tallwright-langgraph
Cloud Proof for a LangChain/LangGraph v1 agent, as one middleware. The agent's context and the actions it triggers become records that somebody else can check offline, while the content stays on your machine.
It is a thin adapter on the Python SDK, tallwright-cloud: it
decides when to hand the client an event and what content to hand it, and nothing else. The commitment,
the evidence, sending, sending again and the receipt are the SDK's
(the adapter contract).
Use it
import os
from langchain.agents import create_agent
from tallwright_cloud import Tallwright
from tallwright_langgraph import TallwrightMiddleware
client = Tallwright(os.environ["TALLWRIGHT_INGEST"], os.environ["TALLWRIGHT_KEY"], "./tallwright-evidence")
agent = create_agent(model, tools, middleware=[TallwrightMiddleware(client)]) # last in the list
agent.invoke({"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Refund ticket 8812"}]})
client.flush() # at the end of a run: wait for what was sent in the background
The ingest address and the key are the ones the backoffice shows for an Environment, as in the quickstart. The middleware never reads a key and never chooses where evidence lives: you build the client, and you hand it over.
What becomes a record
- Each model call: what the model received (system message, messages, the tools offered, the model's name), as context the agent received.
- Each tool call, before the tool runs: the tool's name and its arguments, as an action, with the
tool's name as its
action_type. - What the tool returned, or the type of the exception it raised, as context.
Never recorded: the agent's reasoning or intent. LangChain has no hook for intent, and a provider's
reasoning blocks are left out of what is committed. Messages are projected onto named fields; what was
left out is named in omitted_message_fields, and named credential keys (api_key, token,
authorization, …) are replaced in arguments, messages and results, with each path in
withheld_argument_keys or withheld_result_keys. Pass redact_keys= to name more.
Best effort or fail-closed
By default each event is handed to client.submit: it returns once the evidence is safe on your machine
and sends in the background, so the agent never waits on the network. A capture that fails is logged by
its type, never with content, the agent keeps serving, and the record stays in pending() until it is
sent again.
TallwrightMiddleware(client, fail_closed=True, actor_authority="role:payments-agent")
With fail_closed=True, each tool call is handed to client.capture before the tool runs, and a capture
Tallwright did not confirm raises before the tool runs. A regulated deployment sets it.
actor_authority names the role or rule the agent's actions run under, never a person.
Many end customers
One agent process that serves many end customers records each run into that customer's Environment:
from tallwright_cloud import Environments
environments = Environments(ingest_url, key_for, "./tallwright-evidence")
middleware = TallwrightMiddleware(client_for=lambda runtime: environments.client(runtime.context["customer"]))
agent.invoke(inputs, context={"customer": "customer-42"})
client_for is called with the run's LangGraph runtime; its context is what your code passed to
invoke. middleware.pending() and middleware.flush() reach every client the middleware used.
What is outside the record
- A middleware listed after this one. LangChain composes middleware outermost first, and this one records the tool call before calling the handler. A middleware listed after it runs inside it and may rewrite the call afterwards (context editing, PII, summarization, tool selection, human-in-the-loop), and the record then describes the call as it was before. Install it last.
- Anything that does not pass through the agent's model and tool hooks: a model or an API your code calls directly, and what a tool does inside itself.
- A credential inside free text. Keys are replaced where they are keys; a secret written into a string, such as a tool result the framework turned into text for the model, is not recognised.
- Whether what the agent was told was true. A record commits to what was received, not to whether it was right.
License
Copyright 2026 David Jöbstl. Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0: the package carries the license text and the NOTICE.
Metadata
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