Tarmac CLI (tarmac-cli)
Tarmac is a declarative, idempotent Python CLI for bootstrapping and governing enterprise multi-account AWS Organizations.
Define your organizational units, account factory, SCP guardrails, baseline security (CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Security Hub), and IAM Identity Center (SSO) in simple YAML manifests—then reconcile your entire AWS estate with a single command.
Quickstart
1. Installation & Setup
Install globally from PyPI with uv:
uv tool install tarmac-cli
tarmac --help
Or install from source for local development:
git clone https://github.com/nickdchristian/tarmac-cli.git
cd tarmac-cli
uv sync --locked
uv run tarmac --help
2. Initialize Configuration
Scaffold a production-ready starter project with baseline YAML manifests and CloudFormation templates:
tarmac init --with-templates
This generates:
config/organization.yaml: Organization settings, alternate contacts, OU hierarchy, and SCP guardrails.config/accounts.yaml: Account Factory catalog, OU placement, monthly budgets, and security baselines.config/identity.yaml: IAM Identity Center permission sets, users, groups, and multi-account assignments.
3. Validate & Inspect Readiness
Verify your configurations and audit your AWS Management Account before deploying:
# Validate YAML syntax, Pydantic schemas, and cross-references
tarmac validate
# Run automated pre-flight readiness checks (MFA, quotas, contacts, hygiene, existing trails)
tarmac preflight
4. Deploy Your Landing Zone
Preview proposed actions with a dry run, then execute the automated rollout:
# Preview what will be created and configured
tarmac deploy run --dry-run
# Execute the full 6-phase deployment pipeline
tarmac deploy run
Starting from a brand-new AWS account
Tarmac runs as the management account of the organization it creates, and it cannot run as the root user (root cannot assume the roles tarmac uses to configure member accounts). A fresh account therefore needs a few one-time steps that AWS does not allow to be automated. The most direct path is IAM Identity Center (SSO):
- Sign in as the root user, enable MFA, and add a payment method.
- Open AWS CloudShell (it uses your console session, so no root access keys are created), install tarmac
(
pip install --user tarmac-cli) and create the organization:tarmac org bootstrap. - In the console, enable IAM Identity Center (it requires an existing organization).
- In Identity Center create a user, create a permission set (for example
AdministratorAccess), and assign that user and permission set to the management account. If this assignment is missing,aws configure ssostops withNo AWS accounts are available to you. - In CloudShell run
aws configure sso, thenaws sso login --use-device-code --profile <profile>(see Using AWS CloudShell for why the device-code flag is needed). export AWS_PROFILE=<profile>, then confirm withtarmac access check.tarmac preflight, thentarmac deploy run --dry-run, thentarmac deploy run. Phases are idempotent, so a failed run can simply be repeated.
tarmac preflight and live tarmac deploy run refuse to run as root, so do not run them before step 6.
Each member account needs a unique email address; AWS never lets a closed account's email be reused, and
tarmac validate warns about the sample addresses written by tarmac init. Gmail users can create unique
addresses with the + trick (you+prod@gmail.com, you+log@gmail.com); all of them arrive in one inbox.
Using AWS CloudShell
CloudShell is the easiest place to run tarmac the first time, with a few quirks:
- Sign in with the device-code flow.
aws sso loginnormally redirects tohttp://127.0.0.1:..., which is the CloudShell machine and not your browser, so the callback fails. Useaws sso login --use-device-code: it prints a URL and a short code to enter in your own browser. - Set the profile and Region in every new shell.
export AWS_PROFILE=<profile> AWS_REGION=<primary_region>. WithoutAWS_PROFILE, tarmac uses CloudShell's own (root) credentials and refuses to continue. CloudShell uses the Region you opened it in, which may differ fromprimary_region. - Environment variables do not survive a restart; your home folder does. Re-export
AWS_PROFILE,AWS_REGIONandTARMAC_LOG_FILEafter CloudShell restarts. Your config directory and log file persist. - Use
--log-file.export TARMAC_LOG_FILE=$HOME/run.jsonlrecords every run, which makes a failed phase easy to diagnose withtarmac logs. Download it with the Actions menu.
