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Switchboard

Switchboard is a directory and an encrypted task mailbox for sharing selected local agent sessions with permitted people in your workspace. Readable prompts, answers and transcripts never leave the harness on the Mac that ran them — the hosted service routes opaque ciphertext between permitted devices and stores nothing it can read.

Switchboard is in alpha. Calls between separate signed-in Macs have completed end to end. Treat every other path as pilot material.

How it works

flowchart LR
    UI[Switchboard Web App<br/>or Desktop App]
    U[Caller asks a question] --> H[Caller harness<br/>any supported harness]
    H <-->|MCP over local stdio| L[Local MCP server]
    L <-->|local loopback| C[Caller Local Connector]
    UI -.->|local service health and sharing controls| L
    UI -.->|identity, pairing and sharing controls| M[Switchboard Network Backend<br/>directory, grants, opaque mailbox]
    C -->|signed encrypted envelope over HTTPS| M
    M -->|opaque ciphertext only| W[Owner Local Connector<br/>and mailbox worker]
    W -->|decrypt + recheck grant and policy| A[Local A2A task and harness adapter]
    A --> S[Owner source session<br/>or caller-isolated continuation]
    S --> A
    A -->|encrypted result follows the reverse path| H
Component What it does Where
Switchboard Web App Authenticated browser UI: directory, sharing, inbox, settings switchboard-control behind Cloudflare Access
Switchboard Desktop App Companion app: onboarding, agents, contacts, wallet and service controls apps/desktop (Tauri: Rust + React)
Switchboard Network Backend Hosted control plane: identity, grants, opaque mailbox routing, credit ledger switchboard-control, Docker + PostgreSQL
Local Connector Discovers local harnesses, enforces the answer-only policy, runs the mailbox worker and local MCP server src/switchboard/local, supervised per platform (LaunchAgent, systemd user service, Scheduled Task)

Getting started

Open the dashboard

Your workspace administrator runs the Switchboard Network Backend and has the dashboard URL. Sign in with a permitted account and continue to the workspace. Workspace membership admits you to the directory; each agent's owner still chooses who may call it.

Set up a machine

The desktop app is the easy path: it checks for uv, installs the connector, registers your harnesses, runs the Verified A2A sign-in, pairs the machine and starts the resident service. No source checkout is involved. Download it from switchboard-releases; after that it updates itself from its About page. To build it yourself instead:

cd apps/desktop && pnpm install
pnpm tauri build --config '{"bundle":{"createUpdaterArtifacts":false}}'   # then open the built app

Prefer the terminal? The same steps, on macOS and Linux alike:

uv tool install "switchboard-connector[qedb]"        # installs the `switchboard` CLI
switchboard install --switchboard-url <url>          # harnesses, Verified A2A, resident service
switchboard pair --device-name "my machine"

The PyPI distribution is switchboard-connector (the name switchboard belongs to an unrelated project); the command it installs is switchboard. Update it later with uv tool upgrade switchboard-connector.

install sets up a LaunchAgent on macOS, a systemd user service on Linux and a Scheduled Task on Windows; switchboard start, stop, status and uninstall manage it afterwards. Only the pair sign-in and the Share approval are manual, by design.

The control-plane address is set once per machine with switchboard install --switchboard-url <url> and stored locally; the connector worker and the harness-launched MCP both resolve that single setting, so they cannot point at different servers.

Linux notes

switchboard install writes ~/.config/systemd/user/switchboard.service; run loginctl enable-linger "$USER" to keep it running while you are logged out, and journalctl --user -u switchboard to read its log. The device credential and mailbox keys live in the macOS Keychain; on Linux they are 0600 files under ~/.local/state/ProvablySwitchboard/, protected by your disk encryption.

Windows

Windows runs Switchboard natively: switchboard install registers a per-user Scheduled Task that starts the connector at logon and restarts it if it fails, needing no elevation. Credentials are files under your profile directory, where Windows' own ACL keeps other standard users out. switchboard start, stop, status and uninstall drive the task exactly as they drive the service elsewhere.

Two caveats. Harness CLIs installed by npm or bun are .cmd shims, which Switchboard runs through cmd.exe — this path gets less real-world use than the Unix one, so report anything that misbehaves. And Hermes Desktop's automatic gateway discovery needs ps and lsof, so on Windows set HERMES_API_URL instead.

Windows (WSL2)

WSL2 is the alternative, and the better-travelled one: it is the Linux path above, with two requirements.

  • Enable systemd, so switchboard install can manage the service. Add this to /etc/wsl.conf, then run wsl --shutdown from Windows:

    [boot]
    systemd=true
    

    Without it, switchboard install says so and you run switchboard run in the foreground instead.

  • Install your harness CLIs inside the same distribution. Switchboard discovers sessions from the Linux home directory, so CLIs installed on Windows are invisible to it.

WSL forwards localhost, so the dashboard in a Windows browser still reaches the approval bridge on 127.0.0.1:8766.

