shamir-lbodlev 0.2.0

Simple implementation of Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme

Shamir's Secret Sharing — Python Implementation

A lightweight and robust Python implementation of Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS). This cryptographic technique splits a secret into multiple shares, requiring only a threshold number of shares to reconstruct the original secret. Ideal for secure key management and distributed systems. This implementation also incorporates Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) for verifying the validity of shares using commitments.

Features

• Pure Python with minimal dependencies (pycryptodome)
• Generate any number of secure shares with a configurable threshold
• Reconstruct secrets using only the threshold number of shares
• Support for both file-based and variable-based workflows
• Human-readable share export/import (Base64)
• Verifiable shares using Feldman's VSS scheme with commitments
• Simple and intuitive API
• MIT License for flexible use

Installation

Install the package via PyPI:

pip install shamir-lbodlev

Usage

Importing the Package

from shamir import Shamir

Example 1: File-Based Workflow

Splitting a Secret

Create shares for a secret and export them to files. This example also computes commitments for later verification using Feldman's scheme.

from shamir import Shamir
import json

# Initialize with secret, total shares (n), and threshold (k)
shamir = Shamir(secret=b"My secret message", n=5, k=3)

# Export public parameters and shares
shamir.export_public("public.json")
shamir.export_shares("share{}.dat")  # Creates share1.dat, share2.dat, ...

# Compute and export commitments for Feldman's VSS verification
commitments = shamir.compute_commitments()
with open("commitments.json", "w") as f:
    json.dump(commitments, f)

This generates:

• public.json: Contains public data (prime p, Sophie Germain prime q, generator g, threshold k)
• share1.dat, share2.dat, ...: Base64-encoded share files
• commitments.json: List of commitments for share verification

Verifying and Reconstructing the Secret

Verify shares using Feldman's scheme and recover the secret using at least k shares. Note: The verify_share method returns True if valid or raises ValueError if invalid.

from shamir import Shamir
import json

# Initialize recovery instance
recoverer = Shamir()

# Load public parameters, commitments, and at least 3 shares
recoverer.load_public("public.json")
with open("commitments.json", "r") as f:
    commitments = json.load(f)
recoverer.set_commitments(commitments)

# Verify shares using Feldman's scheme (example for shares 1, 3, 5)
indexes = [1, 3, 5]
for index in indexes:
    filename = f"share{index}.dat"
    try:
        if recoverer.verify_share(filename=filename):
            print(f"{filename} is valid")
    except ValueError:
        print(f"{filename} is invalid")

# Load verified shares and recover the secret
recoverer.load_shares("share{}.dat", indexes=indexes)

# Recover the secret (uses the first k loaded shares)
secret = recoverer.recover()
print(secret.decode())  # Output: My secret message

Example 2: Variable-Based Workflow

Splitting a Secret

Create shares and store them in variables. This example also computes commitments for later verification using Feldman's scheme.

from shamir import Shamir

# Initialize with secret, total shares (n), and threshold (k)
shamir = Shamir(secret=b"My secret message", n=5, k=3)

# Get public parameters, shares, and commitments
public_data = shamir.get_public()
shares = shamir.get_shares()
commitments = shamir.compute_commitments()

Verifying and Reconstructing the Secret

Verify shares using Feldman's scheme and recover the secret using variables.

from shamir import Shamir

# Initialize recovery instance
recoverer = Shamir()

# Set public parameters and commitments
recoverer.set_public(public_data)
recoverer.set_commitments(commitments)

# Verify shares using Feldman's scheme (example for first 3 shares)
selected_shares = shares[:3]
for share in selected_shares:
    try:
        if recoverer.verify_share(raw_share=share):
            print("Share is valid")
    except ValueError:
        print("Share is invalid")

# Set verified shares and recover the secret
recoverer.set_shares(selected_shares)

# Recover the secret (uses the first k loaded shares)
secret = recoverer.recover()
print(secret.decode())  # Output: My secret message

API Reference

Shamir(secret: bytes | None = None, n: int | None = None, k: int | None = None)

Initializes a Shamir instance for splitting or recovering a secret.