Adopting an existing organization
The quickest way to start is to let tarmac write the configuration for you:
tarmac import --config-dir my-lz # read-only: nothing in AWS is changed
cd my-lz && tarmac validate && tarmac drift
tarmac deploy run --dry-run
tarmac import reads the OU tree, member accounts (name, email, OU, tags), customer-managed SCPs and where they
are attached, alternate contacts, trusted services, any existing organization trail, and IAM Identity Center
(users, groups, permission sets with their inline policies, and group assignments). It writes
organization.yaml, accounts.yaml, identity.yaml and the policy documents under policies/, sets
delete_default_vpc: false everywhere, and prints a list of things to review: accounts sitting directly under the
root (skipped), SCPs attached only to accounts or nowhere (not imported, because tarmac would attach them to
the root), SCP attachments tarmac cannot express, a pre-existing organization trail, and placeholder contacts.
organization.name comes from existing tarmac stacks when there are any (so a re-import never orphans them),
otherwise from --name or the management email domain. Use --no-identity to skip Identity Center and --force
to overwrite existing files.
Run tarmac deploy run --dry-run before the first real run and read the Phase 4 table. The rules that keep
adoption safe:
- Declare the accounts you already have, with their real emails. An existing account is matched by email first and then by name. If the name matches but the email differs, tarmac refuses to adopt or move it rather than guess.
- Accounts you do not declare are left alone, unless tarmac itself tagged them as managed earlier and you then
removed them from
accounts.yaml. Those are moved to the Suspended OU, and the Phase 4 plan shows them asSUSPEND. Setquarantine_removed_accounts: falseinaccounts.yamlto turn that off. - Do not change
organization.nameafter the first deploy. Every CloudFormation stack is named after it (<name>-organization-scps, ...). Renaming makes tarmac look for stacks that do not exist and try to import resources an older stack still owns, which fails.tarmac preflightwarns when it sees stacks under a different name; the fix is to set the name back. - An organization trail that already exists is not replaced. Tarmac adds its own, so you briefly pay for two
copies of management events ($2.00 per 100,000 events beyond the first). Once the new trail is delivering logs
(
aws cloudtrail get-trail-status --name <trail>shows a delivery time), delete the old one. A multi-region trail can only be read or deleted in its home Region (describe-trails --include-shadow-trailsshows it). - Default VPC purges are opt-out per account. Set
delete_default_vpc: falsefor accounts that already host workloads, and for the management account inorganization.yaml. - What a full run changes in an existing organization: the OU tree, the service control policy attached to the root (it affects every account, including the existing ones), account tags, a monthly budget stack in each member account, alternate contacts on the management account, trusted service access, and new Identity Center permission sets, users and group assignments. Existing permission sets and users that you did not declare are not touched.
Bootstrap access (why tarmac cannot run as root)
Tarmac configures member accounts by assuming OrganizationAccountAccessRole in each of them, and the AWS root
user is not allowed to call sts:AssumeRole. (Root access keys are also discouraged.) So a brand-new account
needs one non-root principal first. tarmac preflight and live tarmac deploy run refuse to continue as root.
-
Sign in to the management account console as root and open AWS CloudShell (it uses your console session, so no root access keys are created). Install tarmac there (
pip install tarmac-cli) and run:tarmac access bootstrap
This deploys the
tarmac-accessstack:TarmacDeploymentRolewith a least-privilege policy (see below; MFA enforced for IAM users, IAM Identity Center sessions pass; 4-hour sessions). -
Create the organization (
tarmac org bootstrapfrom CloudShell, or the console), enable IAM Identity Center, create an administrator user, and sign in withaws sso login. Run tarmac as that identity. -
tarmac access checkconfirms the credentials are non-root and can read the organization; on failure it prints a hint.
Before Identity Center exists you can instead run tarmac access bootstrap --with-bootstrap-user. (The IAM Identity Center path above avoids creating an IAM user with a long-lived key and is the simpler route.) That also creates an
assume-only IAM user (tarmac-bootstrap) and adds a [profile tarmac] block to ~/.aws/config. Create an access key and
an MFA device for the user in the IAM console, put the key in a [profile tarmac-bootstrap] profile, and run
AWS_PROFILE=tarmac tarmac access check. Delete the user and its key once SSO works.
tarmac access template prints the underlying CloudFormation template if you would rather deploy it yourself.
What the role can do. In the management account it gets only the API calls tarmac makes: Organizations, CloudFormation,
the organization trail, IAM Identity Center, GuardDuty/Security Hub delegation, Cost Explorer and a few read-only checks. For
member accounts it may only assume OrganizationAccountAccessRole. It has no iam:PassRole, cannot create IAM roles or
users, and an explicit deny stops it modifying its own role and policy, so changing the role is a root/admin task (re-run
tarmac access bootstrap). A test checks the policy against every AWS API call in tarmac's source, so adding a new call
without updating the policy fails CI. If a run reports AccessDenied for a new feature, deploy with
ManagedPolicyArn=arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess as a stopgap and report the missing action. The policy has not
yet been exercised end-to-end against a real organization; review it before relying on it in production.
