tool asks a person (the approver must see it). It puts no gateway in your hot path, and never speaks to your users: when it refuses something it hands control straight back to your own code.
1.0.0a6 is an alpha. The detection, provider-wrapper and cost features of 0.11.x are gone; see CHANGELOG.md for what was removed and how to migrate.
Install
pip install runbound --pre
Console tool rules need runbound 1.x. Plain pip install runbound still installs 0.11.2,
because 1.0 is a pre-release, and a 0.x worker ignores the rules you set on a tool in the
console: it enforces only the rules in your code. Install with --pre (or pin
runbound>=1.0.0a2), and see Upgrading from 0.11.x.
Requires Python 3.10 or newer (pip refuses the install on older versions, and import runbound on
3.9 raises an ImportError that says so). No runtime dependencies: stdlib only. There are two optional extras:
pip install "runbound[langchain]" and pip install "runbound[otel]". LangChain / LangGraph is an opt-in reference integration at four tested combinations, not a range: see the LangChain guide.
Quick start
import runbound
@runbound.tool(effects={"read"})
def lookup_order(order_id: str) -> dict:
return {"order": order_id}
@runbound.tool(effects={"financial"}, approval="required", mode="deferred")
def issue_refund(order_id: str, amount: float) -> str:
return "refunded"
runbound.init(token="rb_...", control_plane_url="https://plane.example", service="support-agent",
otel_endpoint="https://plane.example") # puts each call in the console's Traces (self-hosted: the plane's own address)
Decorate before init(). Import your tool modules, then call init(): the
first heartbeat carries the tool report, and a tool declared afterwards can run for
a moment before the plane knows its rules.
A refused call raises one typed exception, never a fake success:
try:
lookup_order(order_id=123) # wrong type: refused before the body runs
except runbound.ExecutionRefused as exc:
print(exc.reason, exc.retryable) # invalid_arguments False
The hook chain
Every call passes the same fixed chain; the first refusal wins and the body never runs:
your rewrite hooks, argument validation against the signature, the tool's rules, the console row, the capability class, the quota, the approval, your gate hooks, the body, and finally the post chain on what it returned (redact secret-named keys, truncate, scan for injection patterns, your post hooks). Hooks that fail are treated by class: a hook error refuses a consequential or unclassified tool and is logged and skipped for a read, write or external one. See How it works.
Per-tool policy
Rules come from two places and only ever tighten each other: the decorator
(blocked, max_calls, constraint, require_approval, effects) and rows set
in the console (blocked, session cap, approval, risk class, fail mode, quota). The
most restrictive wins, field by field. A row you create is a draft; you start it as a dry run, which evaluates
everything, refuses nothing and records would_refuse (or would_ask for a call
it would have sent to a person), takes no quota unit and asks nobody, so you see
what it would have stopped before you promote it to enforced (the console asks for a comment at each step). A tool with no row
follows the service defaults: a new service starts with the standard defaults
enforced, so a financial, destructive, privileged or unclassified tool asks a
person until you give it a row.
Console rows are enforced by runbound 1.x only: a worker on 0.x ignores them and keeps just its code rules (see Upgrading from 0.11.x).
A quota is a fixed clock window: "20 per clock hour", per service or per key. A
full quota refuses with quota_exceeded (retryable, with a retry_after). A quota
the plane cannot confirm (it is unreachable, or answers the take with 400 or 404)
follows the row's fail_mode: closed refuses with quota_plane_unavailable.
A row never loosens a tool: its risk_class can raise what the code declares, and
a tool that declares nothing stays unclassified, so it still fails closed. See
Per-tool policy.
Approvals
@runbound.tool(approval="required", mode="sync" | "deferred") asks a person.
Sync waits for the answer up to timeout_s. Deferred returns
{"status": "pending_approval", "request_id": ...} at once; when a person
approves, a worker verifies an HMAC seal (keyed by RUNBOUND_APPROVAL_SECRET,
which never leaves your processes) and runs the tool with the approved arguments
through the whole chain again. runbound.current_request() is the idempotency key.