Platform support

Platform State
macOS Supported: desktop app or CLI, LaunchAgent service, Keychain credentials
Linux Supported: desktop app or CLI, systemd user service, file-backed credentials
Windows Supported: desktop app or CLI, Scheduled Task service, file-backed credentials under the user profile. Less exercised than the others; WSL2 is the safe alternative

Self-host the control plane

The hosted control plane (identity, directory, mailbox routing, credit ledger) lives in the separate switchboard-control repo — see that repo's README for docker compose up self-hosting.

Security model

  • The Network Backend routes and revokes deliveries; it never sees a prompt, an answer or a transcript. Envelopes are opaque ciphertext at rest.
  • Sharing is one atomic action: the owner's fixed answer-only policy installs locally before a share can be created, and the mailbox worker rechecks the grant and policy before every invocation.
  • Revocation blocks future delivery immediately. It does not rewrite either person's local transcript.
  • Verified A2A (optional, QEDB-backed) adds route-and-record-integrity proofs, shown as green, orange or red marks on an answer.
  • Private caller (opt-in per share) shows the owner a caller-chosen alias instead of an account identity. The alpha credit ledger settles each answer in one double-entry transaction.

Development

Requires Python 3.12+ and uv. Verified A2A needs the qedb extra, which pulls sourcerykit from PyPI.

uv sync
make check                      # pre-commit, full test suite, build — the CI gate

Common targets: make lint, make format, make typecheck (strict mypy on src), make test.

src/switchboard/
├── harness/          adapters for Codex, Hermes, Claude Code, OpenCode and OpenClaw
├── local/            the resident service: CLI, connector, approval bridge, policy
│   ├── owner_app/    the owner-local A2A app (task API, agent cards, state, web UI)
│   ├── mcp/          the harness-facing MCP server and its remote calls
│   ├── policy/       owner policy authoring and enforcement
│   └── skills/       the switchboard-ask skill installed into every harness
├── mailbox/          envelope crypto, client and worker, commitments, QEDB ledger
├── qedb/             A2A task store, task proofs and the A2A profile
└── verified_sources/ narrow read-only SourceryKit-backed sources
apps/desktop/         Tauri desktop companion app
scripts/              MCP launcher and the verified-A2A smoke test
docs/                 harness registration and session publishing
tests/                mirrors src/switchboard

The hosted control plane (control/) lives in the separate switchboard-control repo — users installing this repo never pull down that server-side code.

Releases

The connector and the desktop app ship separately, each from its own tag, so a fix to one never forces a version bump of the other. Neither workflow checks the tag against the manifest, so bump the version first and tag to match.

What Version in Tag Produces
Connector pyproject.toml connector-v0.1.1 A wheel and sdist, published to PyPI
Desktop app apps/desktop/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json (keep package.json and Cargo.toml in step) desktop-v0.1.1 A draft release in switchboard-releases
git tag connector-v0.1.1 && git push origin connector-v0.1.1
git tag desktop-v0.1.1   && git push origin desktop-v0.1.1

Release the connector first when the desktop app depends on its changes.

Connector. The tag publishes straight to PyPI, with no draft to review. Publishing uses trusted publishing through the pypi GitHub environment, so there is no token in the repo: configure the publisher once on PyPI (project → Publishing → GitHub, workflow release-connector.yml, environment pypi), and add a required reviewer to that environment if you want a deliberate click before anything goes out. Running the workflow from the Actions tab publishes too.

Desktop app. Each OS builds on its own runner (Tauri cannot cross-compile): .dmg for Apple silicon and Intel, .deb, .rpm and .AppImage, .msi and .exe. From the Actions tab you can pick one platform; that run also creates a draft release, named after the branch.

Releases go to the public ProvablyAI/switchboard-releases repo, because the app's Check for updates (About page) downloads them without credentials. Besides the installers, each release carries a signed update bundle per platform and a latest.json. The app reads releases/latest/download/latest.json, so users get the update only once you publish the draft: check that every platform has its installer, its update bundle with a .sig, and that latest.json is there.

One-time setup, already done for this repo:

  • ProvablyAI/switchboard-releases exists, is public, and has a commit on main (release tags are created from it).
  • plugins.updater.pubkey in tauri.conf.json holds the updater public key. The workflow refuses to build while it is the placeholder.
  • Repo secrets: TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY and TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD (the updater private key and its password, generated with pnpm tauri signer generate), and RELEASES_TOKEN (a fine-grained token with Contents: read and write on switchboard-releases only).

The private key signs every future update. If it is lost, installed apps can no longer update and users must reinstall by hand.

The same About page checks the connector against PyPI; updating it runs uv tool install --force and restarts the service.

The installers are not code-signed yet: macOS Gatekeeper blocks the .dmg and Windows SmartScreen warns on the installer until signing and notarization are set up. (The updater signature above is separate from that.)

License

Business Source License 1.1 — see LICENSE.md. You may not offer the Software as a commercial hosted service without a commercial license from Provably Technologies Ltd. On the change date the license converts to GPL-3.0-or-later.

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