Σ-GLYPH
A claim with an executable check is worth exactly as much as your ability to run the check yourself. Usually you cannot safely run a stranger's program.
Σ-GLYPH makes a check a content-addressed object rather than mutable code you must trust. Evaluation is deterministic, integer-only and total over its canonical outcomes; one ATP budget prices both semantic work and peak semantic materialization.
Receipt = eval(term_hash, atp: uint32, content_environment)
Two machines given the same term hash, budget and valid demanded content return
the same exit, result hash and ATP spent. Missing demanded content is an explicit
input and yields Unresolved Reference; local process/resource faults stay
outside canonical outcomes. Implementations must apply local admission limits
before reading untrusted terms or stores.
The three-input form above is normative since Book I 0.6.0.
What it establishes
Σ-GLYPH owns two things: Book I (deterministic reduction, content addressing,
one ATP budget for work and memory) and sigma-resume (budgeted segments,
checkpoints, resume and verification by replay). Everything else this
repository once carried (Books II and III, the GOV-anchors governance, the
Warrant 0.x apparatus, gate and review material) was retired on 2026-10-31;
history/RETIREMENT-2026-10-ECHO.md says
what left, why and where its bytes are.
Two implementations agree on all 49 Book I conformance vectors and on generated terms: the Python reference and a from-scratch Rust implementation, from one author/model lineage. Lean 4 checks determinism, totality, the semantic-size bound and valid-store monotonicity of Book I, and for sigma-resume segmentation invariance, one state per spent and what an accepted cycle witness establishes. This is strong internal conformance evidence, not independent custody, outside adoption, semantic truth or immunity of a binary to local faults.
The cheapest attacks have repeatedly targeted the apparatus around the kernel:
hidden theorem scope, weakened statements, omitted files and guards that stopped
observing their subjects. proofs/README.md separates what
the Lean kernel checks from what bridges, registries and generated inputs must
still be trusted to supply.
Run it
From a checkout:
python3 impl/sigma_glyph.py # Book I
python3 tests/spec_conformance/run_reference.py # the conformance vectors
python3 tests/resume_test.py # sigma-resume
python3 tests/book1_claims_test.py # the claims' witnesses
tools/test-all.sh # full repository suite
From PyPI (latest release 0.8.0; see "Status by surface" below):
pip install sigma-glyph
python -m sigma_glyph
The wheel contains the Python modules, not the replay corpora; full
re-derivation needs a checkout. The artifact boundary and release procedure are
in PUBLISHING.md.
The resume provider, installed
sigma_provider is the consumer surface of the resumable kernel
(impl/sigma_resume.py, specified by spec/sigma-resume.md): build a
computation from a term, run a budgeted segment (PAUSED or a normal form or an
explicit local refusal), resume from a checkpoint, verify a receipt by replay,
verify a cycle witness. It ships from 0.8.0
(pip install sigma-glyph==0.8.0), or build the wheel from a commit and install
that file.
pip wheel --no-deps -w wheelhouse "git+https://github.com/s0fractal/sigma-glyph@<commit>"
pip install wheelhouse/sigma_glyph-*.whl
python -m sigma_provider # self-test
echo '{"sigma_provider":1,"op":"term","args":{"expr":"S K K (K I)"}}' | python -m sigma_provider serve
The library and the one-request-per-process protocol are documented in the
module's docstring. To continue someone else's checkpoint, use resume, which
replays it from your own root first; raw advance trusts its checkpoint. A consumer decides which provider bytes it accepts:
sigma_provider.identity_of(...) names them, and a provider reporting its own
identity grants nothing.
Status by surface
Each paragraph names its authoritative source; when this section and that
source disagree, the source is right. tools/version_check.py checks the
distribution heading below against pyproject.toml, and the conformance
suite's spec_version against Book I's.
Specification
Book I 1.0.0 and sigma-resume 1.0.0, both STANDARD, the semantics of
Book I 0.6.0 unchanged. A version is the bytes at its release tag, and its
identity Book I §8's SpecAnchor of those bytes; it is adopted when the roadmap
goal "sigma-glyph 1.0" is met, a signed record (AGENTS.md rule 2), not a
heading. The detached registry spec/ANCHORS.txt and its bundle headings were
retired on 2026-11-01 (history/RETIREMENT-2026-11-ANCHORS.md):
Warrant's records and the release tags hold what it held.
