SUM: source review and checkable transformations
SUM helps people reshape text, inspect changes against the original source, and share a checkable review. Its long-term aim is a knowledge distiller with useful levels of detail and perspective over retained sources. Today the browser workbench supports source/rewrite review and receipt-aware export; the CLI and MCP add model-based research measurements and offline verification.
A signed receipt identifies the bytes and measurements an issuer attested. It does not prove that meaning survived or that the issuer is a trusted organization. Keep source review, model measurements, statistical assumptions and cryptographic checks separate.
See what an AI transform silently dropped. sum meaning-diff reads out, per document, which source claims survived a rewrite and which vanished. Here it is on a shipped fixture — a four-clause lease notice rewritten as verse:
$ sum meaning-diff examples/poetry_frontier/source.txt examples/poetry_frontier/sonnet.txt --scorer nli
Meaning readout — measured for THIS document (not a certified bound)
judge: nli:MoritzLaurer/DeBERTa-v3-base-mnli-fever-anli v1
preservation: 55% (loss 0.450)
source claims: 4 — 1 preserved, 3 DROPPED:
✗ Late payment after the fifth day incurs a 50 dollar fee.
✗ The landlord must give 24 hours notice before entering the unit.
✗ Either party may terminate this lease with 30 days written notice.
added / unsupported claims: none ✓
→ 3 dropped — review before relying on this rendering.
(measured for THIS document under the named judge — a per-document MEASUREMENT, not a certified bound or a guarantee; for a (1-δ) bound use a meaning_risk receipt over a named corpus.)
To run that exact command: pip install 'sum-engine[research,judge]' (meaning-diff needs [research]; the --scorer nli judge needs [judge]) from a git checkout — examples/ ships in the repo, not in the wheel. The zero-clone path is the receipt replay in Verify it yourself in 60 seconds below.
Receipt-producing operations can sign their declared inputs, outputs and metadata. Offline verification checks those signed fields against supplied keys. Extraction, unsigned local bundles and human review decisions must not be described as signed when no signature is present. Historical per-axis benchmarks are measurements on their named corpora, not a measurement of the current browser result.
Live trust loop: https://sum-demo.ototao.workers.dev — the Worker and the Python package sign Ed25519 over JCS-canonical bytes; Python, Node and browser verifiers check those bytes offline against /.well-known/jwks.json. CI runs the Python and Node paths on every PR (the JS verifiers under Node, the workbench tests under jsdom); no browser engine runs in CI.
Use cases to evaluate: editors reviewing rewrites, researchers tracking source evidence, and AI teams exchanging checkable artifacts. Real recurring use and willingness to pay remain to be established. Audit-log validators check specific data structures; they do not certify organizational or legal compliance.
The cryptographic side is mechanically checked — the Python and Node verifiers agree on the K-matrix (valid) and A-matrix (invalid) fixture bundles in CI on every PR; the browser verifier implements the same checks but no browser engine runs in CI. The semantic side (extraction quality, slider fact preservation) is empirically measured with explicit per-corpus numbers and explicit per-corpus boundaries. docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md is the arbiter.
Headline supporting numbers (each links to its source of truth):
| Claim | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Python ↔ Node agreement on Ed25519 over JCS bytes (the browser verifier is not run in CI) | provable; locked by make xruntime (K1–K4) + make xruntime-adversarial (A1–A8) |
docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md §1.2, §1.3.1 |
Canonical round-trip reconstruct(parse(canonical_tome(S))) == S |
provable; 0.00% drift on every CI run | docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md §1.1 |
Render receipt — sum.render_receipt.v1, Ed25519 / JCS / detached JWS |
shipped; verifier in three runtimes | docs/RENDER_RECEIPT_FORMAT.md |
| Slider fact preservation: median 1.000, p10 0.769 (long n=16) / 0.818 (short n=8) | empirical-benchmark — measured; same-commit replay receipt still pending (bench-hardening T2/T3) | docs/SLIDER_CONTRACT.md |
Extraction F1 = 1.000 (seed_v1), 0.762 with precision 1.000 (seed_v2) |
empirical-benchmark | docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md §2.1 |
A render receipt verifies the render attestation (issuer signed this tome, these triples, this slider position, this model, at this time). It does not verify the truth of the tome's content. The slider bench measures a named preservation proxy on a particular corpus; it does not establish factual truth either. See docs/RENDER_RECEIPT_FORMAT.md §5 for the explicit trust scope.
