szl-openshell-receipts
Control before action. Evidence after.
Product · Proof · GitHub organization
Governed, hash-chained receipts and an independent policy reach-delta witness for sandboxed agent runtimes such as NVIDIA OpenShell.
v0.2
ingest-log: parses OpenShell-style audit tokens (HTTP:* DENIED/ALLOWED, CONFIG:PROPOSED/APPROVED/REJECTED/LOADED) into receipts. Only line digests and key=value fields are kept, never raw lines.delta: SZL reach-set witness. Computes what a policy change adds and flags the four categories OpenShell's prover reasons about, using an independent simplified model.- Link-local reach checks cover IPv4, the full IPv6 link-local range, IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals, and absolute forms of the listed metadata hostnames. This remains a literal/name witness; it does not resolve DNS or prove runtime network isolation.
- Two-witness gate:
ALLOW_ELIGIBLEonly when this witness and the supplied prover result both report nothing. - Approval receipts bind candidate hash and a digest of the review token.
- Controls ledger (
governance/controls.json) with doctrine labels. - Combined multimodal digest.
Rendered policy paths are quoted YAML scalars so comment or mapping punctuation remains part of the filename and cannot broaden the validated permissions.
Honest status
See governance/controls.json. Chain, gate, approvals and multimodal digest are MEASURED by tests. Live OpenShell field mapping and credential isolation are UNKNOWN. Signing is UNAVAILABLE; receipts are UNSIGNED_HONEST. Examples are SYNTHETIC. The reach model is not the OpenShell policy schema. The observation-consistency checker below is MEASURED on synthetic fixtures only (C-08); a live export adapter is UNAVAILABLE (C-09).
Reference: observation-consistency checker
reference/observation_checker/ is a standalone, standard-library, zero-model checker. It reads one saved agent-run evidence bundle and reports what the records consistently support: schema validity, identity, lifecycle, attempt accounting, call budget, admission, durable acknowledgement, fresh-process restoration, separate support assessment, claim strength and current-runtime evidence. Each is a separate PASS, FAIL, UNKNOWN or NOT_APPLICABLE finding. There is no overall verdict, and a PASS grants no authority.
It is not part of the installed package. It does no network or model work, never repairs or signs anything, and does not authenticate the evidence it is given. Missing, stale or denied evidence never becomes PASS. A cancellation acknowledgement is never treated as stopped effects. The wall-clock bound is always UNKNOWN. The 20 canonical scenarios are disclosed, authored synthetic fixtures, not a benchmark. The checker contains no PentAGI or other third-party code. Read its README.md, review.md and completion_receipt.md for the full contract and limits.
cd reference/observation_checker
python -B -m unittest -v test_observation_checker.py
python -B observation_checker.py example_bundle.json example_policy.json
verify.py and the independent_review/ scripts rewrite the committed result files, so run them in a copy. CI does this on Python 3.10, 3.12 and 3.13 and requires byte-identical output. SHA256SUMS binds every file.
Usage
pip install .
szl-openshell-receipts ingest-log examples/openshell.sample.log --policy examples/policy.readonly-audit.yaml --commit <sha> --out r.jsonl
szl-openshell-receipts verify r.jsonl
szl-openshell-receipts delta examples/policy.before.json examples/policy.after.json --prover-findings capability_expansion
szl-openshell-receipts controls governance/controls.json
Study notes: docs/STUDY.md.
CLI workspace containment
The CLI confines every input/output path to --root (default: current working
directory). Put --root before the subcommand. Paths with traversal components,
NUL/control characters, symlink components, or non-regular leaf files are refused.
Absolute paths are accepted only inside the selected root. Parent directories
must already exist. Output is committed through a same-directory temporary file
and atomic replacement after every input/output path passes preflight validation.
Secure file operations require POSIX directory descriptors and O_NOFOLLOW;
unsupported platforms fail closed. Keep the root and its directories owned by a
trusted operator. This is an I/O boundary, not an operating-system sandbox.
The policy witness normalizes repeated separators and observes symlink resolution
on the local host; it does not prove remote-host containment or prevent changes
after a witness result. Invalid policy paths are rejected, not repaired silently.
Metadata
Release files for szl-openshell-receipts 0.3.2
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| szl_openshell_receipts-0.3.2.tar.gz | 24.1 kB | With provenance | Details for szl_openshell_receipts-0.3.2.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| szl_openshell_receipts-0.3.2-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for szl_openshell_receipts-0.3.2-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 43.4 kB
Release files / szl_openshell_receipts-0.3.2.tar.gz
| Download URL | szl_openshell_receipts-0.3.2.tar.gz |
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| Size | 24.1 kB |
| Tags | Source |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
1fdcd38e8d56ede900416f1d0d66132b7bf2a72d2ee1402803eeac8ab09f0c5f
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| Download URL | szl_openshell_receipts-0.3.2-py3-none-any.whl |
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| Size | 19.3 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
f0d915c47516e935386536bfbfd941884b2d60d188e2d2e5e4a5549f129826ef
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twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
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