Member accounts need nothing extra: Organizations creates OrganizationAccountAccessRole in every account tarmac
creates, trusting the management account, and the tarmac role reaches it through that. Accounts that were invited
(not created) need that role added by hand.
Deployment Pipeline
Tarmac executes an idempotent multi-phase deployment:
[Phase 0: Preflight] ──► Validate AWS prerequisites, quotas, & credentials
[Phase 1: Org & Root] ──► Bootstrap AWS Organizations, contacts, & root access
[Phase 2: OUs & SCPs] ──► Idempotently sync OU tree & attach guardrail SCPs
[Phase 3: Central Log] ──► Deploy Log-Archive bucket & Org-wide CloudTrail
[Phase 4: Accounts] ──► Provision member accounts, purge default VPCs, set budgets
[Phase 5: Hardening] ──► Delegate Security Hub / GuardDuty & anomaly monitors
[Phase 6: Identity] ──► Sync IAM Identity Center permission sets & assignments
You can target a specific phase at any time:
tarmac deploy run --phase 4 # Run only Account Factory provisioning
Command Reference
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
tarmac init |
Scaffold starter configuration manifests and CloudFormation templates. |
tarmac validate |
Validate configuration manifests against Pydantic schemas and cross-references. |
tarmac preflight |
Run 17 diagnostic checks for management account operational readiness (doctor alias). |
tarmac info |
Display caller identity, AWS account details, and Organization status. |
tarmac deploy run |
Execute the automated multi-phase landing zone rollout (--dry-run to preview). |
tarmac status |
Inspect live landing zone reconciliation and phase completion status. |
tarmac drift |
Audit IAM Identity Center permission sets and member account budget drift. |
tarmac import |
Read an existing organization (read-only) and write matching configuration files. |
tarmac deploy destroy |
Safely destroy deployed governance stacks (protected by production safety locks). --everything also removes OUs, Identity Center users/groups, org settings and the access role. |
Granular Service Commands
For targeted management outside the end-to-end pipeline:
- Organizations & OUs:
tarmac org bootstrap— Enable AWS Organizations and trusted services.tarmac org contacts— Synchronize alternate contacts (Billing, Security, Ops).tarmac ou sync— Idempotently synchronize OU tree hierarchy.tarmac org scp apply— Reconcile and attach Service Control Policies.
- Account Factory:
tarmac account plan— Preview proposed account actions (Create, Move, No-op).tarmac account apply— Provision missing accounts and assign to OUs.tarmac account sync-tags— Synchronize governance tags with member accounts.
- Security & Baseline:
tarmac baseline cloudtrail— Deploy organization-wide CloudTrail.tarmac baseline backend— Deploy Terraform S3 state and DynamoDB locks.tarmac baseline security— Deploy GuardDuty, Security Hub, and log hardening.
- IAM Identity Center:
tarmac identity status— View Identity Center instance status and region.tarmac identity sync— Synchronize permission sets, users, groups, and assignments.
Logging and Audit Trail
| Option | Effect |
|---|---|
| (default) | Warnings and errors only, on stderr |
-v, --verbose |
Also print every recorded action (what was created, updated, attached, skipped) |
-d, --debug |
Full diagnostic output with tracebacks |
--log-file PATH (or TARMAC_LOG_FILE) |
Append a JSON-lines record of the run to PATH |
Each line of the log file is one JSON object with a timestamp, level, a run_id shared by the whole invocation, and (where known) the command, phase, account and Region. The first record (run_start) holds the version and arguments, and the last (run_end) holds the exit code and duration. Records with "event": "audit" describe a single action: what was done, to which resource, and whether it succeeded, was skipped, was only simulated by --dry-run, or failed. Secrets such as access keys and tokens are redacted before anything is written, and the file is created readable by its owner only.
tarmac --log-file run.jsonl run --yes
jq -r 'select(.event=="audit") | "\(.ts) \(.data.outcome) \(.message)"' run.jsonl
Outcomes mean what they say: succeeded is a change tarmac made, unchanged means AWS already held the requested state (tarmac reads before it writes, so a second run of the same command should be almost all unchanged), skipped was deliberately not done, simulated is what --dry-run would have done, and failed is an error. To prove a dry run changed nothing, check that the log has no dry_run_violation records: tarmac logs run.jsonl --run latest --all --json | grep dry_run_violation should print nothing. deploy run --dry-run also records each phase plan, and each account action in the Phase 4 plan, as simulated.