Why it matters
More of what people read is now produced or reshaped by AI — summarised, translated, distilled, rewritten. As that grows, the ability to check what changed, what was preserved, and what was lost stops being a nicety and becomes shared infrastructure for a trustworthy information commons.
SUM is built to be that layer in the open: Apache-2.0, offline-verifiable by anyone, and aligned with open standards (C2PA digital_source_type, W3C VC 2.0, JOSE / JWS / JWKS) rather than a proprietary trust silo. It does not ask you to trust SUM — any third party verifies the receipt themselves, in Python, Node or the browser, and the project states plainly where proof ends and measurement begins. The aim is a checkable chain of custody for knowledge in motion, not another walled garden.
Verify it yourself in 60 seconds
The differentiator — replay a meaning-loss bound, fully offline. SUM's flagship receipt is a signed, replayable certificate over a named meaning-loss proxy. The verifier is dependency-light — sum_verify imports only cryptography and joserfc, with no numpy / scipy / torch, no GPU, and no network — and a real binding-gate golden over public-domain text (BillSum, CC0) ships inside the wheel, so this works straight from pip, no clone:
pip install 'sum-engine[verify]' # no numpy/scipy/torch; see note below
python -m sum_verify --demo # replays the bundled BillSum golden, offline
# → {"verified": true, "schema": "sum.meaning_risk_receipt.v1", "replayed": true,
# "scorer": "bidirectional-entailment[minilm-cosine-0.5]",
# "not_covered": ["arrangement","sound","connotation","implicature"],
# "statistical_scope": "not_declared", "sampling_status": "not_declared",
# "n": 64, "method": "hoeffding", "delta": 0.05,
# "risk_upper_bound": 0.645438, "controlled": true,
# "proxy_caveat": "verified=true is a cryptographic fact ... the proxy
# correlated only modestly at summary level (Spearman rho 0.267-0.291 on
# SummEval; NLI ~0.29 replicates on FRANK; the embedding judge is
# corpus-dependent, near zero on abstractive FRANK-XSum). Not a
# substitute for human review.",
# "demo_key_warning": "The bundled demo JWKS is derived from a publicly
# known all-zero Ed25519 seed, so anyone can sign under it: ..."}
What [verify] actually installs. cryptography, joserfc, and sympy (a base dependency of the package, used by the state-integer path — not imported by sum_verify). The load-bearing promise is the one above: no numpy, scipy, torch, GPU, or network on the verification path.
To verify your own receipt — or the source goldens from a git checkout — pass the files explicitly:
python -m sum_verify <receipt.json> --jwks <jwks.json> --losses <losses.json>
# from a checkout, the binding-gate goldens live in fixtures/meaning_receipts_billsum/
verified: true + replayed: true means the committed per-pair losses hash to the receipt's anchor and reproduce its stated bound arithmetic (0.645438, ≤ 0.6455 at δ = 0.05) by exact integer equality — on your machine, against the supplied JWKS. That number is a descriptive measurement of these 64 bills: they are the first 64 of the test split, not an independent random draw, so it carries no 95% confidence reading about other documents. Without --losses the verdict shows the bound only as issuer_asserted_risk_upper_bound and omits controlled. The demo JWKS is the all-zero-seed test key, so the demo signature authenticates no issuer (see demo_key_warning); for real receipts, establish trust in the issuer's keys through an independent channel. Read the proxy_caveat: that PASS is a cryptographic fact, not proof meaning was preserved — the bound is over a proxy that tracks human judgment only modestly. The richer readout (the bound itself, perspective cohorts) is sum verify-meaning (which needs the heavier pip install "sum-engine[research,receipt-verify]" — the no-numpy promise above is scoped to python -m sum_verify); for non-extractive rewrites use --scorer nli — examples/poetry_frontier/ shows exactly where the embedding judge's blind spot is.
Mint your own receipt
Verifying someone else's receipt is half the loop. To issue one over your own corpus:
pip install 'sum-engine[research,receipt-verify,judge]'
sum mint-meaning --pairs pairs.jsonl --scorer nli \
--corpus-id my-corpus --transform my-transform \
--out out/receipt.json --gen-key out/
# self-verifies through the verify path before handing you the file,
# and prints the exact `sum verify-meaning …` line a third party runs
pairs.jsonl is your own data, one {"source": "…", "rendering": "…"} per line. Aim for n ≥ ~32: small samples often produce a vacuous bound near 1.0. New receipts default to descriptive batch scope; a confidence interpretation for future expected proxy loss requires independent calibration draws from the target population, a fixed policy and no unaccounted calibration reuse. Sample size alone establishes none of those conditions. (--source FILE --rendering FILE mints from a single pair, which is exactly that vacuous case.) --gen-key writes a fresh keypair plus JWKS; the private half is mode 0600 and never leaves your machine.
docs/THIRD_PARTY_VERIFY.md walks the full mint-then-verify round trip, and examples/issue_meaning_receipt.py is the scripted version. Read the vacuity, independent-sampling and distribution-match warnings it prints — a bound over a corpus your text does not resemble is not evidence about your text.
