SZL Holdings · Doctrine v11 · Λ = Conjecture 1 (advisory, never "green"/theorem) · canonical a-11-oy.com
szl-trust
Control before action. Evidence after.
Product · Proof · GitHub organization
STATUS — ACTIVE HISTORICAL PROOF REGISTRY. This repository remains the source-of-record for the published trust run artifacts and their offline verification helpers stored here. The former
docs-siteconsolidation target is now an archived mirror whose repository metadata points toa11oy-netas the canonical proof-site source. The public proof surface is a11oy.net. SeeDEPRECATED.mdfor the superseded consolidation history; it is not current deprecation authority for this repository.
SZL Holdings Public Trust Portal · Doctrine v11 LOCKED (749 / 14 / 163) · CC-BY-4.0
Source-of-truth note (2026-09-22): The June
docs-sitecopy is historical.szl-trustowns the published historical artifact bytes and verification material in this repository;a11oy-netowns the current proof-site source and deployment evidence fora11oy.net. A copied or archived mirror does not establish current runtime alignment.
A measurable governance operator on the receipt-bus σ-algebra of agentic AI — publishing
Covenant Proof Standard run artifacts from experiment executions that the run producer flagged
mocked:false, with evidence chains for external auditability.
What this is
szl-trust is the public transparency layer of the SZL Holdings governed AI platform.
It publishes Covenant Proof Standard (CPS) run artifacts — hash-chained, cryptographically
verifiable governance receipts from experiment executions flagged mocked:false by the run
producer. The canonical reference run
is the E4 Codex Kernel (2026-04-29): 12 receipts, all mocked:false, 12 proof ledger
steps, 12 trace spans in trace.jsonl (all validators PASS), with a deployment_contract.json anchoring the full
run to a specific repo_commit. mocked:false is a flag the producer sets; on its own it does
not show how the run was executed. The run's version_lineage.json records
model_provider: proxy_or_offline_emulator and model_version: deterministic.
External auditors, partners, and regulators can verify every decision without SZL tooling.
Quickstart
Receipts are plain JSON, verifiable without any SZL tooling:
git clone https://github.com/szl-holdings/szl-trust
cd szl-trust
# Inspect the E4 Codex Kernel run
cat runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/run_manifest.json | jq '.deliverables'
cat runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/proof_ledger.jsonl | head -3 | jq '.'
# Verify mocked:false on all receipts
cat runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/trace.jsonl | jq '[.decision_receipt.mocked] | unique'
# → [false]
E4 Codex Kernel run at a glance
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Run ID | E4-codex-kernel-governed-loop-unified-replit-all-in-one |
| Date | 2026-04-29 |
| Receipts | 12 (mocked:false on all) |
| Proof ledger steps | 12 (hash-chained, covenant-v1) |
| Span IDs in trace | 12 spans (all validators PASS) |
| Policy version | covenant-v1 |
| Repo commit | 7eb623f8b870128e615ac6be9880e0265204b454 |
Key files
| Path | Role |
|---|---|
runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/run_manifest.json |
Run manifest — payload hash, ledger digest, deliverable SHAs |
runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/proof_ledger.jsonl |
12-step hash-chained proof ledger |
runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/trace.jsonl |
12 execution spans — all mocked:false |
runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/deployment_contract.json |
Deployment contract (platform: replit, repo_commit anchored) |
runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/decision_receipt.json |
Canonical decision receipt |
ops/evidence-snapshot-worker/ |
Cloudflare Worker source for GET https://api.a-11-oy.com/v1/evidence-snapshot. The SKU is offered in source (OFFERED = true); the origin does not return an accepts list. |
ops/revenue-tracker-worker/ |
szl-revenue-tracker Worker: records only verified PAYMENT-CONTEXT authorizations and origin-reported settlements; no route by default |
Honesty scope
- Not a live execution system. Read-only audit artifact registry — publishes receipts, does not execute AI decisions.
- Not independently sufficient for trust. Receipts should be verified against the Ouroboros runtime.
- Not a general-purpose blockchain ledger. JSON artifacts anchored by Merkle roots; Cardano anchoring (via the receipt-minting layer) is separate.
- SLSA L1 honest — provenance generated; L2/L3 not claimed.
- Λ-uniqueness = Conjecture 1 (not a theorem).
- No FedRAMP / Iron Bank / CMMC claims.
Related
| Repo | Role |
|---|---|
| ouroboros | Runtime that generates the receipts |
| lutar-lean | Lean 4 proofs — 749 decls / 14 unique axioms (15 raw, 1 dup) / 163 sorries @ c7c0ba17 |
| a11oy | Flagship governance app |
| a11oy-net | Current proof-site source and deployment evidence for a11oy.net |
| docs-site | Archived historical documentation mirror; not current proof authority |
Citation
See CITATION.cff. Preferred: The Ouroboros Substrate (v18.0), DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20434276.
License
CC-BY-4.0. Artifacts may be used and redistributed with attribution to SZL Holdings. Security disclosures: security@szlholdings.com — see SECURITY.md.
