stapel-gdpr

GDPR compliance: staged async data export (Art. 15/20) with status polling and download; subject-scoped erasure (Art. 17) — account, workspace, meeting, recording, document, file — each proven by one receipt per data owner that claims the subject type, with a purge SLA, timeout sweep and a subprocessor ledger behind fully_erased_by; account closure keeps its cancellable 30-day grace and produces an ErasureRequest at grace end; DSAR intake (Art. 12) with automated acknowledgement and both statutory clocks; data-owner liveness probing; inactivity closure, retention cleanup, LegalHold and ReRegistrationHash; orchestrated through an in-process GDPRProvider registry (stapel_core.gdpr.gdpr_registry) plus comm confirmation (gdpr.section.erased) for remote owners.

Part of the Stapel framework — composable Django apps that deploy as a monolith or as microservices without changing module code.

Install

pip install stapel-gdpr

At a glance

Documentation

OpenAPI · capabilities.json · llms.txt (for agents)

Quick start

# settings.py
INSTALLED_APPS = [
    ...
    'stapel_gdpr',
]

MIDDLEWARE = [
    ...
    # After authentication: refuses every request of an account being erased,
    # whatever a still-valid token claims.
    'stapel_gdpr.guards.AccountClosureGuardMiddleware',
]

STAPEL_GDPR = {
    # Every store holding personal data, mapped to the subjects it holds it
    # about. Erasure is only ever reported complete when each of these
    # returned a deletion receipt, so an owner missing here is a store that
    # quietly keeps the data. `manage.py check` fails while this is empty.
    #
    # These are the names the LIBRARIES declare, not app labels: the `cdn`
    # app owns `media`, the `profiles` app owns `profile`. A name no
    # installed library declares is inferred remote and times out in
    # silence, so `manage.py check` refuses it (gdpr.E009), and an installed
    # owner missing from this map — a store no erasure ever waits for — is
    # gdpr.E010.
    'DATA_OWNERS': {
        'auth': ['account'],
        'profile': ['account'],
        'media': {'subject_types': ['account', 'workspace', 'file'],
                  'kind': 'remote'},
    },
    'DATA_OWNERS_VERSION': '2026-09-07.1',
    # How the user's sessions are revoked at closure. Auto-detected when
    # stapel-auth is installed; without any seam, closure is refused rather
    # than performed with live tokens left behind.
    'SESSION_REVOKER': 'stapel_auth.sessions.services.SessionService.revoke_all',
}

Run manage.py check after wiring: a missing or stale data-owner inventory, an owner name no installed library declares, an installed owner the inventory omits, hash rows written outside store_hashes, and every open escape hatch are reported there rather than discovered in an audit.

Bus events

Emits

| user.deleted | schema | All user PII permanently deleted after grace period. Every package storing user | | user.deletion_cancelled | schema | Account closure cancelled during the grace period; every reversible reaction to user.deletion_initiated must be lifted. | | user.deletion_initiated | schema | Account closure started. 30-day grace period begins; account is deactivated. | | user.export_ready | schema | Data export archive is ready for download. | | user.sessions_revoked | schema | Closure revoked every session and access JTI of the user. |

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

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