The render trust loop (signed provenance). The other receipt family attests that a transformation happened (issuer, inputs, slider position, model, time) — the same JWS verifiable in Python, Node and the browser (CI checks the Python and Node verifiers):
# JWKS — single Ed25519 OKP JWK, application/jwk-set+json
curl -sS https://sum-demo.ototao.workers.dev/.well-known/jwks.json > jwks.json
# Render — tome + render_receipt (signed JWS over JCS payload); keep the receipt
curl -sS -X POST https://sum-demo.ototao.workers.dev/api/render \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"triples":[["alice","graduated","2012"],["alice","born","1990"]],
"slider_position":{"density":1.0,"length":0.5,"formality":0.7,"audience":0.5,"perspective":0.5}}' \
| jq '.render_receipt' > render_receipt.json
# Verify it offline against the key you just fetched
pip install "sum-engine[verify]"
python -m sum_verify render_receipt.json --jwks jwks.json
# -> verified: true, replayed: false. A render receipt has no bound to replay;
# it attests that this issuer signed this render, not what the render preserved.
A render receipt attests the render, not the truth of its content (trust scope in docs/RENDER_RECEIPT_FORMAT.md §5); a minimal Node verifier using jose + canonicalize is in §A.5, and the same format is reachable from Python (joserfc + jcs), Go, and Rust per §3.
What ships today
| Surface | Status | Verifies |
|---|---|---|
pip install 'sum-engine[sieve]' — sum attest / sum verify / sum render / sum resolve / sum ledger / sum inspect / sum schema |
shipped on PyPI ≥ 0.4.1 | structural reconstruction; HMAC-SHA256 + Ed25519 signatures (W3C VC 2.0 eddsa-jcs-2022); bidirectional sum attest ↔ sum render symmetry from the shell |
Cloudflare Worker at sum-demo.ototao.workers.dev |
shipped | /api/render → tome + render_receipt; /api/transform → generic transform-registry dispatch + sum.transform_receipt.v1; /api/complete → LLM proxy; /api/qid → Wikidata resolver; /.well-known/jwks.json + /.well-known/revoked-kids.json → trust-loop endpoints. Public LLM-axis routes are rate-limited per IP — see docs/PUBLIC_API_RATE_LIMITS.md (5/day operator-keyed demo; 100/hr with BYO key via X-Render-LLM-Key-Anthropic / -OpenAI). |
Browser workbench (single_file_demo/index.html) |
available in this checkout; deployment is a separate release step | retained source + existing rewrite, advisory literal span comparison, human review and exact packet export; generated results carry available render receipts, checked against displayed content. No arbitrary-document model judge runs in this page. |
| Cross-runtime trust check | locked by CI (make xruntime) |
K1 / K1-mw / K2 / K3 / K4 — Python ↔ Node agree byte-for-byte on valid bundles. make xruntime-adversarial adds A1–A8 rejection-class equivalence. No browser engine runs in CI. |
| 5-axis slider rendering surface | density actioned deterministically; length / formality / audience / perspective LLM-conditioned. Two dispatch paths: Worker /api/render (Anthropic + Cloudflare AI Gateway optional) producing sum.render_receipt.v1, OR Python sum transform apply slider (OpenAI via OPENAI_API_KEY) producing sum.transform_receipt.v1 |
bench: median LLM-axis fact preservation 1.000, p10 0.769 (long, n=16) / 0.818 (short, n=8), order preservation 1.000 wherever measurable. Tightening worktrail at docs/BENCH_HARDENING_FROM_QCVV.md adds iteration-stability + DKW worst-case bounds + capability-region headlines |
MCP server (sum-mcp console script) |
shipped; meaning layer on main | bundle tools (extract / attest / verify / inspect / render / schema) plus the meaning layer for agent swarms (verify_receipt for the four sum_verify schemas with the same honest verdict the sum_verify CLI prints, meaning_diff, depth_frontier, mint_meaning_receipt / mint_chain_receipt BYO-private-key only) over stdio; verification is parallel-safe, judge calls serialise (run N processes for parallel judging); measured ~450-530 full-chain verifies/s on one process (see docs/MCP_INTEGRATION.md) |
Transform substrate (sum.transform_receipt.v1 + registry) |
shipped on PyPI ≥ 0.7.0 | sum transform list / sum transform apply <name> — three registered transforms (slider / extract / compose); receipts via Ed25519 / JCS / detached JWS just like render-receipts; 20-fixture cross-runtime K-matrix locks accept + reject across Python ↔ Node (the browser loads the same JS verifier; no browser engine runs in CI); T4 source_chain_hash binds receipts to source byte ranges; T5 ShareableRender round-trips signed renders for offline verification (library API only, no CLI door yet); T6 multi-school extract runs two extractors in tandem for adversarial-divergence detection. Wire spec at docs/TRANSFORM_RECEIPT_FORMAT.md; design at docs/TRANSFORM_REGISTRY.md. |
