signxml 4.5.1

Python XML Signature and XAdES library

SignXML is an implementation of the W3C XML Signature standard in Python. This standard (also known as “XMLDSig”) is used to provide payload security in SAML 2.0, XAdES, EBICS, and WS-Security, among other uses. The standard is defined in the W3C Recommendation XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 1.1. SignXML implements all of the required components of the Version 1.1 standard, and most recommended ones. Its features are:

• Use of a libxml2-based XML parser configured to defend against common XML attacks when verifying signatures

• Extensions to allow signing with and verifying X.509 certificate chains, including hostname/CN validation

• Extensions to sign and verify XAdES signatures

• Support for exclusive XML canonicalization with inclusive prefixes (InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList, required to verify signatures generated by some SAML implementations)

• Modern Python compatibility (3.9-3.13+ and PyPy)

• Well-supported, portable, reliable dependencies: lxml and cryptography

• Comprehensive testing (including the XMLDSig interoperability suite) and continuous integration

• Simple interface with useful, ergonomic, and secure defaults (no network calls, XSLT or XPath transforms)

• Compactness, readability, and extensibility

Installation

pip install signxml

Synopsis

SignXML uses the lxml ElementTree API to work with XML data.

from lxml import etree
from signxml import XMLSigner, XMLVerifier

data_to_sign = "<Test/>"
cert = open("cert.pem").read()
key = open("privkey.pem").read()
root = etree.fromstring(data_to_sign)
signed_root = XMLSigner().sign(root, key=key, cert=cert)
verified_data = XMLVerifier().verify(signed_root).signed_xml

To make this example self-sufficient for test purposes:

• Generate a test certificate and key using openssl req -x509 -nodes -subj "/CN=test" -days 1 -newkey rsa -keyout privkey.pem -out cert.pem (run apt-get install openssl, yum install openssl, or brew install openssl if the openssl executable is not found).

• Pass the x509_cert=cert keyword argument to XMLVerifier.verify(). (In production, ensure this is replaced with the correct configuration for the trusted CA or certificate - this determines which signatures your application trusts.)

Verifying SAML assertions

Assuming metadata.xml contains SAML metadata for the assertion source:

from lxml import etree
from base64 import b64decode
from signxml import XMLVerifier

with open("metadata.xml", "rb") as fh:
    cert = etree.parse(fh).find("//ds:X509Certificate").text

assertion_data = XMLVerifier().verify(b64decode(assertion_body), x509_cert=cert).signed_xml

Signing SAML assertions

The SAML assertion schema specifies a location for the enveloped XML signature (between <Issuer> and <Subject>). To sign a SAML assertion in a schema-compliant way, insert a signature placeholder tag at that location before calling XMLSigner: <ds:Signature Id="placeholder"></ds:Signature>.

See what is signed

It is important to understand and follow the best practice rule of “See what is signed” when verifying XML signatures. The gist of this rule is: if your application neglects to verify that the information it trusts is what was actually signed, the attacker can supply a valid signature but point you to malicious data that wasn’t signed by that signature. Failure to follow this rule can lead to vulnerabilities against attacks like SAML signature wrapping and XML comment canonicalization induced text element truncation.

In SignXML, you can ensure that the information signed is what you expect to be signed by only trusting the data returned by XMLVerifier.verify(). The signed_xml attribute of the return value is the XML node or string that was signed. We also recommend that you assert the expected location for the signature within the document:

from signxml import XMLVerifier, SignatureConfiguration
config = SignatureConfiguration(location="./")
XMLVerifier(...).verify(..., expect_config=config)

Recommended reading: W3C XML Signature Best Practices for Applications, On Breaking SAML: Be Whoever You Want to Be, Duo Finds SAML Vulnerabilities Affecting Multiple Implementations, Sign in as anyone: Bypassing SAML SSO authentication with parser differentials

Establish trust

If you do not supply any keyword arguments to verify(), the default behavior is to trust any valid XML signature generated using a valid X.509 certificate trusted by your system’s CA store. This means anyone can get an SSL certificate and generate a signature that you will trust. To establish trust in the signer, use the x509_cert argument to specify a certificate that was pre-shared out-of-band (e.g. via SAML metadata, as shown in Verifying SAML assertions), or cert_subject_name to specify a subject name that must be in the signing X.509 certificate given by the signature (verified as if it were a domain name), or ca_pem_file to give a custom CA.

