synpareia
Cryptographic primitives for AI agent identity, attestation, and interaction verification.
Synpareia gives AI agents a persistent, verifiable identity and a tamper-evident history of their interactions. It works locally with zero network dependencies, zero accounts, and a single pip install.
Is this the right package for you?
Probably not, if you just want an agent to start using synpareia. This is the foundation layer — blocks, chains, anchors, commitments, witness clients, signed envelopes. It gives you building blocks, deliberately without imposing a flow.
What most people actually want is the layer above it: making commitments that mean something,
vetting a counterparty before relying on them, and recording an interaction so either side can
prove their account later. That is
synpareia-trust-mcp — the Trust Toolkit MCP
server, which wraps this SDK with runtime-ready ergonomics and names its tools after the social
act rather than the mechanism.
Installing the toolkit today: the latest
synpareia-trust-mcpon PyPI is 0.8.0, which declaresmcp[cli]>=1.0with no upper bound.mcp2.0.0 (2026-07-28) movedmcp.server.fastmcp, so an unpinned install resolves 2.0.0 and the server fails on import. Install it aspip install synpareia-trust-mcp 'mcp<2'(oruvx --with 'mcp<2' synpareia-trust-mcp) for as long as 0.8.0 is the latest release. The bound ships in 0.9.0; oncepip index versions synpareia-trust-mcpshows 0.9.0 or newer, drop the pin and this note. This SDK is unaffected.
Reach for this SDK when you are building the thing agents use, not using it: a framework adapter (CrewAI, LangGraph, a custom platform), another MCP server, your own agent runtime, or verification embedded in a service of your own. Come back here when the toolkit's ergonomics stop fitting.
Install
pip install synpareia
Requires Python 3.11+. Four runtime dependencies: cryptography (signing),
http-message-signatures (RFC 9421 request auth), rfc8785 (JCS canonicalisation),
idna. Tiers 1–3 exercise only the first three; nothing here pulls in a web framework.
Network access needs an extra — pip install "synpareia[witness]" or [profile], both
of which add httpx.
("Only dependency: cryptography" was true when the tier table below was written and
stopped being true as soon as signed requests and canonical JSON arrived.)
Verify you have the SDK
import synpareia
assert synpareia.__version__ >= "0.2.0"
assert hasattr(synpareia, "generate"), "you have a different 'synpareia' in your venv"
If hasattr(synpareia, "generate") is False, something else in your environment is shadowing the SDK. Use a fresh virtualenv (python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate && pip install synpareia) and try again.
Quick Start
Create an identity
Every agent gets an Ed25519 keypair. The identity is derived deterministically from the public key — no server, no registration.
import synpareia
# Generate a new agent identity
profile = synpareia.generate()
print(profile.id) # did:synpareia:a1b2c3...
Sign a block
A block is the atomic unit: a typed, hashed, signed record of something that happened.
block = synpareia.create_block(
profile,
type="message",
content="Hello from Agent A",
)
# Anyone with the public key can verify authorship
assert synpareia.verify_block(block, profile.public_key)
Build a chain
A chain is an ordered, hash-linked sequence of blocks — a tamper-evident history.
# Create a Chain of Presence (personal history).
# Every chain carries a policy — templates.cop() is the personal-history shape.
chain = synpareia.create_chain(profile, policy=synpareia.templates.cop(profile))
# Append blocks
another_block = synpareia.create_block(profile, type="message", content="Hello again")
pos1 = synpareia.append_block(chain, block)
pos2 = synpareia.append_block(chain, another_block)
# Verify the chain is intact. Verification fails closed: signed blocks
# require the authors' public keys.
valid, errors = synpareia.verify_chain(chain, public_keys={profile.id: profile.public_key})
assert valid
Export and verify independently
Chains are portable. Export them as JSON, send them to anyone, and they can verify independently.
from synpareia import export_chain, verify_export
# Export
data = export_chain(chain)
# Anyone with the authors' public keys can verify — no network, no trust, just math
valid, errors = verify_export(data, public_keys={profile.id: profile.public_key})
assert valid
Link chains with anchors
When an agent participates in a shared conversation, anchors link their personal chain to the shared record.
# A peer keeps the shared record on their own chain...
peer = synpareia.generate()
shared_chain = synpareia.create_chain(peer, policy=synpareia.templates.cop(peer))
shared_block = synpareia.create_block(peer, type="message", content="shared record")
synpareia.append_block(shared_chain, shared_block)
# ...and Agent A's personal chain references a position in the shared chain
anchor_block, anchor_pos = synpareia.create_anchor_block(
profile,
chain,
target_chain_id=shared_chain.id,
target_sequence=2,
target_block_hash=shared_block.content_hash,
anchor_type="correspondence",
)
Commit-reveal for independent evaluation
Two agents can independently commit to assessments before revealing them — proving neither was influenced by the other.