Replay-defense window (signed_at_out_of_window) |
shipped | opt-in max_age_seconds parameter across all four verifier surfaces (Python render / Python transform / JS render / JS transform). Default-off preserves archival use; receivers opt in per use-case (agent-swarm 60s, real-time 600s, newsletter 1d, legal-discovery no window). |
sum verify --explain layered output |
shipped | Per-dimension report (sum.verify_explained.v1): cryptographic integrity / canonical reconstruction / axiom consistency / extraction provenance / source evidence coverage / semantic preservation / truth of content. Each carries epistemic_status (provable / certified / empirical-benchmark / not-asserted). Truth of content is ALWAYS not_asserted — locked by test. |
Meaning-loss receipts + sum_verify SDK |
shipped on PyPI ≥ 0.8.0 | sum.meaning_risk_receipt.v1 — a signed, replayable bound on a named meaning-loss proxy, with independent-sampling and distribution-match assumptions (pip install 'sum-engine[verify]' → import sum_verify / python -m sum_verify, dependency-light: no numpy/scipy/torch). Plus sum meaning-diff (per-document "what was kept / dropped / added"), sum drift-budget (compose meaning-loss across a transform chain), and sum exchangeability (advisory: is a bound applicable to your text?). Research-flagged; the affirmative contribution behind arXiv Paper-1. |
| Signed chains + transparency log | shipped on PyPI ≥ 0.9.0 | sum.chain_receipt.v1 binds ordered hop receipts (by canonical hash + an order-binding chain_id) into an integer-exact Bonferroni budget with a joint δ (sum mint-chain; verify with python -m sum_verify … --hops). The first real signed chain over public-domain text is committed at fixtures/chain_receipts_billsum/: BillSum (CC0), 2 real hops — the dataset's own reference summary, then deterministic lead-N extractive compression — under the strict NLI judge; budget ≤ 1.3547 (signed 1.354628) by Bonferroni arithmetic at joint δ = 0.10. That is a descriptive measurement of the first 32 bills of the test split, not an independent random draw, so no 0.90 confidence reading applies. The budget is the sum of the per-hop bound values, not a bound on the end-to-end loss (a directed loss, not a metric, so no triangle inequality holds); the mandatory budget_scope field says the latter. Like every chain minted before this change, this golden's signed budget_scope states the Bonferroni reading unconditionally; verdicts add an unsigned budget_scope_note saying it holds only under each hop's sampling assumptions, and new chains sign the conditional wording. Verifiers report the budget as issuer_asserted_budget with joint_delta, derive no confidence, and set replayed only when the end-to-end leg is replayed from losses (hop_envelopes_checked covers the hop signature and mirror checks). Every committed golden is witnessed in an append-only transparency/log.jsonl (python scripts/witness_receipt.py verify). |
| Negative-control corpus (T5 of bench-hardening) | shipped | 95 hand-authored documents across 7 failure modes (the first 20 cover ambiguous coref / predicate-alias / contradictions / entity-resolution-adversarial / non-extractable; 75 more cover 34 conditional assertions, 38 cross-clause chimeras and 3 negations: neither / nor, "No" and "Nobody"). Runner exits 1 if observed failures don't match annotations. Receipts: fixtures/bench_receipts/negative_control_2026-10-04.json (95 documents, extractor v2: 82 expected / 10 advisory / 3 unexpected) and the 20-document baseline fixtures/bench_receipts/negative_control_2026-05-17.json. |
| Compliance validators (six regimes) | shipped | sum compliance check --regime <id> --audit-log <path> — EU AI Act Article 12, GDPR Article 30, HIPAA § 164.312(b), ISO/IEC 27001 A.8.15, SOC 2 CC 7.2, PCI DSS v4.0 Req 10. All six produce the same sum.compliance_report.v1 schema; per-regime docs at docs/COMPLIANCE_*.md. |
Historical slider preservation numbers describe their named corpora and judges. The NLI audit examined embedding-flagged cases; it cannot establish that high-scoring cases contain no missed losses. The live benchmark runner is implemented, but committed evidence for the current production generation loop and independent human validation remain open. See docs/SLIDER_CONTRACT.md and docs/BENCH_HARDENING_FROM_QCVV.md.
