satsignal-mcp 0.1.0

MCP server exposing Satsignal tamper-evident anchoring as agent-callable tools.

satsignal-mcp

MCP server exposing Satsignal tamper-evident anchoring as agent-callable tools.

Any MCP-compatible client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, agent frameworks that speak MCP over stdio) can call Satsignal directly — no custom SDK required.

What it does

Each anchor call computes a sha256 of the input client-side and sends only the hash to proof.satsignal.cloud. The file/text/JSON bytes never leave the calling machine. The server records the hash on the BSV blockchain and returns a receipt the agent can save or pass on.

Tools

Tool	Auth	What it does
anchor_file	yes	sha256 a local file, anchor the digest
anchor_text	yes	sha256 a UTF-8 string, anchor the digest
anchor_json	yes	canonicalize JSON (sorted keys, compact, UTF-8), sha256, anchor
lookup_hash	no	check if a sha256 is on-chain
verify_bundle	no	open a local .mbnt and chain-confirm via lookup_hash

anchor_* tools accept dry_run: true to preview the sha256 without broadcasting. The Satsignal API itself does not honor dry_run — the flag lives in this MCP layer and short-circuits before any network call.

Configuration

Env var	Required	Default
SATSIGNAL_API_KEY	for anchoring	—
SATSIGNAL_API_BASE	no	https://proof.satsignal.cloud
SATSIGNAL_MATTER	no	inbox

Get an API key at https://proof.satsignal.cloud.

Install

pip install satsignal-mcp

Claude Desktop config

Add this to claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "satsignal": {
      "command": "satsignal-mcp",
      "env": {
        "SATSIGNAL_API_KEY": "sk_...",
        "SATSIGNAL_MATTER": "case-123"
      }
    }
  }
}

Verification model

Each anchor returns a bundle_id, txid, and receipt_url. The proof is independent of Satsignal: anyone can fetch the bundle, verify the on-chain transaction directly against BSV, and check the sha256 matches. satsignal-cli performs the full cryptographic + chain verification; verify_bundle in this MCP server does a faster chain-confirm only (matches the bundle's claimed txid against what the public /lookup_hash index reports for that sha).

Security notes

• The label, filename, and matter_slug fields you pass are written into the receipt and rendered on the public verifier page. They are also attacker-controllable from any agent calling this server — downstream code that reads these fields should treat them as untrusted text (HTML-escape, never embed in LLM context without an isolation boundary).
• The API key is sent as Authorization: Bearer … over HTTPS and is never logged or returned in tool output.

License

MIT.