Parameter	Type	Description
secret	bytes, optional	The secret to split (as bytes).
n	int, optional	Total number of shares to generate.
k	int, optional	Minimum number of shares needed to reconstruct the secret.

Raises: ValueError if k > n.

---

recover() -> bytes

Reconstructs and returns the secret as bytes. Requires public parameters and at least k shares to be loaded. Uses the first k loaded shares for reconstruction.

Example:

secret = recoverer.recover()
print(secret.decode())

---

export_public(filename: str) -> None

Exports public parameters (p, q, g, k) to a JSON file.

Example:

shamir.export_public("public.json")

---

load_public(filename: str) -> None

Loads public parameters from a JSON file.

Example:

recoverer.load_public("public.json")

---

get_public() -> dict

Returns public parameters (p, q, g, k) as a dictionary.

Example:

public_data = shamir.get_public()
# Returns: {'p': <prime>, 'q': <Sophie Germain prime>, 'g': <generator>, 'k': <threshold>}

---

set_public(public_data: dict) -> None

Sets public parameters from a dictionary. Supports keys p (prime), q (Sophie Germain prime), g (generator), and k (threshold).

Example:

recoverer.set_public({'p': 123456789, 'q': 61728394, 'g': 5, 'k': 3})

---

export_shares(template: str) -> None

Exports shares to files using a filename template (e.g., share{}.dat).

Example:

shamir.export_shares("share{}.dat")  # Creates share1.dat, share2.dat, ...

---

load_shares(template: str, indexes: list[int]) -> None

Loads shares from files based on a template and a list of indexes. Loads all specified shares, but reconstruction uses only the first k.

Example:

recoverer.load_shares("share{}.dat", indexes=[1, 3, 5])

---

get_shares() -> list

Returns the list of generated shares as Base64-encoded strings.

Example:

shares = shamir.get_shares()

---

set_shares(shares: list) -> None

Sets shares from a list of Base64-encoded strings.

Example:

recoverer.set_shares(shares[:3])  # Use first 3 shares

---

compute_commitments() -> list

Generates and returns a list of commitments for verifying shares using Feldman's VSS scheme.

Example:

commitments = shamir.compute_commitments()

---

set_commitments(commitments: list) -> None

Sets the list of commitments used for verifying shares with Feldman's VSS scheme.

Example:

recoverer.set_commitments(commitments)

---

verify_share(raw_share: str | None = None, filename: str | None = None) -> bool

Verifies the validity of a share using Feldman's VSS scheme. Requires commitments to be set. Provide either a raw Base64-encoded share string or a filename.

Returns True if valid; raises ValueError if invalid or no input mode specified.

Example:

try:
    if recoverer.verify_share(raw_share=share):
        print("Valid")
except ValueError:
    print("Invalid")

Security Notes

• Shares are generated using a cryptographically secure random number generator (secrets.token_bytes).
• The finite field is defined by a large safe prime p = 2q + 1 (where q is also prime) to ensure security.
• Feldman's VSS allows verification of shares without revealing the secret, using discrete logarithm commitments in the subgroup of order q modulo p.
• Ensure shares and commitments are stored securely, as any k valid shares can reconstruct the secret.
• The implementation uses pycryptodome for secure prime generation and number conversions.

How It Works

1. Splitting: The secret is converted to an integer and used as the constant term of a random polynomial of degree k-1 in a finite field modulo q. Shares are points (x, y) on this polynomial.
2. Verification: Using Feldman's VSS, commitments to the polynomial coefficients are generated modulo p. Each share can be verified against these commitments without revealing the secret.
3. Reconstruction: Using Lagrange interpolation modulo q, the secret is recovered from at least k shares.
4. Storage: Shares can be exported to files or handled as variables, with public parameters and commitments stored separately.

👤 Author

• Bodlev Laurentiu
• 📍 Cahul, Republic of Moldova
• 💡 Passionate about cryptography, networking, and distributed systems.
• 🌐 GitHub: https://github.com/lbodlev888

License

This project is licensed under the MIT License. See the LICENSE file for details.