Distribution: 1.0.1
pyproject.toml carries 1.0.1: Book I (sigma_glyph) and the resume kernel
and provider (sigma_resume, sigma_provider), without the retired Book II and
III modules, implementing Book I 1.0.0 and sigma-resume 1.0.0. 1.0.0 is on PyPI
since 2026-11-01, cut from tag v1.0.0 once goal G1's obligations were accepted
(AGENTS.md rule 5 says by whom and on what evidence). Its provider did not
conform to sigma-resume §5: it normalized a non-canonical cycle witness and
replayed it (Codex's challenge on G1). 1.0.1 refuses those bytes before replay;
the documents are unchanged.
Releases and what was checked about each are in PUBLISHING.md
and CHANGELOG.md; PyPI is right about what it holds.
The specification
| Document | Status | Owns |
|---|---|---|
Book I — Truth (EN) |
Normative | canonical bytes, SHA-256 identity, SKI normal-order reduction, ATP totalization, content resolution, C1 compiler profile |
sigma-resume |
Normative (draft standard) | budgeted segments, checkpoints, resume, receipts verified by replay, cycle witnesses |
spec/GLOSSARY.md fixes the local meaning of work, size,
memory and materialization; WHY-THESE-THREE.md explains
why determinism, addressing and one semantic bound are combined.
Implement and verify
impl/sigma_glyph.py is the Book I Python reference and impl/sigma_resume.py
the resumable kernel. impl-rs/ independently implements Book I (and
impl-rs/wasm-resume/ the resume kernel) within the same author/model lineage.
(cd impl-rs && cargo build --release)
./impl-rs/target/release/book1 conformance tests/spec_conformance/vectors.json
python3 proofs/proof_guard.py
python3 tools/spec_audit.py
python3 tools/version_check.py
Implementation guidance is in spec/IMPLEMENTING.md.
A released version is the bytes at its tag, and its identity the SpecAnchor of
those bytes; a specification update is an explicit fork, not a mutable page edit
(Book I §8).
For AI or human review, run the reference suite first and attack one exact claim/operand boundary. Green tests are baseline evidence, not an independent gate or governance adoption.
Every RFC 2119 keyword of Book I and sigma-resume (MUST, SHALL, REQUIRED) lies
in some claim's sentence, and warrant claims check refuses one that does not
(coverage): .warrant/claims.json names both documents, the witness files
(tests/book1_claims_test.py, tests/resume_claims_test.py) and the mutant
harness (tests/claims_mutants.py); each claim@1 record quotes one sentence verbatim and
cites the cases that witness it and the mutants that must break them, or says
why it is unbacked. warrant claims check refuses a sentence its document no
longer holds, a witness nobody prints or a mutant off its claim; warrant claims view prints them. A backed claim is accepted by the claims checker
(claim/verifier), a key bound in .warrant/v3.json whose acceptance is a replay
of the witnesses and mutants at one commit; CI re-executes every new acceptance.
Reviews are records, not prose: .warrant/ is this repository's Warrant 3
store (warrant-graph, pinned in .github/warrant-requirements.txt). A pull
request's head is a pr-head@1 version; the reviewer named by
.warrant/v3.json (pr/acceptor) accepts it or files finding@1 challenges
against it, signed with its own key. warrant status and warrant review view
read them. The owner merges (AGENTS.md rule 5).
Published evidence
- One Integer for Semantic Work and Materialization —
Zenodo 10.5281/zenodo.22646920
(v2, 2026-09-07, repository snapshot
47cf57d; concept DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22069650); v1 is 10.5281/zenodo.22069651 (snapshot7ecba6a). Deposited, not peer reviewed. - Does One Integer Still Price Work and Memory in Parallel? —
Zenodo 10.5281/zenodo.22073568, a
preregistered experiment: the aggregate bound survived the measured parallel
reducer while per-redex refusal did not. Its harness is in the deposit and at
commit
96414ab.
Prior eras and their historical hashes are preserved in git history and in the
deposited snapshot, not in the default tree: history/ holds the retirement
ledgers that say what left the surface, why, what was lost and how to retrieve
it with status. Current provenance does not erase superseded semantics; current
admission does not reactivate them.
MIT for implementations; CC BY 4.0 for specification texts.
Metadata
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| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sigma_glyph-1.0.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for sigma_glyph-1.0.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 63.7 kB
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