Requiring digital signature key usage extension for certificates

When verifying x.509 certificates, the default verification policy provided by Cryptography is used. To pass a custom policy to require the digital signature key extension to be set in the certificate, use:

def require_digital_signature_key_usage(_, _, key_usage):
    assert key_usage.digital_signature

ee_policy = x509.verification.ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
    extension_type=x509.KeyUsage,
    criticality=x509.verification.Criticality.AGNOSTIC,
    validator_cb=require_digital_signature_key_usage
)

XMLVerifier(...).verify(..., ee_policy=ee_policy)

XML signature construction methods: enveloped, detached, enveloping

The XML Signature specification defines three ways to compose a signature with the data being signed: enveloped, detached, and enveloping signature. Enveloped is the default method. To specify the type of signature that you want to generate, pass the method argument to sign():

signed_root = XMLSigner(method=signxml.methods.detached).sign(root, key=key, cert=cert)
verified_data = XMLVerifier().verify(signed_root).signed_xml

For detached signatures, the code above will use the Id or ID attribute of root to generate a relative URI (<Reference URI="#value"). You can also override the value of URI by passing a reference_uri argument to sign(). To verify a detached signature that refers to an external entity, pass a callable resolver in XMLVerifier().verify(data, uri_resolver=...).

See the API documentation for more details.

XML representation details: Configuring namespace prefixes and whitespace

Some applications require a particular namespace prefix configuration - for example, a number of applications assume that the http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig# namespace is set as the default, unprefixed namespace instead of using the customary ds: prefix. While in normal use namespace prefix naming is an insignificant representation detail, it can be significant in some XML canonicalization and signature configurations. To configure the namespace prefix map when generating a signature, set the XMLSigner.namespaces attribute:

signer = signxml.XMLSigner(...)
signer.namespaces = {None: signxml.namespaces.ds}
signed_root = signer.sign(...)

Similarly, whitespace in the signed document is significant for XML canonicalization and signature purposes. Do not pretty-print the XML after generating the signature, since this can unfortunately render the signature invalid.

XML parsing security and compatibility with xml.etree.ElementTree

SignXML uses the lxml ElementTree library, not the ElementTree from Python’s standard library, to work with XML. lxml is used due to its superior resistance to XML attacks, as well as XML canonicalization and namespace organization features. It is recommended that you pass XML string input directly to signxml before further parsing, and use lxml to work with untrusted XML input in general. If you do pass xml.etree.ElementTree objects to SignXML, you should be aware of differences in XML namespace handling between the two libraries. See the following references for more information:

• How do I use lxml safely as a web-service endpoint?

• ElementTree compatibility of lxml.etree

• XML Signatures with Python ElementTree

XAdES signatures

XAdES (“XML Advanced Electronic Signatures”) is a standard for attaching metadata to XML Signature objects. This standard is endorsed by the European Union as the implementation for its eSignature regulations.

SignXML supports signing and verifying documents using XAdES signatures:

from signxml import DigestAlgorithm
from signxml.xades import (XAdESSigner, XAdESVerifier, XAdESVerifyResult,
                           XAdESSignaturePolicy, XAdESDataObjectFormat)
signature_policy = XAdESSignaturePolicy(
    Identifier="MyPolicyIdentifier",
    Description="Hello XAdES",
    DigestMethod=DigestAlgorithm.SHA256,
    DigestValue="Ohixl6upD6av8N7pEvDABhEL6hM=",
)
data_object_format = XAdESDataObjectFormat(
    Description="My XAdES signature",
    MimeType="text/xml",
)
signer = XAdESSigner(
    signature_policy=signature_policy,
    claimed_roles=["signer"],
    data_object_format=data_object_format,
    c14n_algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315",
)
signed_doc = signer.sign(doc, key=private_key, cert=certificate)

verifier = XAdESVerifier()
verify_results = verifier.verify(
    signed_doc, x509_cert=certificate, expect_references=3, expect_signature_policy=signature_policy
)
for verify_result in verify_results:
    if isinstance(verify_result, XAdESVerifyResult):
        verify_result.signed_properties  # use this to access parsed XAdES properties

Authors

• Andrey Kislyuk and SignXML contributors.

Links

• Project home page (GitHub)

• Documentation

• Package distribution (PyPI)

• Change log

• List of W3C XML Signature standards and drafts

• W3C Recommendation: XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 1.1

• W3C Working Group Note: XML Signature Best Practices

• XML-Signature Interoperability

• W3C Working Group Note: Test Cases for C14N 1.1 and XMLDSig Interoperability

• W3C Working Group Note: XML Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0 (This draft standard proposal was never finalized and is not in general use.)

• Intelligence Community Technical Specification: Web Service Security Guidance for Use of XML Signature and XML Encryption

• XMLSec: Related links

• OWASP SAML Security Cheat Sheet

• Okta Developer Docs: SAML

Bugs

Please report bugs, issues, feature requests, etc. on GitHub.

Versioning

This package follows the Semantic Versioning 2.0.0 standard. To control changes, it is recommended that application developers pin the package version and manage it using uv or similar. For library developers, pinning the major version is recommended.

License

Copyright 2014-2024, Andrey Kislyuk and SignXML contributors. Licensed under the terms of the Apache License, Version 2.0. Distribution of the LICENSE and NOTICE files with source copies of this package and derivative works is REQUIRED as specified by the Apache License.