Suijin
Your team of fully autonomous web app pentesters and red teamers for any situation.
Developer's Note and Practical Note
⭐️ Please leave a star if you liked Suijin!
Hello and thanks to everyone who's reading this! I'm William, the dev behind Suijin. It's taken months to build Suijin and it is the culmination of my knowledge of web app pentesting and systems knowledge.
Glad to see that you might be giving Suijin a change to help you with your pentesting workflows or bug bounty hunting!
I personally use Suijin almost every day, mostly benchmarking runs and real engagements and it has shown real results and found many CVEs and earned me lots of real-world reputation with bug bounty programs and vulnerability disclosure programs.
But on a practical note, Suijin is still very much in development and I am actively building and shipping improvements and bug fixes.
If you do encounter any bugs or issues please open an issue or email me directly at jiangwilliam30@gmail.com or DM me on X @0xwi11iam. If you'd like to, pull requests are accepted and greatly appreciated.
Thank you so much!
made with ❤️ by 0xwi11iam
You tell it what to test. It maps the product landscape, spawns the right specialists for each vulnerability class, discusses attack surfaces with the other sessions, shares confirmed findings with the team automatically, and gets hacking. It runs the engagement — recon, exploitation, post-exploitation, report — like a pentester who never gets tired, never skips the boring surfaces, never tunnels-visions on one endpoint while 90% of the target sits untested, and proves every finding by running the exploit before claiming it, all while you supervise from an Operator Console watching over what everyone on the team is doing.
Who it's for
- Bug bounty hunters who can load the program rules, point Suijin at in-scope targets, and get back verified findings — not "the model thinks there's an IDOR here," here's the POC, the output, the marker.
- Pentest teams running authorized engagements. One agent per target, or a whole team on one target — they split lanes, share dead ends, and never re-burn a payload a peer already ruled out.
- CTF players. Flip the profile and the doctrine changes: the flag is the objective, a confirmed bug is a stepping stone, persistence prioritised over tidiness.
- Security researchers who want an agent platform that grades itself — onboard labs with chain-verification tests and bench scoring, so "did my change make the agent better" is a number, not a vibe.
What a run looks like
1. Start it.
suijin lab up
suijin
(mode: type 1)
target: 127.0.0.1:6000
It maps the surface, probes, exploits, escalates to as far as it can go, and writes the
report — narrating its reasoning in your terminal the whole way. You
can interrupt at any point to redirect it; it can pause between turns,
resume saved runs, and pick up an engagement weeks later from its
.sje snapshot.
2. Or start a team. Open one terminal per agent. Sessions on the same target find each other, introduce their lanes, and coordinate — while agents on different targets are kept strictly apart.
3. Watch from one screen.
suijin operator
Every running agent on one dashboard: live cards, iteration history,
confirmed exploits, the team's chat. Keyboard-first — tab cycles
panels, j/k pages the roster, ←→ walks any agent's iteration
history. The input box is a command line:
/say <msg> |
talk to the whole team |
/pause [msg] |
hold every agent between turns, with a message they read on resume |
/report [note] |
tell every agent to wrap up, write the report, and end cleanly |
/su <hex> |
become an agent — /state /cost /findings, change its objective, or type guidance straight into its context |
/exploits /tail /sort /filter |
inspect and rearrange the field |
4. Trust the output. A finding only counts when its POC ran and
the target produced the expected marker — unique, target-derived
strings; 200 OK proves nothing. No match means the exploit comes
back with every command and output attached so you can fix or drop
it. A finding without a cataloged POC is a rumor. Confirmed findings
capture their verifying output as tamper-evident, content-addressed
evidence — the report re-hashes every proof at generation time and
flags drift, so what you submit is provably what you verified. And
severity is honest by construction: the system caps claims whose
evidence only shows information-class output.
4a. The system catches what the model misses. Every HTTP request feeds an observation engine that deterministically detects IDOR and access control gaps from accumulated evidence — different credentials getting different responses for the same object surfaces as a finding the model can't ignore. When a vulnerability class is detected, sub-agents get the specialist's doctrine: the IDOR expert tests cross-account systematically, the injection expert knows the filter evasion playbook. And when the agent tunnels on one endpoint, the breadth alert tells it to rotate: "68% of your last actions target Search & Redirectors. 5 product families untested. Pick one."
