tai42-sandbox-docker
Docker sandbox provider for the TAI ecosystem — per-session containers on a REMOTE Docker engine over the Docker Engine API.
Each session runs as its own hardened container on a remote engine reached over mTLS. The app container spawns no local process, holds no host Docker socket, and mounts no host path; real work is driven through the engine's exec API against an idle session container.
Enable it
sandbox_module: tai42_sandbox_docker
Configuration
The SANDBOX_DOCKER_ env group. SANDBOX_DOCKER_HOST is required (a
unix:///var/run/... socket path or a tcp://host:port); the mTLS client
certificates are read from the canonical /certs/client mount, never from the
environment. Resource-cap fallbacks (SANDBOX_DOCKER_DEFAULT_CPU /
SANDBOX_DOCKER_DEFAULT_MEMORY_MB), the image SANDBOX_DOCKER_PULL_POLICY, the
opt-in egress-firewall readiness probe (SANDBOX_DOCKER_READINESS_PROBE_ENABLED /
SANDBOX_DOCKER_READINESS_PROBE_IMAGE /
SANDBOX_DOCKER_READINESS_PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS), and the shared TTL / reap /
exec-timeout knobs round out the group.
Security model
- Remote engine over mTLS — no host Docker socket, no privilege in the app container.
- Per-session containers hardened with
no-new-privileges, all capabilities dropped, never privileged, and no host bind mount. - Single-workspace-mount isolation invariant: a session mounts ONLY its own workspace volume and can never read the engine's mTLS client identity.
- Network tiers
none/internal/egressmap onto the engine's network mode; egress default is OPEN, so tool-result data is exfiltratable under open egress (the egress firewall is provisioned by the deployment that runs the engine). - Egress-firewall readiness (opt-in): with
SANDBOX_DOCKER_READINESS_PROBE_ENABLED, a create first proves the engine's egress firewall is in force — a throwaway, unprivileged probe container on the egress tier must not reach the engine's control address and must reach its own resolver — and refuses the create loudly otherwise. Both probe targets are derived, so there is nothing to mis-set.
Durability model
An ephemeral session's workspace is an anonymous volume reaped with the session; a
persistent session binds a durable named tai-sbx-<workspace_key> volume that
survives the session and its reap, removed only by an explicit unforced teardown.
The durable store is provisioned by the deployment that runs the engine.
See docs/index.mdx and the tai-docs operate page for the full settings table and
deployment topology.
Metadata
Release files for tai42-sandbox-docker 1.3.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | |
|---|---|---|---|
| tai42_sandbox_docker-1.3.1.tar.gz | 45.7 kB | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| tai42_sandbox_docker-1.3.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 75.5 kB
Release files / tai42_sandbox_docker-1.3.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | tai42_sandbox_docker-1.3.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 45.7 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Release files / tai42_sandbox_docker-1.3.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | tai42_sandbox_docker-1.3.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 29.7 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
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