Reading a log back
tarmac logs turns a log file into something a person can review without jq:
tarmac logs run.jsonl # one line per run: status, what changed, what failed
tarmac logs run.jsonl --run latest # what the last run did, plus any warnings and errors
tarmac logs run.jsonl --run 20261020T1 # a run by id or id prefix
tarmac logs run.jsonl --outcome failed # only actions that failed
tarmac logs run.jsonl --account dev --phase accounts
tarmac logs run.jsonl --run latest --all # every record, including AWS calls
tarmac logs run.jsonl --run latest --json # matching records, one JSON object per line
With TARMAC_LOG_FILE set, the file argument can be left out. Reading a log never writes to it. A run shows as incomplete if the process was killed before it could write its final record.
AWS calls and CloudTrail
Every AWS call is recorded with its service, operation, Region, outcome, duration, request id and a redacted summary of its parameters. Calls that change something (Create*, Put*, Delete*, Enable*, ...) are logged at INFO, so they are in the log file and shown by -v; read-only calls (Describe*, List*, Get*) appear with --debug.
The run id is added to the AWS user agent (app/tarmac-<run-id>) and to the role session name (tarmac-<run-id>), so any CloudTrail event can be matched back to the run that caused it, for example by searching for the run id in userAgent or in the assumed-role session name.
During --dry-run and plan commands, any state-changing call (other than CloudFormation change sets) is logged as an ERROR with "event": "dry_run_violation": a preview must not change anything.
Keeping CloudTrail logs
By default CloudTrail logs are kept forever, which is the safe choice but means storage cost grows slowly. Set cloudtrail.retention_days to delete log files that many days after they are written:
cloudtrail:
retention_days: 365 # omit to keep logs indefinitely
Deleted objects are purged for good seven days later and cannot be recovered, so pick a value that meets your audit and compliance requirements (many frameworks ask for a year or more). tarmac deploy run --dry-run shows the retention that will be applied. The setting is applied to the log archive stack; changing it re-deploys that stack.
Encryption of the log archive
cloudtrail.enable_kms: false stores the CloudTrail logs with SSE-S3 (AES256) and does not create the log archive KMS key, which saves about $1 a month plus request charges. If you switch an existing deployment from true to false, the key already created is kept (logs written earlier still need it to be read); remove it yourself once those logs have expired.
Safe Teardown
Tarmac includes built-in safeguards to prevent accidental infrastructure or state loss:
- Production Environment Lock: Refuses to destroy any environment whose
Environment/Env/Stagetag isproduction,prodorprdunless--forceis explicitly provided. - Ownership checks: SCPs, the standalone CloudTrail trail and Identity Center permission sets that tarmac did not create (no
tarmac:managed-by=tarmactag) are skipped, not deleted. - Remote State Preservation: Pass
--preserve-backendto destroy infrastructure while protecting remote Terraform state buckets and lock tables. - Non-Empty Bucket Protection: Halts if unmanaged data exists in S3 buckets unless explicitly confirmed.
# Preview teardown actions
tarmac deploy destroy --dry-run
# Execute teardown preserving Terraform state
tarmac deploy destroy --preserve-backend
Starting over
A full tarmac deploy destroy removes everything tarmac deployed (stacks, buckets, budgets, SCPs, permission
sets, milestone tags) so tarmac deploy run can rebuild it. It deliberately keeps:
- the organization, OUs and member accounts (closing an account is irreversible and AWS reserves its email, so
use
tarmac account suspend --closeper account and declare a new email if you want a truly fresh account); - GuardDuty / Security Hub / AWS Config delegation and member detectors, which keep billing until disabled.
Pass
--disable-security-servicesto turn them off as part of Phase 5 (it turns off auto-enable, deregisters the delegated administrators, deletes the GuardDuty detectors and disables Security Hub in the audit, management and declared member accounts). This deletes finding history, so it is opt-in. Failures per account/region are reported, and a failed step makes the command exit non-zero; - IAM Identity Center users and groups, OUs, organization settings and the access role (kept unless you pass
--everything, below).
The log-archive KMS key is scheduled for deletion (30-day window, cancel with aws kms cancel-key-deletion)
once its buckets have been purged and deleted; if any log-archive cleanup failed the key is kept.
Removing everything tarmac did
tarmac deploy destroy --everything --dry-run # preview
tarmac deploy destroy --everything # asks you to type the organization name
On top of a normal destroy, --everything removes, in dependency order: the Identity Center users and groups
tarmac created (and their assignments), the OUs tarmac created (only when empty), the organization settings tarmac
enabled (delegated administrators, root credentials management and root sessions, trusted service access,
alternate contacts, cost-allocation-tag activation), the milestone tags, and finally the tarmac-access stack
(TarmacDeploymentRole) and the tarmac-bootstrap IAM user with its keys and MFA device.