A parameter your app supplies (a DB session, a client, the tenant) is marked Annotated[Session, runbound.Injected]: it is never stored or shown, and
init(provide={Session: make_session}) supplies it again when the approved request runs. Pydantic models, datetime, Decimal, UUID and Path arguments are
supported when their JSON form gives the value back (checked before the approval is opened). Type hints must resolve at decoration: a TYPE_CHECKING-only hint refuses registration unless the parameter is marked runbound.Injected
(then it is supplied by parameter name or default, not by type). init(approval_bind=True) (off by default) asks the plane to bind an approved request to one execution attempt, so it cannot run twice. See Injected parameters and Supported argument types.
An approval never outlives the policy. When the answer arrives (sync, deferred or
through a grant), the call is checked again against the policy the worker holds
at that moment; if the tool is now blocked, denied or capped, the call is refused
with approval_superseded (not retryable) and never runs on the approval alone.
See Approvals.
When the plane is unreachable
plane_status().mode is connecting, connected, degraded or unavailable.
The last policy is kept on disk and enforced before the first heartbeat after a
restart. While the plane is away read, write and external tools keep running
on it; financial, destructive, privileged and unclassified tools refuse with
reason="plane_unavailable" once consequential_grace_s (default 60) has passed.
A new worker reads its policy on its first answered hello and releases those tools
only once it holds the policy and the service defaults; until then, or while it
holds neither a policy nor a saved one, they refuse. A service with enforced
service defaults does not use the grace: it keeps running on its last policy
confirmation for the offline window (15 minutes for a new service; an existing one
keeps 24 hours until an operator changes it; init(offline_execution_s=) may only shorten
it). Inside it a tool a row allows keeps running, and a tool with no row asks, so it is
refused approval_unavailable while nobody can be reached; after it every
financial, destructive, privileged and unclassified tool refuses plane_unavailable.
After a restart, a consequential call whose cached policy confirmation has expired can wait for the first policy confirmation, within the first three seconds after boot. The call is then evaluated against the policy the worker holds, including restrictions received during that wait. If no valid confirmation arrives, the call remains refused. Waiting and restarting do not renew the offline window. Set confirm_wait_s=0 to disable the wait; the maximum setting is 10 seconds. Async calls do not block the event loop while waiting. Only an authenticated policy confirmation accepted by the worker renews the window; a merely answered or degraded hello does not, and no tool body runs on the strength of the wait alone. The three seconds are one allowance counted from boot, not a fresh one for every call. See
Plane loss.
A worker with export_events=False exports nothing, refusals included, so the
console will not show that worker's refusals.
OpenTelemetry spans
Each call is a span named execute_tool {tool}, scope runbound, sent to your
OpenTelemetry provider or, with init(otel_endpoint=...), posted as OTLP/JSON. It
carries the tool, the outcome, the decision and a hash of the arguments, never the
arguments.
Every refusal, span and approval request also says what decided it, when the
worker knows it: the rule revision the row was served under (rule_revision, when
a row decided), the configuration the worker held (cfg_hash) and the process that
decided (boot_id). Each heartbeat reports
the configuration the worker accepted, so the console can show which workers
enforce a change. Set init(worker_id=...) to a stable name (a pod or host name)
so a restart is recognised as the same worker.
Every governed call also carries random identities (action_id, attempt_id,
evaluation_id), and just before the tool's own code runs the SDK ends a
zero-length execution_started marker span, so a call whose own span was lost
can still be seen to have started. A receiver that counts every span counts the
marker too; Runbound's ingest excludes it by name. Span batches carry an
X-Runbound-Batch token so a retried insert is not counted twice, and the hello
says where this worker's evidence can go. See OpenTelemetry and
LangChain.
What runbound does not do
It guards the tools you decorate; it does not read prompts, wrap model providers,
detect loops, price tokens or sandbox a tool's body. runbound.coverage() and
python -m runbound check tell you which tools are guarded. See
Boundaries and
Guarantees.
Documentation
The manual is in docs/: Getting started,
Configuration, API,
Handling refusals,
Privacy and three runnable examples.
Getting help
Open an issue at github.com/runboundai/runbound/issues, or email runboundai@gmail.com for anything you cannot post in public. Never paste a token, an approval secret, an argument or a real session key into an issue. Security issues go to email: see SECURITY.md.
import runbound
print(runbound.__version__)
print(runbound.coverage()) # after init() and your first guarded call
License
MIT, see LICENSE. Release history is in CHANGELOG.md; the invariants, each with the test that asserts it, are in INVARIANTS.md.
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