t7 — Triple Seven agent
Threat model, verified fixes and proof for every change. Runs on the developer's machine and in your CI. Your source code never leaves your environment: Byteramp only receives an abstract architecture model and finding metadata (title, file:line, fix/proof results as hashes and pass/fail).
Install
pipx install t7-agent # stdlib only, no third-party dependencies
cd your-repo
t7 setup # paste your token (hidden); verified, then stored for this repo
t7 scan # review your current branch + uncommitted work
t7 fix SEC-REQ-SHOP-004 # apply a verified fix and its regression test
An active Triple Seven subscription and a repository token (portal → Triple Seven →
Repositories) are required for every review — in the terminal, in your IDE and in
CI. t7 setup checks the token against Byteramp before saving it to
~/.config/t7/credentials.json (mode 0600), keyed by the repository path. In CI,
set T7_TOKEN instead; it always takes precedence. t7 logout removes a stored token.
In your editor / AI assistant (MCP)
t7 mcp is a Model Context Protocol server. Your assistant can then review the
change you're working on, explain findings and apply verified fixes — before a
pull request exists. Tools: t7_scan, t7_findings, t7_explain,
t7_show_fix, t7_apply_fix, t7_doctor.
Run t7 setup once in the repository and the MCP server uses that token — no
token in any editor config. (Setting T7_TOKEN in the server's env still works
and wins.)
# Claude Code
claude mcp add triple-seven -- t7 mcp
Cursor / Windsurf (~/.cursor/mcp.json, ~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json):
{ "mcpServers": { "triple-seven": { "command": "t7", "args": ["mcp"] } } }
VS Code (.vscode/mcp.json, safe to commit — it holds no token).
With GitHub Copilot in Agent mode the analysis runs on your Copilot model via MCP
sampling (VS Code asks once to allow it) — no separate AI setup. Set T7_LLM to override:
{ "servers": { "triple-seven": { "type": "stdio", "command": "t7", "args": ["mcp"],
"env": { "T7_REPO": "${workspaceFolder}" } } } }
Codex (~/.codex/config.toml):
[mcp_servers.triple-seven]
command = "t7"
args = ["mcp"]
tool_timeout_sec = 900
Give each developer a personal token (portal → Repositories → Install for your team) so runs are attributed and one person can be revoked on their own.
GitHub Actions
# .github/workflows/triple-seven.yml
name: Triple Seven
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [main] # review coverage: which merges were reviewed
issue_comment:
types: [created] # /t7 accept-risk | false-positive | not-applicable | reopen
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
statuses: write # the "Triple Seven" commit status carries the merge gate
jobs:
t7:
if: github.event_name != 'issue_comment' || startsWith(github.event.comment.body, '/t7')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with: { fetch-depth: 0 }
- uses: byteramp/triple-seven@v0
with:
token: ${{ secrets.T7_TOKEN }}
Protect the branch on the Triple Seven commit status (not the job). A
collaborator can clear a blocking finding from the PR with
/t7 accept-risk SEC-REQ-… <reason> — the decision is recorded with an audit
trail and the status flips to success. Each finding in the PR comment also has
a ready prompt for Claude Code, Cursor, Codex or Copilot.
The PR comment and one-click suggested changes are posted with the runner's own
GITHUB_TOKEN. Byteramp needs no access to your repository.
Models
T7_LLM |
Where code goes |
|---|---|
byteramp |
Byteramp's own EU VPS models — requires opt-in in the portal; never forwarded to a cloud provider, never logged |
azure |
Your Azure OpenAI deployment |
openai |
Any OpenAI-compatible endpoint you choose |
anthropic |
Your Anthropic account |
ollama |
A model next to the agent (laptop / runner) |
GitLab
Copy templates/gitlab-ci.yml into your .gitlab-ci.yml
and add two masked CI/CD variables: T7_TOKEN (from the portal) and
T7_GITLAB_TOKEN (a project access token, scope api, role Reporter, so t7 can
comment on the merge request with one-click suggestions). Works with
self-managed GitLab — CI_API_V4_URL is picked up automatically.
Any other CI (Bitbucket, Azure DevOps, Jenkins …)
See templates/generic-ci.sh: t7 scan --ci exits
non-zero when an enforced merge gate blocks, and writes t7-report.md.
How a review runs
planner picks the chain for this diff → mapper builds the abstract
architecture delta → Byteramp's threat model returns hypotheses →
specialist analysts run in parallel (authz, injection, LLM, IaC,
secrets/crypto, logic) → triage checks each hypothesis against the
code → an adversarial critic tries to refute high/critical findings →
fixer ⇄ verifier loop (isolated git worktree: applies, lint, types,
independent re-check, test suite) → prover writes a regression test that
must fail before and pass after the fix (L2) → noise budget → report.
Every step streams to the portal timeline.
Verifying a release
Every release is Sigstore-signed with a CycloneDX SBOM and SLSA provenance — see RELEASING.md. Source is public so you can read exactly what runs on your code; what is sent to Byteramp is documented in SECURITY.md.
Metadata
Release files for t7-agent 0.1.5
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| t7_agent-0.1.5.tar.gz | 64.5 kB | With provenance | Details for t7_agent-0.1.5.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| t7_agent-0.1.5-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for t7_agent-0.1.5-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 130.8 kB
Release files / t7_agent-0.1.5.tar.gz
| Download URL | t7_agent-0.1.5.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 64.5 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
9ce451518ac8a5b37fcdd779a5ba036dc6cc8de8aad81389f4192f677a4e0674
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
6cfa13155c0d49f4d9040289f9636c32a95ad4ea00b1af686d987fc2ace31a72
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
Provenance
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PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 14, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / t7_agent-0.1.5-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | t7_agent-0.1.5-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 66.3 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
32e2b647705e149cc9f61efd77747cdd74fad91f416e8cad2d895a15429d5661
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
93ef2bf7611fad81af54fd42bdc67183454ba2ca8fb0dc5e9cdb61b1747a6a7b
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 14, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for t7-agent 0.1.5
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
Both files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for t7_agent-0.1.5.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 14, 2026.
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