Strategic context
The operational compass — read in this order if you want the project's intent + how it operates + where it's going:
docs/CHARTER_2026-05-17.md— intent, the Why, strategy, objectives, success criteria, constraints, and the operational loop. The compass every other doc resolves to.docs/PRODUCT_VISION.md— the product vision (the slider workbench: drop text → render it from a tag to a tome, with a signed receipt of what was preserved) and the positioning: SUM is the chain-of-custody standard for AI-transformed text — provenance-first, attest-don't-detect (a cryptographic guarantee robust to rewriting; an "is this AI?" answer ships only as an honest advisory signal, never a "99 %").docs/PRODUCT_DELIBERATION_2026-05-14.md— three-option strategic analysis + grant-outcome decision tree.docs/ZENITH_FRAMING_2026-05-16.md— destination framing (SUM as chain-of-custody for AI-transformed knowledge) plus three new concepts (Perspective Receipts, Trust Profiles, Epistemic Nutrition Label) on the design queue.docs/BENCH_HARDENING_FROM_QCVV.md— five-task empirical-benchmark hardening plan (T5 shipped 2026-05-17; T1 closed 2026-05-21; T4 closed 2026-05-22; T2 + T3 still open, gated onsum.slider_drift_bench.v1receipts).docs/DOGFOOD_QUICKSTART.md— five-minute guide to running SUM on your own writing.
LLM narrative round-trip — closed across measured corpora (2026-04-28)
The hardest measurement in PROOF_BOUNDARY.md is the full LLM narrative round-trip (text → LLM-extract → axioms → LLM-generate → prose' → LLM-extract → axioms'). The unprompted-pipeline baseline on seed_v1 was drift = 107.75% / exact-match recall = 0.12 — facts preserved, keys not.
A two-layer generator-side intervention (canonical-first generator prompt + constrained-decoding extractor with vocab-pinned Literal enums + lemma-exclusion of source-predicate lemmas from the canonical-padding set) now closes this across every measured corpus shape:
| Corpus | n_docs | axioms / doc | combined recall | drift_pct | full recall |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| seed_v1 (single-fact SVO) | 50 | 1 | 1.0000 | 0.00 | 50 / 50 |
| seed_v2 (7 difficulty parse patterns + multi-fact) | 20 | 1–2 | 0.9750 | 5.00 | 19 / 20 |
| seed_long_paragraphs (16-topic multi-paragraph) | 16 | 11–28 | 0.9972 | 0.57 | 15 / 16 |
The combined intervention lands ≥ 0.97 recall and ≤ 5 % drift on every measured corpus shape — single-fact short-form, multi-fact difficulty-pattern, and multi-paragraph dense-prose. The §2.5 closure is corpus-independent. The remaining gap on each corpus traces to upstream LLM source-extraction artifacts (corrupted axioms on seed_v2 doc_015, semantically-duplicate predicates on seed_long solar_system), not to the intervention pattern.
Receipt artifacts:
fixtures/bench_receipts/s25_generator_side_2026-04-28.json— full ablation matrix on seed_v1.fixtures/bench_receipts/s25_residual_closure_2026-04-28.json— combined + lemma-exclusion on seed_v1.fixtures/bench_receipts/s25_generator_side_seed_v2_2026-04-28.json— all three ablations on seed_v2.fixtures/bench_receipts/s25_generator_side_seed_long_combined_2026-04-28.json— combined ablation on seed_long_paragraphs.
Reproducible: python -m scripts.bench.runners.s25_generator_side --ablation combined --corpus <path> --out <path> (~$0.07–$0.20 OpenAI per corpus, ~3–8 min wall clock). Full attribution + per-ablation breakdowns + per-doc failure analysis in docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md §2.5.