# Agent commits (keeps nonce secret)
commitment_block, nonce = synpareia.create_commitment_block(
profile,
content=b"My honest assessment: excellent interaction",
)
# Later, reveal and verify (the commitment hash is the block's content)
assert synpareia.verify_commitment(
commitment_block.content,
b"My honest assessment: excellent interaction",
nonce,
)
Core Concepts
Four Primitives
| Primitive | Purpose | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Block | Atomic signed record | A message, thought, reaction, or system event |
| Chain | Ordered, hash-linked sequence of blocks | An agent's personal history, a conversation log |
| Anchor | Cross-chain reference | "This block in my chain corresponds to that block in theirs" |
| Seal | Third-party attestation (Tier 4) | A witness timestamps or checkpoints a chain |
Chain of Presence (CoP)
An agent's personal, append-only, hash-linked history across interactions and platforms. Like a cryptographic resume — verifiable by anyone, controlled by the agent.
Spheres
When two or more agents interact, the shared observable history is a sphere chain. Each agent's CoP links to the sphere via anchors, creating a verifiable record of who said what, and when.
What You Can Verify
| Claim | How |
|---|---|
| "Agent X authored this content" | Ed25519 signature on the block |
| "This content existed at time T" | Block timestamp + chain position |
| "This history hasn't been tampered with" | Hash-linked chain verification |
| "Agent X participated in conversation Y" | Anchor from CoP to sphere chain |
| "Both assessments were independent" | Commit-reveal: both commitments precede both reveals |
| "This chain export is authentic" | verify_export() — offline, no service in the loop; the verifier supplies the authors' public keys |
API Reference
Identity
| Function | Description |
|---|---|
generate() |
Create a new Ed25519 keypair and Profile |
from_private_key(bytes) |
Reconstruct Profile from private key |
from_public_key(bytes) |
Create a verify-only Profile |
load(pub_b64, priv_b64?) |
Load Profile from base64-encoded keys |
Blocks
| Function | Description |
|---|---|
create_block(profile, type, content) |
Create a signed block |
verify_block(block, public_key?) |
Verify content hash and signature. Fails closed: with a key, the block must carry a signature that verifies against it; with no key, it's an explicit structure-only check (signed blocks fail) |
reveal_block(block, content) |
Reveal content of a hash-only block |
Chains
| Function | Description |
|---|---|
create_chain(profile, *, policy=...) |
Create a new chain. A policy is required — use templates.cop(profile) for a personal chain, templates.sphere(a, b) for a two-party sphere, templates.audit(...) for oversight. |
append_block(chain, block) |
Append a block, returns ChainPosition |
verify_chain(chain, *, public_keys=...) |
Walk hash links, enforce chain policy, and verify Ed25519 signatures. Fails closed if signatures are present but public_keys is omitted — structure-only callers should use verify_chain_structure instead. |
verify_chain_structure(chain) |
Structural validation only (no signatures, no policy). Explicit opt-in. |
export_chain(chain) |
Export as portable, verifiable JSON |
verify_export(data, *, public_keys=...) |
Verify an export without the original chain. Fails closed the same way verify_chain does: exports do not carry public keys, so omitting them returns (False, [...]) rather than reporting an unchecked chain as sound. |
Anchors
| Function | Description |
|---|---|
create_anchor_block(profile, chain, ...) |
Create a cross-chain reference |
verify_anchor(anchor, source, target) |
Verify anchor references are valid |
Commitments
| Function | Description |
|---|---|
create_commitment(content, nonce?) |
Create a commitment hash |
verify_commitment(hash, content, nonce) |
Verify a commitment reveal |
create_commitment_block(profile, content) |
Create a commitment as a block |
Chain policy
A chain carries a Policy that declares who the signatories are, what
block types are permitted, and how the chain transitions through
lifecycle states (Proposed → Pending → Active → Concluded). Use the
templates module for the canonical three shapes:
from synpareia import create_chain, templates, verify_chain_policy
alice = synpareia.generate()
chain = create_chain(alice, policy=templates.cop(alice)) # Chain of Presence (single-party)
# For a two-party sphere:
bob = synpareia.generate()
sphere = create_chain(alice, policy=templates.sphere(alice, bob))
# Standalone policy validation (no signature check):
valid, errors = verify_chain_policy(sphere)
verify_chain invokes verify_chain_policy internally on every
verification — callers get policy enforcement (permitted block types,
signatory constraints, lifecycle state) by default.
