agentmail — compliance & verification toolkit for AI agents
Your agent is about to send USDC to a stranger. Is that stranger sanctioned? 782 OFAC crypto wallets · 19,086 sanctioned names · 16 embargoed jurisdictions. No API key. No signup. 30-second setup. Free & open source.
agentmail gives any AI agent three capabilities it can't provide itself:
| Layer | What | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 🛡️ Compliance | OFAC sanctions screen, KYA, transaction risk score, disputes | ✅ Live — real OFAC data |
| Disposable verification inbox (receive OTP/magic links) | ✅ Live | |
| 📱 SMS | Rentable phone numbers (receive SMS/OTP) | ✅ Live (mock free, 5sim/Twilio paid) |
It exposes all of these through three surfaces — MCP tools (for Claude Code / Cursor / Hermes), an HTTP API (for any agent), and a CLI (for you). Same core, same data.
Why this exists
Agents are starting to pay for things (x402, AP2, ACP, Coinbase AgentKit). But every payment rail assumes a human is watching. If your agent autonomously pays a wallet that's on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list, that's your legal problem — and the big payment infra players (OpenAI, Stripe, Coinbase) explicitly do not handle per-jurisdiction sanctions screening, Know-Your-Agent, or agent-transaction fraud signals. That's the gap this fills.
agent ──about to pay──▶ sanctions_check(wallet) ──▶ clean? proceed. sanctioned? ABORT.
Quick start (30 seconds)
git clone https://github.com/kindrat86/agentmail.git
cd agentmail
pip install -e .
Option A — use it from an MCP client (Claude Code / Cursor)
// .mcp.json or your client's MCP config
{
"mcpServers": {
"agentmail": {
"command": "python",
"args": ["-m", "agentmail.mcp_server"]
}
}
}
Now your agent can call sanctions_check, risk_score, kya_verify, dispute_open, create_inbox, fetch_code, create_number, fetch_sms, release_number, list_inboxes.
Option B — use it as an HTTP API
python -m agentmail.api # serves on :8000
# Screen a wallet against real OFAC data — no key, no auth needed for self-host
curl "http://localhost:8000/sanctions?wallet=0x098B716B8Aaf21512996dC57EB0615e2383E2f96"
# → {"matches":[{"list":"OFAC_SDN","match_type":"wallet_exact","confidence":1.0}],
# "clean":false,"provider":"osint"}
curl "http://localhost:8000/risk" -d '{"counterparty_id":"0xabc...","amount":"5000","rail":"x402"}'
# → {"score":0,"recommendation":"decline","reasons":["sanctions_match:OFAC_SDN/..."]}
Option C — use it from the CLI
# Sanctions screen — real OFAC data, no key
python -m agentmail.cli sanctions --wallet 0x098B716B8Aaf21512996dC57EB0615e2383E2f96
# → flagged: OFAC_SDN wallet_exact
python -m agentmail.cli risk 0xabc123def456 5000 --rail x402
python -m agentmail.cli kya my-agent --wallet 0xabc... --wallet-age 400 --domain bot.dev
python -m agentmail.cli compliance-status
# → OFAC SDN: 782 wallets, 19086 names; source=vile/ofac-sdn-list@...
The compliance layer (the part that matters)
Four tools, called before an agent trusts or pays a counterparty:
| Tool | When to call | Returns |
|---|---|---|
sanctions_check(name, wallet, country) |
Cheapest check. Call first. | {matches, clean} |
risk_score(counterparty, amount, ...) |
Right before authorizing payment | {score 0-100, recommendation: allow/review/decline} |
kya_verify(agent_id, evidence) |
Before trusting another agent | {trust_score, verified, flags} |
dispute_open(transaction_id, reason) |
When a paid transaction went bad | {dispute_id, escalation_at} |
Where the data comes from (all public, free, no key)
| Source | What | Refresh |
|---|---|---|
| vile/ofac-sdn-list (GitHub releases) | 782 multi-chain crypto addresses (ETH/USDT/TRX/XBT/...) | daily |
US Treasury OFAC sdn.csv |
19,086 sanctioned individuals & entities | as published |
| Embargoed jurisdictions set | 16 ISO-2 codes under comprehensive OFAC/UN/EU sanctions | tracked manually |
Lists are cached locally (~/.agentmail/cache/, 24h TTL) and refresh from source. If the network is down, a stale cache is used and status() reports degraded: true so you know screening is against older data rather than failing silently.
Providers (swappable backend)
AGENTMAIL_COMPLIANCE_PROVIDER=osint ← default, real OFAC data, free
AGENTMAIL_COMPLIANCE_PROVIDER=mock ← rule-based, for offline tests
AGENTMAIL_COMPLIANCE_PROVIDER=paid ← ComplyAdvantage passthrough (roadmap)
The osint provider does exact + token-subset name matching, exact case-insensitive wallet matching, and ISO-2 country matching. Every match carries a confidence so you can decide how hard to block.
The other two layers (verification toolkit)
Email — a disposable inbox an agent can use to sign up and receive OTP/magic-link verifications (backed by Mail.tm). create_inbox() → address → fetch_code() → OTP.
SMS — a rentable phone number an agent can use for phone/SMS verification. Mock provider works with no key (for dev); AGENTMAIL_SMS_PROVIDER=fivesim AGENTMAIL_FIVESIM_KEY=... goes live with real numbers.
Both share an otp.py extraction brain (regex for codes + magic links) so email and SMS produce the same {code, link} shape.
Self-host vs. hosted
Self-host is fully functional and free — that's what this repo is. Run the MCP server locally or the HTTP API on your own box, screen against real OFAC data, never pay a cent.
Hosted API (roadmap) is for when you don't want to keep a server up, keep lists fresh, or keep a 24/7 uptime: a managed endpoint with API-key auth, rate limits, and an audit log of every screen (the thing regulators/investors ask for). Dev tier ~$19/mo. This README updates when it ships.
Roadmap
- Email inbox (Mail.tm) + SMS/OTP (mock/5sim/twilio) + OTP extraction
- Compliance layer — real OFAC data (osint provider): 782 wallets + 19,086 names
- MCP server (10 tools) + HTTP API + CLI
- Hosted API with API-key auth + rate limiting (Fly.io)
- Audit log (tamper-evident screen history — the enterprise wedge)
- EU + UN consolidated lists (osint provider, phase 2)
- Paid provider: ComplyAdvantage passthrough (enterprise)
- x402 per-call billing (when agents pay themselves)
Design notes (honest)
- The compliance layer has the real moat. Email/SMS are plumbing a platform could swallow. Sanctions screening tied to agent-transaction history builds a dataset nobody else has, and per-jurisdiction rules are something the big infra players explicitly avoid.
- Self-host is the free tier, not a trap. The value you pay for (eventually) is not the data — it's uptime, freshness, and the audit trail. The data is and will stay public.
- 5sim numbers are shared-after-release. Fine for receiving an OTP, never for 2FA on accounts you intend to keep.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.
Contributing
Issues and PRs welcome. If you're using agentmail in production, I'd love to hear what for.
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