The deterministic canonical round-trip (the one sum attest | sum verify exercises) is mechanically proven (§1.1, 0.00% drift). The LLM round-trip is not, and this section is here to keep that distinction above the fold.
CLI quick start
pip install 'sum-engine[sieve]'
echo "Alice likes cats. Bob owns a dog." \
| sum attest --extractor=sieve > bundle.json
sum verify --input bundle.json
# → sum: ✓ verified 2 axiom(s), state integer matches (hmac=absent, ed25519=absent, extractor=sieve (verifiable))
sum render < bundle.json > tome.md
# → bundle's axioms re-emitted as canonical prose; round-trips to the same state integer
The reverse direction also runs under explicit slider control. The local path actions only the density slider; non-neutral length / formality / audience / perspective require the LLM extrapolator and route through the hosted Worker:
sum render --density 0.5 < bundle.json
# → keeps the lex-prefix half of the axioms; @sliders header records what was requested
sum render --length 0.9 --use-worker https://sum-demo.ototao.workers.dev --json < bundle.json
# → LLM-conditioned tome + signed render_receipt (sum.render_receipt.v1) on stdout
Add cryptographic attestation with one flag:
# Ed25519 / W3C VC 2.0 (eddsa-jcs-2022)
python -m scripts.generate_did_web --domain your.example --private-key-out keys/issuer.pem
sum attest --ed25519-key keys/issuer.pem < prose.txt | sum verify --strict
# → hmac=absent, ed25519=verified, extractor=sieve (verifiable)
The same bundle bytes verify under sum verify (Python), node standalone_verifier/verify.js (WebCrypto), and the in-browser demo (SubtleCrypto); CI checks the Python and Node paths, not the browser. docs/DID_SETUP.md walks the did:key / did:web issuer setup. docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md §1.3.1 documents what the cross-runtime Ed25519 contract proves.
Calling SUM from MCP-aware LLM clients
pip install 'sum-engine[mcp,sieve]'
# Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor / Continue: add to MCP config:
# { "mcpServers": { "sum": { "command": "sum-mcp" } } }
sum-mcp exposes the bundle verbs (extract, attest, verify, inspect, render, schema) plus the meaning layer (verify_receipt, meaning_diff, depth_frontier, mint_meaning_receipt, mint_chain_receipt — BYO private key only; the server never generates or stores keys) as MCP tools. Bundles attested via MCP verify byte-identically through the CLI / Node / browser verifiers — same canonical codec — and receipt verdicts carry the same honesty fields (proxy_caveat, budget_scope) the CLI prints. See docs/MCP_INTEGRATION.md for the full client wiring and the measured concurrency story.
Calling SUM over HTTP
The hosted Worker at https://sum-demo.ototao.workers.dev exposes /api/render, /api/transform, /api/complete, /api/qid, and the /.well-known/{jwks,revoked-kids}.json verification surfaces. docs/API_REFERENCE.md is the wire spec — request/response shapes, error codes, the six-step receipt-verification flow, working Node + Python examples. Use this when the caller is a web app, mobile app, or server-side service; use the MCP server when the caller is a local LLM client.
How the trust loop fits together
prose ─► /api/render ─► tome
+ render_receipt {kid, payload, jws}
│
▼
/.well-known/jwks.json
(Ed25519 OKP JWK by kid)
│
▼
jose.flattenedVerify(JCS(payload))
│
▼
render attested ✓ — issuer signed
(this tome, these triples, this slider
position, this model, at this time)
The receipt is a render attestation, not a truth oracle. Fact preservation is verified by the bench (NLI audit on weak cells). The receipt is what a downstream system keeps as durable proof; the tome is what a reader consumes. See docs/RENDER_RECEIPT_FORMAT.md §5.
Underlying substrate
Below the slider sits the substrate that earlier phases shipped and verified. Pointers, not paraphrase — every claim links to its source-of-truth doc.