5. Come back tomorrow. Suijin remembers: blocked patterns, WAF rules, false positives, dead batteries, what worked where. The next engagement — same target or same tech — starts with all of it and skips the graveyard. Resumed runs scrub verified-dead credentials from carried state — a key that was SERVICE_DISABLED yesterday doesn't come back as today's "discovery."
6. Or run it in a box.
suijin box
A sealed linux environment (OrbStack on macOS, or Docker) that runs
Suijin and its tools with your device untouched: build it once,
enter it, work inside. Your config, packs and prompts sync one-way
in — nothing the box generates ever flows back — and entering
detects drift, offering to sync and install any newly-listed tools.
Engagements live on the box's own disk and survive restarts;
destroying it archives everything out first and asks you to type the
confirmation. Bare suijin keeps working exactly as before — the
box is a choice, not a migration.
Comparison
| Suijin | non-specialised agents | |
|---|---|---|
| Findings are | terminal-verified POCs | model claims |
| Ending the run | structurally refused while surfaces are untested | up to the model |
| Parallel agents | session mesh — lane claims, shared dead ends, cross-target isolation | separate chats |
| Confirmed findings | auto-propagate to peers (blackboard) | each agent hoards |
| Target coverage | product-family landscape — the agent sees "1/10 families explored" and gets told to rotate | one endpoint at a time |
| IDOR / access control | deterministic from accumulated evidence — the system surfaces what the data already shows | model has to notice |
| Sub-agents | vuln-class specialists (9 profiles: idor, injection, ssrf, authn…) | general workers |
| Dead credentials | scrubbed on resume — verified-dead keys can't reappear as "findings" | carried forever |
| Dead ends | remembered cross-engagement | re-tried tomorrow |
| The operator | one command center — pause, steer, impersonate any agent | N terminals |
Safety first
New to it — or new to the agent? Run it against the onboard lab: a multi-service target (15 named services behind a gateway/auth/core plane, ~100+ vulnerability instances, cross-service chains, decoys, 22 flags) that runs on your machine. Sharpen against something that can't get you arrested.
suijin lab up
suijin
press 1
press 1
target: 127.0.0.1:6000
Quick start
# one command (macOS / Linux)
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xwi11iam/Suijin/main/install.sh | bash
# first engagement
suijin engage "http://127.0.0.1:6000 — full assessment"
# watch every agent from one screen
suijin operator
install — all methods
# pipx / uv (installable package)
pipx install suijin
# with the Neo4j knowledge-graph backend (json is the default)
pipx install "suijin[kg]"
# manual
git clone https://github.com/0xwi11iam/Suijin
cd Suijin && pip install -e .
# dev install (live local copy)
pip install -e ".[dev]"
# docker (turnkey)
docker build -t suijin .
CLI reference
| group | verbs |
|---|---|
| engage | engage exploit resume load plan replay panic |
| operator | operator tui attach ps stop daemon suijind mesh-port |
| knowledge | kg kb recipes wordlist pull creds bb-scope |
| workspace | workspace sessions reports export clean |
| system | doctor selftest status version env providers config install lab bench pack capability tools modules module skills profile prompt theater market gateway tokens rules policy notify compliance authorize |
Authorized security testing only.
On a more serious note, never point Suijin at a system you do not own or lack written
permission to test. Unauthorized access is illegal — you accept full
responsibility for what you run.
Licensed under AGPL v3.0 · Suijin · By 0xwi11iam(William Jiang)
Metadata
Release files for suijin 7.2.0
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Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
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| suijin-7.2.0.tar.gz | 1.1 MB | Without provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| suijin-7.2.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 2.8 MB
Release files / suijin-7.2.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | suijin-7.2.0.tar.gz |
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| Size | 1.1 MB |
| Tags | Source |
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| Tags | Python 3 |
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Security for suijin 7.2.0
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