Doctrine v11 LOCKED · 749/14/163 · kernel c7c0ba17 · Λ = Conjecture 1 · SLSA L1 honest
Signed-off-by: stephenlutar2-hash stephenlutar2@gmail.com
One-click buyer verification
Run verify.sh to verify a receipt from this repo in under 30 seconds — no SZL tooling required:
# Clone and run
git clone https://github.com/szl-holdings/szl-trust
cd szl-trust
chmod +x verify.sh
./verify.sh
The script:
- Fetches the org cosign public key from szl-lake
- Fetches
decision_receipt.jsonfrom the E4 run in this repo - Confirms the receipt carries
mocked:false(a flag set by the run producer) - Recomputes SHA-256 of the decoded payload
- Attempts ECDSA-P256 DSSE signature verification against the cosign public key
- Probes Lean-kernel liveness against the ROADMAP HF Space
SZLHOLDINGS/lean-kernel(not yet deployed — the probe reports unreachable and is non-fatal). Live governed-kernel artifacts: SZLHOLDINGS/szl-kernels
Expected verdict line when the mocked:false check passes: ✓ VERIFIED — receipt is flagged mocked:false by its producer
Honest limits: DSSE signing is PLACEHOLDER when HATUN_MCP_SIGNING_KEY is unset at
runtime — the receipt will say so honestly (never fabricates a signature). Trust ceiling = 0.97
(never 1.0 by doctrine). Λ = Conjecture 1 (advisory, not a theorem).
To verify the DSSE sig with cosign directly:
cosign verify-blob \
--key /tmp/szl_cosign.pub \
--bundle runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/cosign-bundle.json \
runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29/decision_receipt.json
Source-manifest structure check
python3 scripts/validate_source_manifest.py docs/source-manifest.example.json
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p test_validate_source_manifest.py -v
The validator rejects duplicate JSON members (including nested source and proof
fields), non-finite numbers, and invalid required structure. Exit 0 and the
DECLARED message mean structural validation only. Historical and unbound
inventory records can remain in a structurally valid manifest.
Producer-supplied proof booleans, signer names, and source revisions are
declarations; this checker does not verify their authenticity, freshness, served
bytes, signatures, or execution authority. It never grants admission or changes
the status of the recorded assets. Malformed JSON exits 2; schema errors exit
1.
Offline chain-integrity check (no network, no SZL tooling)
scripts/verify_chain.py verifies the internal consistency of a published
run entirely offline (Python 3 standard library only — no deps, no network):
python3 scripts/verify_chain.py # verify every run under runs/
python3 scripts/verify_chain.py runs/E4-codex-kernel-2026-04-29
It is fail-closed: a malformed / truncated JSON record, a step gap or
reorder, a broken hash-chain link, a ledger↔trace state-binding mismatch, a
receipt-id disagreement, a non-boolean mocked posture, or a manifest anchor
that does not match the final ledger state each cause a non-zero exit — nothing
is silently skipped. The adversarial suite in tests/test_verify_chain.py
(run: python3 -m unittest discover -s tests) mutates a copy of the real E4
artifacts and asserts every such tampering is rejected.
Duplicate JSON member names are rejected in every ledger, trace, manifest, and optional final-receipt object, including nested objects, identical values, and escaped spellings that decode to the same name. This prevents a parser's last-value-wins behavior from silently hiding conflicting artifact fields.
State hashes in the ledger, trace (previous and next), and manifest anchor must be 32-character lowercase hexadecimal strings, matching the historical E4 run format. Nulls, non-string values, and malformed hash strings are rejected before comparison. Every span after the first must link to its predecessor; the first previous-state hash is checked for format but has no external genesis anchor. This format check does not identify a hash algorithm or establish authenticity.
Honest scope: this is advisory tamper-evidence — it shows the published artifacts are self-consistent (any edit to one record breaks a cross-referenced invariant), not a proof of authenticity. It does not assert the state hashes were produced by a trusted signer and never fabricates a signature. Λ = Conjecture 1 (advisory). Trust ceiling 0.97 — never 1.0 by doctrine.
x402 PAYMENT-CONTEXT validators (offline; nothing here charges)
This repository holds the estate's two PAYMENT-CONTEXT validators for
Cloudflare Monetization Gateway: scripts/x402_payment_context.py (Python)
and ops/evidence-snapshot-worker/src/payment-context.mjs (Workers runtime).
They share one contract and the vectors in
tests/vectors/x402-payment-context.v1.json, which
tools/x402_payment_context_vectors.py generates from test-only keys. The
validator in governed-receipt-spec (science_evidence/payment.py) is
deprecated in favour of these.
The caller must state the route's scheme and price: an exact context must
sign exactly that amount and an upto maximum may not exceed it, so a payment
made under a cheaper rule is rejected. Leeway is 5 seconds by default and at
most 30. Keys come only from the pinned JWKS, and a key set that cannot be
fetched fails closed.
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -p 'test_x402_*.py' -v
python3 tools/x402_payment_context_vectors.py --check
(cd ops/evidence-snapshot-worker && npm ci && npm test)
In this repository they are wired only to the evidence snapshot. Owner decision
(2026-11-12): that route is https://api.a-11-oy.com/v1/evidence-snapshot and
the apex stays free. The SKU is offered in source (OFFERED = true). Gateway
rule 8f6c7d526b7c4a42a1075671898474b9 is the exact $1.00 rule and should be
re-enabled after merge and Worker redeploy. The origin does not return HTTP 402
(see docs/monetization/evidence-snapshot-activation-2026-11-02.md).
Metadata
Release files for szl-trust 0.1.0
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Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| szl_trust-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for szl_trust-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 63.6 kB
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