- Canonical round-trip conservation (provable).
reconstruct(parse(canonical_tome(S))) == Sfor every Gödel stateS. 0.00% drift onseed_tiny_v1/seed_v1/seed_v2.docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md§1.1. - Cross-runtime state equivalence (provable). Python (
sympy) and Node (BigInt + Miller-Rabin) produce byte-identical state integers, locked in CI bymake xruntime+make xruntime-adversarial; the in-browser JS is not run in CI.docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md§1.2. - Bundle public-key attestation (provable). Ed25519-signed CanonicalBundles are tamper-detectable by any third party in Python, Node or the browser (CI checks Python and Node).
docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md§1.3.1. - Merkle hash-chain integrity (provable, including under concurrent writers).
docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md§1.7. - Extraction F1 (empirical-benchmark). 1.000 on
seed_v1(50 simple-SVO docs); 0.762 with precision 1.000 onseed_v2(20-doc difficulty corpus). Every remainingseed_v2failure is a recall miss, not a truth inversion; outsideseed_v2's constructions the 0.11.1 sieve asserted conditional, reported, negated and cross-clause triples, most of which the 0.12.0 sieve withholds and counts (§2.1 lists the gaps).docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md§2.1. - 170 numbered features, each with a reproducible verification command, in
docs/FEATURE_CATALOG.md.
Research substrate (under sum_engine_internal/research/)
Less-surfaced but shipped:
- MinHash-LSH bundle similarity index (
research/lsh/) — near-duplicate bundle detection at scale. - Robust PCA corruption score (
research/robust_pca/) —corruption_scorefield in bundle metadata; flags adversarially-perturbed bundles. - Sequential & conformal-prediction (
research/sequential/,research/conformal/) — bench-side confidence bounds with documented coverage guarantees. - MMD distribution distance (
research/mmd/) —axiom_distribution_mmdfield on bundles; surfaces when an attested bundle is structurally unlike its baseline corpus. - Spectral entropy (
research/spectral_entropy/) — axiom-graph entropy on every bundle, with confidence interval. - Bootstrap multiplier spike detection (
research/bootstrap/) — seedocs/MULTIPLIER_BOOTSTRAP_SPIKE_FINDINGS.md. - SMT consistency checking (
research/smt_consistency/) — z3-backedaxiom_consistency_checkon every bundle. - Sheaf-Laplacian hallucination detection — see
docs/SHEAF_HALLUCINATION_DETECTOR.md(research direction).
Other substrate-adjacent surfaces
- Trust-root manifest (
sum_engine_internal/trust_root/) — operator-issued signed manifest binding kid lifecycle, revocation policy, and verifier expectations. - Merkle sidecar format (
sum_engine_internal/merkle_sidecar/) — seedocs/MERKLE_SIDECAR_FORMAT.md. - Evidence-chain layer (
sum_engine_internal/evidence/) — substrate behindsource_chain_hash(T4). - Algorithm registry — see
docs/ALGORITHM_REGISTRY.md(the in-tree list of permitted signing algs; crypto-agility gate). - Audit log format — every CLI operation can emit
sum.audit_log.v1events; seedocs/AUDIT_LOG_FORMAT.md. - Agent surface (
sum_engine_internal/agent_surface/) — seedocs/AGENT_SURFACE_FINDINGS.md.
Internal research surfaces (NOT shipped, present in repo)
api/quantum_router.py+quantum_main.py— FastAPI surface with 26+ endpoints (branchable knowledge graph, divisibility witnesses under the historical/zk/*paths (they reveal the state; not zero-knowledge), federated KG sync, JWT multi-tenant API). 1,684 LOC; 58/58 tests pass; runs locally viauvicorn quantum_main:app. NOT in the PyPI wheel (pyproject.tomlexcludesapi*), NOT in the live Worker, NOT in the dogfood quickstart. The substrate it composes is load-bearing for the shipping surfaces above; only the FastAPI HTTP layer is internal-research. Promote to a shipping[api]extra only if a named buyer or grant deliverable explicitly references one of the endpoint clusters. See top-of-file banner inapi/quantum_router.pyfor the full triage rationale.
Reproduce the bench
# Short corpus (n=8, 4–12 triples/doc, ~$0.30, ~2 min with NLI)
bash scripts/bench/run_paragraphs.sh
# Long corpus (n=16, 9–24 triples/doc, ~$1.50, ~10 min with NLI)
bash scripts/bench/run_long_paragraphs.sh
Both runners require OPENAI_API_KEY (NLI audit + extraction). Pinned model snapshots are mandatory; the harness raises SystemExit on unpinned identifiers (see docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md §2.6). Output is NDJSON sum.slider_drift_bench.v1, with per-cell strict / normalized / semantic / NLI fact-preservation columns.
Future developments
This roadmap names only unshipped work. Items already landed are recorded in CHANGELOG.md. Detailed sequencing lives in docs/NEXT_SESSION_PLAYBOOK.md.