What counts as "created by tarmac" is decided by evidence, never by name:
- Stacks, SCPs, permission sets and accounts carry the
tarmac:managed-by=tarmactag. - OUs, users, groups and organization settings cannot be tagged, so tarmac records each one in
<config dir>/.tarmac/inventory.jsonthe moment it changes it. Things that already existed (an event logged as "unchanged") are never recorded and therefore never removed.tarmac deploy inventoryshows the record. - For a deployment that predates the inventory, rebuild it from a run log:
tarmac deploy destroy --everything --inventory-from-log "$TARMAC_LOG_FILE"(ortarmac deploy inventory --from-log FILEto inspect it first).
Member accounts are never closed by this command. It lists the accounts tarmac manages with the exact
tarmac account suspend NAME --close command for each. An alternate contact that replaced one which already existed is
left in place (tarmac cannot restore the old one), and the tarmac-bootstrap user is only deleted when it carries
the tarmac:managed-by=tarmac tag. Disabling Identity Center trusted access is also left to you, because it can
delete the Identity Center instance. If you run the teardown as TarmacDeploymentRole, the
access stack's deletion is started but not awaited. The role cannot manage IAM users, so when the access stack
contains a bootstrap user the stack is kept and the command tells you to remove the user as an administrator
(for example your SSO admin) and run it again.
If a teardown leaves a CloudFormation stack in DELETE_FAILED (for example a bucket that could not be emptied),
fix the cause and re-run teardown or deploy: both now delete and recreate stacks stuck in DELETE_FAILED,
CREATE_FAILED or ROLLBACK_COMPLETE.
Templates exported with
tarmac init --with-templatestake precedence over the ones bundled with the CLI. After upgrading tarmac, delete or diff your localcloudformation/andpolicies/copies against the bundled ones to pick up fixes. (Do not usetarmac init --forcefor this: it also overwrites your YAML configuration.)
Troubleshooting
| What you see | Why | What to do |
|---|---|---|
Root credentials cannot assume roles in member accounts |
The shell is using root credentials (for example CloudShell's own session). | export AWS_PROFILE=<sso-profile> and re-run; see Starting from a brand-new AWS account. |
aws configure sso says No AWS accounts are available to you |
Your Identity Center user has no permission set on any account. | In Identity Center, assign the user and a permission set to the management account, then run aws configure sso again. |
The SSO sign-in page redirects to 127.0.0.1 and fails |
CloudShell has no browser to receive the callback. | Use aws sso login --use-device-code. |
The config profile (...) could not be found |
aws configure sso stopped before writing the profile. |
Fix the cause above, then run aws configure sso again. |
tarmac info shows Identity Center as not found |
Identity Center lives in one Region, which may not be your shell's. | Set AWS_REGION to it, or pass --region. |
Phase 2: Failed to import resources into stack '<name>-organization-scps' and a change set reason of p-... already exists in stack ... |
The SCP belongs to a stack named for a different organization.name. |
Set organization.name back to the original name (the prefix of the stack in the message). |
Phase 5: You must enable service access before you delegate an administrator (config-multiaccountsetup) |
Trusted access for that service was not enabled (fixed in newer releases). | aws organizations enable-aws-service-access --service-principal config-multiaccountsetup.amazonaws.com, then re-run phase 5. |
refusing to create an account with the sample email |
accounts.yaml still has an address from tarmac init. |
Use a real, unique address you can receive mail at. |
refusing to adopt or move it |
An account with that name exists under a different email. | Put the account's actual email in accounts.yaml. |
Warning: An organization trail already exists |
A trail from before tarmac is still recording. | Delete the old trail once the new one is delivering logs; see above. |
UPDATE_ROLLBACK_COMPLETE on the tarmac-access stack |
A stack update failed and was rolled back. | aws cloudformation describe-stack-events --stack-name tarmac-access --query "StackEvents[?contains(ResourceStatus,'FAILED')].[LogicalResourceId,ResourceStatusReason]" --output text shows why. |
A warning such as No updates are to be performed or already a delegated administrator |
AWS reporting that nothing needed doing. | Nothing; these are logged as unchanged and are not errors. |
Always start with tarmac logs --run latest: it shows the failing action, its AWS error and the phase it happened in.
Development & Testing
# Sync environment dependencies from lockfile
uv sync --locked
# Run the Pytest suite
uv run pytest
# Run static analysis, formatting, and template/config validation
uv run ruff check .
uv run ruff format --check .
uv run basedpyright
uv run cfn-lint cloudformation/*.yaml src/tarmac/templates/cloudformation/*.yaml
uv run tarmac validate --config-dir examples/config
License
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0.
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