szl-evidence-mandate
Control before action. Evidence after.
Product · Proof · GitHub organization
Scope and data boundary
This repository is not a clinical tool: its evidence engine and audits must never receive patient data, PHI or clinical records. It audits repositories and Hugging Face assets of the SZL Holdings estate, and its engine reads the project files that a manifest declares.
A Scientific Evidence Gate engine plus evidence-backed, read-only audits of the
szl-holdings GitHub organisation and the SZLHOLDINGS Hugging Face estate.
A passing check must emit enough evidence to prove it had the opportunity to fail. The system producing an answer must not be the sole authority certifying that its own verification occurred.
Maturity: research prototype (0.1.2 source candidate; the last PyPI release may differ).
Licence: Apache-2.0 (org standard; see LICENSE).
What it does
| Component | What it verifies |
|---|---|
szl_evidence engine |
Manifest-declared inputs are present, opened and fully examined; every required check ran (hash-chained invocation ledger); claims are registered, replayable and numerically correct; dependency staleness blocks publication; receipts are canonical and content-bound. Exit codes: PASS 0, FAIL 1, ABSTAIN 2, ERROR 3. |
| Mutation harness | 19 mandated mutations + 4 blind-spot probes; undetected mutations are reported as BLIND_SPOT, never hidden. |
audit.github |
Every repo (all pages), shallow clones, file-class presence, licence consistency, secret scan (locations only), risky-code patterns, CI/release/protection state, clean-venv install/import/--help/tests, 12-axis scorecard. |
audit.huggingface |
Every model/dataset/Space, card scorecard, Space runtime + read-only probes, weight-header checks by HTTP range, small-array loads without pickle, dataset slices, conformance-corpus replay against the paired verifier. |
reconcile / zoomout |
Cross-surface links, orphans, version drift, schema skew, recomputed inventories vs every stated count; band-aid detection with root cause and structural fix. |
Quick start (under ten minutes)
python -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -e ".[dev]" # Windows: .venv\Scripts\pip
szl-audit engine verify fixtures/valid # exit 0
szl-audit engine verify fixtures/empty-input # exit 2 (ABSTAIN: nothing examined)
szl-audit engine mutate fixtures/valid # prints BLIND_SPOTS
python -m pytest -q
Full audit (read-only; uses GITHUB_TOKEN/gh auth token and HF_TOKEN/HF cache token if present, never printed):
szl-audit engine report --output reports
szl-audit github --org szl-holdings --clone --stream --deep --output reports # --stream: one repo on disk at a time
szl-audit hf --org SZLHOLDINGS --functional --output reports
szl-audit reconcile --output reports
szl-audit zoomout --output reports # also renders reports/00..11
Every command writes a receipt under reports/receipts/ and supports --dry-run.
Optional signed engine receipts
Install the sign extra to make Ed25519 signing available, then configure
SZL_RECEIPT_ED25519_KEY with the path to a protected, unencrypted Ed25519 PEM private key.
Do not put the key or its contents in a repository or receipt. For an engine run that must
produce a signature, use szl-audit engine verify fixtures/valid --require-signed.
An absent dependency, key, or usable Ed25519 signature retains an UNSIGNED receipt and
returns CLI exit code 3 with signature_requirement: BLOCKED_UNSIGNED, even if the engine
checks themselves passed. The receipt keeps the engine result so the signing failure cannot
erase a scientific finding. Without the flag, signing remains optional and honest UNSIGNED
receipts keep their existing exit codes. A successful local signature is self-checked before
the receipt is written, but a recipient must independently verify it against a trusted public
key; engine verify-receipt currently checks content/ledger integrity, not signer identity.
Evidence boundary
- Integrity: receipts bind content by SHA-256 and chain invocations. Receipts are
UNSIGNEDunless a usable Ed25519 key and signing dependency are configured; no signature is ever fabricated.SIGNEDidentifies local signing, not independent signer trust. - Performance: not measured by this tool beyond wall-clock durations of smoke tests.
- Validity: not established. A receipt supports integrity, provenance, and replayability. It does not establish scientific truth, accuracy, safety, or fitness for use.
What this does not prove
- That audited repositories or models are correct, secure, or fit for any purpose.
- That the engine catches defect classes outside its mutation set (see published blind spots).
- That a claim marked
UNVERIFIABLEis false, or that aSTALEclaim was ever wrong. - That install failures observed on the (Windows) audit host reproduce on Linux.
Layout
src/szl_evidence/ engine and audits · fixtures/ 19 generated fixtures (regenerate
with szl_evidence.fixturegen.build_all) · schemas/ receipt and manifest JSON Schemas ·
tests/ · reports/ generated output · examples/.
Metadata
Release files for szl-evidence-mandate 0.1.2
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| szl_evidence_mandate-0.1.2.tar.gz | 161.9 kB | With provenance | Details for szl_evidence_mandate-0.1.2.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| szl_evidence_mandate-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for szl_evidence_mandate-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 321.6 kB
Release files / szl_evidence_mandate-0.1.2.tar.gz
| Download URL | szl_evidence_mandate-0.1.2.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 161.9 kB |
| Tags | Source |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
91d862a9daa43b0e4b1475574c2e33e82a5f2c1423abdbd7c7393ffd5554e3f6
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Transparency logRelease files / szl_evidence_mandate-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl
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| Size | 159.7 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Transparency logSecurity for szl-evidence-mandate 0.1.2
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