Generalising the LLM round-trip result beyond the measured corpora. The round-trip gap itself is closed — see the section above and docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md §2.5 (closed 2026-05-21 across all measured corpora; the unprompted baseline was 107.75 % drift / 0.12 recall on seed_v1, now 0.00 % / 1.00 there). What is not shipped is evidence that the intervention (canonical-first generator prompt + constrained-decoding extractor + lemma-exclusion) holds on corpora nobody has measured yet, and a same-commit replay receipt for it. Treat the closure as an empirical result with a stated envelope, not a universal guarantee.
Hardening backlog
sha256_128_v2default-activation — Python ↔ Node byte-identity now locked (12-key K1-v2 + 6-state K2-v2 gate runs on every PR;scripts/verify_godel_v2_cross_runtime.py). The default scheme stayssha256_64_v1; flipping the default is a separate operator decision that requires abundle_versionminor bump perdocs/COMPATIBILITY_POLICY.md. The migration path is now empirically open./api/qidaccuracy floor — measured 2026-04-28 on a 30-term hand-curated corpus across people, places, concepts, and common nouns: hit-rate 100% (30/30), label-substring-match 100% (24/24, excluding 6 common-noun rows). Receipt atfixtures/bench_receipts/qid_accuracy_2026-04-28.jsonunder schemasum.qid_resolution_accuracy.v1. Boundary: label-substring match acceptedrelativity→Q201607 (Relativity Records)— a music-label entity, not the physics theory. The two-tier metric is robust to wbsearchentities's quirks but does not measure semantic-accuracy against canonical Q-IDs; that's a follow-on with hand-verified ground-truth pairs. The current resolver is a thin layer overwbsearchentities; SPARQL-driven disambiguation that prefers the most-linked-to entity for ambiguous terms remains an unshipped enhancement.- Threat-model validation — every documented defence in
docs/THREAT_MODEL.mdgets an executable test. - Delta-bundle composition semantics — specifies what
bundle.is_deltameans cross-runtime. - Sigstore / cosign signing of release artifacts.
- LLM-extraction honesty guardrails —
extraction.verifiable: true | falseso signed ≠ true is visible at the consumer interface. - Calibration-set authoring for the Venn-Abers conformal-interval implementation that already ships.
- Remaining sieve recall work on
seed_v2(apposition / relative-clause / compound-conjunct) — gated on the §2.5 work, seedocs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md§6.
Platform surface (post-hardening)
Source anchoring in the bundle schema, bundle explorer / viewer, sum tutorial onboarding, shareable bundle URLs /b/{hash}, PWA-installable demo, sum attest <url> fetch mode. Each item names its dependency in docs/NEXT_SESSION_PLAYBOOK.md.
Verification surface
make help lists every dev command. Common targets:
make install # editable install with sieve + dev extras
make test # full pytest run (2000+ tests)
make xruntime # cross-runtime K1/K1-mw/K2/K3/K4 (Python ↔ Node)
make xruntime-adversarial # rejection-matrix A1–A8
make fortress # 21-check pure-math invariants
make smoke # fresh-venv install + attest|verify round-trip
make demo # open the single-file browser demo
CI runs the full suite on every push (.github/workflows/quantum-ci.yml); the cross-runtime-harness job runs K1–K4 + A1–A8 (Python ↔ Node) on Node 22, and a separate job runs the browser workbench tests under jsdom (no browser engine); pypi-install-smoke builds the wheel and runs echo prose | sum attest | sum verify in a throwaway venv.
Epistemic contract
Every claim in this repo carries an explicit epistemic status — provable, certified, empirical-benchmark, or expert-opinion. The arbiter is docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md. A summary surface that quotes an empirical-benchmark number alongside language like "mathematically guaranteed" is a policy violation per §5 and must be corrected.
Performance language (fast, efficient, low-latency, scalable) requires a benchmark in the same commit. Adversarial input agreement (the A-matrix) is a separate proof from valid-input agreement (the K-matrix); both run in CI.
If a number in this README disagrees with docs/PROOF_BOUNDARY.md or docs/SLIDER_CONTRACT.md, the docs are canonical and this README is wrong.
Contributing
- Fork and branch.
make install && make test && make xruntime.- Read
docs/NEXT_SESSION_PLAYBOOK.mdfor principles, stop-the-line triggers, and the work-ordering rule. - Open a PR. Every claim added to docs or commit messages must trace to a test, a measurement, or an explicit
designed, not provedlabel.
CONTRIBUTING.md has the test-gate matrix and the verification-gate runbook.
License
Apache 2.0. See LICENSE.
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