sunaba
Most AI coding tools optimize for humans. sunaba optimizes for frontier LLMs.
Less context. Less trust. More structure.
An MCP server that runs an AI's test → verify → publish workflow inside disposable Docker containers. It assumes the model is already capable, so it spends its effort elsewhere: stripping away the context bloat, the broad host trust, and the raw-log noise that frontier models don't need — and shouldn't have.
What's different
Most sandboxing tools are built around a human watching a terminal. This one is built around a model reasoning over a small, structured context window:
- The LLM is assumed competent. No sprawling toolset to hand-hold it — a small set of first-class verbs (search, edit, verify, publish) plus an image full of CLIs it already knows.
- The context is never polluted. The payload — issue bodies, source files, diffs — stays inside the container. The model carries only
run_ids, handles, and structured summaries. - Output is structured, not raw. A green run is one line; a failure is
{test, error, file, line}. No 5000-line logs scrolling through the context window. - Trust is structural, not policy. The host is cut off by construction, so you grant the AI less standing access — not more careful prompts.
The result is an MCP whose value is as much about what it withholds from the model — context, trust, noise — as what it gives it.
Why sandbox?
AI coding agents that operate directly on the host filesystem carry maximum risk: a single rm -rf ~ or git push --force can destroy your working environment, SSH keys, and git configuration.
This MCP routes all AI operations through disposable Docker containers with structural safety guarantees:
| Guarantee | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| AI operations never touch the host | All file ops, package installs, and test runs happen inside the container. |
| No network by default | Bare initialization has no container network; clone_repo, pr, or branch auto-enable it. A bare container can set allow_network=True for package installation or other allowed network work. Container traffic remains subject to the egress allowlist. |
| Non-root execution | Container runs as unprivileged user sandbox. No sudo, no system package modifications. |
| VCS tokens stay host-side | The container never receives a GITHUB_TOKEN. Token values are masked in all output (KEY=***). |
| Audit trail | Every operation is recorded in an append-only journal (~/.sunaba/journal.log). |
Reducing host permissions
By placing a disposable container as a middle layer, you can turn off broad host execution permissions in your AI client. Host-level shell tools become unnecessary for the vast majority of tasks.
Design Philosophy
Four principles drive every decision in Sunaba:
- Security and convenience are not a tradeoff — the sandbox dissolves it: Inside the container, the AI operates with maximum convenience (like a local shell). To the host, the AI is structurally cut off, allowing you to disable local shell permissions.
- AI-first: return structure and diffs, not raw logs: Sunaba strips logs, ANSI colors, and library stack traces, returning only structured test failures (
{test, error, file, line}) or diffs. This keeps context windows small and reasoning accurate. - Defend the sandbox boundary — not "dangerous" commands: We do not try to filter "dangerous" commands inside the container. Instead, we strictly isolate the boundary using a default-deny Egress Proxy and host-side token resolution.
- The payload never passes through the LLM: Issue bodies, codebases, and diffs stay inside the container. The AI only carries resource handles, run IDs, and structured summaries.
For the full detailed rationale, see Design Decisions.
Typical Workflow
The core developer workflow is centered around a single 5-step loop:
sandbox_initialize # Pull the repository into a fresh container (clone_repo="owner/name")
↓
write_file/edit_file # Create or edit files (transform_file for bulk/computed edits)
↓
verify_in_container # Lint + type-check, then runs tests → structured result
↓
checkpoint # Cheap in-container Git save point (no token, no gate)
↓
publish(create_pr=True) # Stage, squash checkpoints, push, and create PR (VCS token host-side); default is push only, and pr_title alone does not create a PR
The heavy data (repositories, full diffs, raw logs) lives and dies inside the container. The model only carries run_ids and structured summaries.
Quick Start (WSL2 / Linux Daemon Setup)
Sunaba is designed to run as a resident background service (daemon) under systemd to support persistent token rotation and long-running Docker operations without client timeouts.
Follow these three phases to install and start the service:
Phase 1: Install
Create a Python virtual environment and install the package from PyPI:
python -m venv ~/.local/share/sunaba-venv
~/.local/share/sunaba-venv/bin/pip install sunaba
To track unreleased main instead:
~/.local/share/sunaba-venv/bin/pip install git+https://github.com/masuda-masuo/sunaba
Phase 2: Setup (Keystore Setup)
The operator scripts live in the repository — the PyPI package ships the server, not the scripts — so clone it first:
git clone https://github.com/masuda-masuo/sunaba
cd sunaba
Register your GitHub App credentials into the OS keystore:
./scripts/setup.sh
Phase 3: Enable the systemd Service
./scripts/install-systemd.sh ~/.local/share/sunaba-venv
For client configurations (such as connecting Claude Desktop via mcp-remote) and advanced configurations, see the Daemon Setup Guide.