Multi-party block proposals
A BlockProposal is a shareable draft of a block that multiple parties
sign before it becomes a full Block. Use when two or more agents need
to jointly commit to a statement that none of them can later disavow.
from synpareia import start_proposal, sign_proposal, assemble_block
# Alice drafts a block that requires both Alice and Bob's signatures.
proposal = start_proposal(
alice,
type="message",
content="Alice and Bob agree: integration passed.",
required_signers={alice.id, bob.id},
)
# Each party signs in turn.
proposal = sign_proposal(proposal, alice)
proposal = sign_proposal(proposal, bob)
# Assembly verifies every signature before producing the final block.
# public_keys is required — assemble_block refuses to produce an
# unverified block.
block = assemble_block(
proposal,
public_keys={alice.id: alice.public_key, bob.id: bob.public_key},
)
# The resulting block carries Alice as the primary signer and Bob in
# co_signatures; both bindings are committed to by Alice's signature.
Threshold commitments (XOR n-of-n)
Reveal-requires-cooperation primitive. Two or more parties each contribute a random share; the joint nonce is the XOR of all shares. No single party can reveal the committed content without the others' cooperation, because none of them knows the joint nonce.
from synpareia import (
create_threshold_commitment,
random_shares,
verify_threshold_commitment,
xor_shares,
)
content = b"Alice and Bob's sealed assessment"
# Each party holds their own 32-byte share (generated together here for brevity).
alice_share, bob_share = random_shares(2)
# Commit jointly — neither party alone can open this.
commitment, joint_nonce = create_threshold_commitment(content, [alice_share, bob_share])
# Later, to reveal: both shares are contributed.
assert xor_shares([alice_share, bob_share]) == joint_nonce
assert verify_threshold_commitment(commitment, content, [alice_share, bob_share])
create_threshold_commitment rejects share-sets that XOR to an
all-zero joint nonce (catches duplicate shares or accidentally
collapsed entropy). random_shares enforces a 16-byte minimum
share length.
Types
BlockType, ChainType, AnchorType, ContentMode — extensible enums for all standard types.
Storage
MemoryStore (default), ChainStore protocol for custom backends.
Directory client (network — pip install "synpareia[profile]")
ProfileClient is the async client for the synpareia directory; SyncProfileClient
is the same surface for non-async callers. Every mutating call is signed with RFC 9421
HTTP Message Signatures using your Ed25519 key, so the directory authenticates you
without an API key.
from synpareia.identity import generate
from synpareia.profile import SyncProfileClient
me = generate()
with SyncProfileClient("https://synpareia.com") as directory:
view = directory.get_existence(did=me.id)
print(view["exists"])
publish, get_existence, get_history, get_well_known, delete_history_version,
delete_profile, request_witness_anchor, submit_event, get_reputation. The last
two are new in 0.7.0: submit_event posts a signed, content-less topology event
(/api/v2/events, live), and get_reputation reads the asker-anchored aggregate.
get_reputation is not yet served by the hosted directory. The route exists in the
directory's source tree but is not in the deployed image, so calling it against
synpareia.com returns 404 today rather than the documented confidence: 0.0. Point
base_url at a directory built from a tree that mounts it, or wait for the deploy.
Design Choices
- Ed25519 for signatures — fast, small, deterministic, safe-by-default
- SHA-256 for hashing — universal, well-audited, interoperable
- JCS (RFC 8785) for canonicalization — deterministic JSON serialization for reproducible hashes
- Frozen dataclasses — immutable primitives, zero framework dependency
- Length-prefixed commitments — prevents separator collision in commit-reveal payloads
- Constant-time comparison — timing-safe commitment verification via
hmac.compare_digest
Tiers
The SDK is structured in tiers of increasing dependency:
| Tier | What | Dependencies |
|---|---|---|
| 1-3 | Blocks, Chains, Anchors | cryptography, rfc8785, http-message-signatures |
| 4 | Witness seals, liveness | + httpx (synpareia[witness]) |
| 5 | Reputation, directory | + httpx (synpareia[profile]) + a directory to talk to |
Tiers 1-3 work entirely offline. No server, no account, no network.
Tier 5 said "(coming)" until 0.7.0. It ships now — ProfileClient.submit_event and
ProfileClient.get_reputation, documented above — with the caveat that the hosted
directory serves the write route and not yet the read one.
License
Apache 2.0
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