Prerequisites & First-Run Pitfalls
- Docker daemon must be running:
docker infoshould succeed before you start. - The first initialization can take several minutes: The first call to
sandbox_initializepulls the base sandbox images from GHCR. We recommend running Sunaba as a systemd daemon to handle long-running operations. - Container network is off by default: Bare initialization has no network.
clone_repo,pr, andbranchenable it automatically; for a bare container that needs package installation or other allowed outbound access, setallow_network=True. The egress allowlist still applies.publishuses a host-side VCS token for GitHub operations.
Troubleshooting
| Symptom | Likely Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
Cannot connect to the Docker daemon |
Docker isn't running | Start Docker Desktop or dockerd. |
permission denied on docker.sock |
DOCKER_HOST unset/wrong (rootless); user not in docker group (rootful) |
Set DOCKER_HOST=unix:///run/user/$(id -u)/docker.sock first; fallback sudo usermod -aG docker $USER (⚠️ root-equivalent — see Daemon Setup). |
sandbox_initialize times out |
Pulling image from GHCR exceeds 60s client timeout | Switch to the systemd background daemon. |
BLOCKED by egress proxy |
Container network is disabled or the destination host is not allowlisted | Enable container network access as needed and add the host to SUNABA_ALLOWED_EGRESS_HOSTS; allow_network=True does not bypass the allowlist. |
Documentation Map
Dive deeper into specific topics:
- Daemon Setup Guide: Detailed instructions on running Sunaba as a background
systemduser service, configuring token rotation, and connecting IDE clients. - Security & Network Containment: The Egress Proxy design, allowed host configurations, and token isolation details.
- Sandbox Images: Details on the
neutral,python,go,js,rust, andfullDocker images, included tools, and language auto-detection. - MCP Tool Reference: A complete reference table of every tool — 35 by default, plus 5 opt-in observability tools.
- Observability & Dashboard: The local web dashboard, append-only execution logging, replay traces, and push notification triggers.
- Contributing Guide: Local developer setup instructions (
pip install -e .[test]) and test commands. - Design Decisions: Detailed rationale and design logs.
- Changelog: Release version history and migration guides.
Known Limitations
- No local export (No host write-back): To prevent host contamination, file transfer is strictly one-way (host → container). The only way to export changes from the sandbox is via
publishto a GitHub repository. Purely local projects that are not hosted on GitHub cannot be round-tripped. - Job state lives in the container: Background job results (
sandbox_exec_background) are stored as files in the container's/tmp, keyed by job ID. They survive server restarts but are lost when the container is destroyed (sandbox_stop/ reaper) — poll withsandbox_exec_checkand collect results before stopping the container. - Job files accumulate in /tmp: Job result files (
.start/.out/.err/.exit) are removed oncesandbox_exec_checkobserves completion, but jobs that finish and are never checked leave their files behind for the container's lifetime. Nothing accumulates in server memory; the cost is/tmpusage proportional to container lifetime.
Compact results and saved execution output
The default MCP response format remains unchanged. Clients that consume
structuredContent can opt in at the connection URL:
http://127.0.0.1:8750/mcp?response=compact.
Combine with a profile using ?profile=implement&response=compact; keep the same
query parameters on every request, including tools/list and tools/call.
Use response=legacy (or omit it) for clients that parse text-only JSON results.
In compact mode, JSON object results appear directly in structuredContent,
arrays under items, and scalar/plain-text results under result. There is
no second JSON decode. The text block contains only a short summary; the full
payload is not repeated there. The advertised output schema changes only for
this connection. Tool arguments and error flags are unchanged.
When sandbox_exec omits output, it returns an output_id if the sanitized
full output fits the snapshot limit. Read it with
read_output(container_id, output_id, offset=100, limit=50), or
read_output(container_id, output_id, tail_lines=20); never rerun a command
merely to read its next page. Offsets are zero-based in the full sanitized
stream, before repeated-line/failure compression (stdout on success, combined
stdout/stderr on failure). Each page includes shown, total_lines,
next_offset, has_more, and truncated.
Foreground snapshots are process-local and bounded: 8 MiB per output, 64 MiB
total UTF-8 payload, at most 128 snapshots, and a one-hour lifetime. Oldest
snapshots are evicted first. They survive container removal but not server
restart, and reads require the same container ID spelling as the exec.
Oversized snapshots return output_unavailable; missing/expired IDs return an
explicit error. Background-job storage and sandbox_exec_check are unchanged.
License
MIT
Metadata
Release files for sunaba 0.14.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sunaba-0.14.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for sunaba-0.14.0-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 1.4 MB
Release files / sunaba-0.14.0.tar.gz
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PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 31, 2026.
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