tcl-fw
Pull and decrypt official TCL (MediaTek) firmware — flashable service packages, fully offline.
tcl-fw talks to TCL's own FOTA download servers the way the on-device updater
does (no Google, no account, no dongle), lists a device's complete factory
"service" fileset, streams the plaintext partitions, and AES-decrypts the
small partitions that ship inside an encrypted 4 MiB header — producing clean,
flashable images (lk.img, boot.img, vbmeta.img, preloader_*.bin, the
scatter, …).
Credit
The header-decryption scheme that makes this tool possible — AES-128-ECB with a universal key recovered from
sugar_otu_r.dll— was cracked by Littlenine Ennea. Mode 4 (full-image decryption) exists entirely because of that work. Thank you.
Works on TCL-made Android devices (TCL, REVVL, Alcatel).
Install
pip install tcl-fw # CLI only
pip install "tcl-fw[gui]" # CLI + desktop app (PySide6)
Or grab the standalone tcl-fw / tcl-fw.exe (CLI) or tcl-fw-gui.exe
(desktop app) from
Releases — no Python needed.
Desktop app
Prefer clicking to typing? Launch the GUI:
tcl-fw-gui # or: python -m tcl_fw_gui
Pick (or Detect) a device → Load to see every partition with real sizes
→ tick what you want → Pull. Per-partition progress, live decrypt log, and
SHA-1 verification, all over the exact same backend as the CLI. On Windows the
GUI uses the native adb, so Detect phone works without any usbipd/WSL
plumbing.
Click 🔥 Firmware (Auto-updated) to browse the community device database in place of the partition list — every device/build the tool has learned about (CUREF/MODEL, Version, Date, Size, Mode, SW ver). Double-click a row to load that device. The list grows on its own (see below).
Quickstart
# Plug in a phone with USB debugging on — tcl-fw reads the curef itself:
tcl-fw pull
# …or name the device explicitly:
tcl-fw list T704SP-EAUHUS12-V # see every partition, size, name
tcl-fw pull T704SP-EAUHUS12-V # download + decrypt the whole package
tcl-fw pull T704SP-EAUHUS12-V --small # just the small parts (lk/preloader/… fast)
tcl-fw pull T704SP-EAUHUS12-V --only lk,boot,vbmeta
tcl-fw decrypt some_header.bin # decrypt one local header blob
Find your curef on a handset:
adb shell getprop ro.tct.curef
Commands
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
tcl-fw pull [curef] |
Download + decrypt a device's service package into flashable images. Auto-detects the curef from a plugged-in phone if omitted. --small, --only p1,p2, --out DIR, --no-verify. |
tcl-fw list [curef] |
Resolve a device and list every partition: name, real size, and whether it comes from the body or the encrypted header. |
tcl-fw decrypt <blob> |
Decrypt a single local encrypted-header blob and name it by content. |
tcl-fw devices [--detect] |
List known devices, or probe for a connected phone. |
tcl-fw templates [--all] |
List validated firmware templates with a NEW tag on recent builds (--all shows full release history). |
tcl-fw sync |
Pull newly-recorded devices from the community server into your device list. |
tcl-fw sharing [--on|--off] |
Show or change community device-ID sharing (opt-out, nothing personal). |
Community device database (opt-out)
tcl-fw can only auto-fill a device it knows about, so it grows its own list.
When a lookup succeeds, the tool reports the device identifiers it used to a
small community registry; other installs pull those in, so a device one person
discovers becomes auto-detectable for everyone.
-
Shared: curef, firmware version (fv), mode, resolved tv/fw_id, package size, TCL software version (SVN), the device model name, and the tool version. The model name comes from a read-only build property (
ro.tct.setupwizard.marketname, elsero.product.model) — it is identical on every unit of that model, so it names the model, never your phone. It is only sent when a matching handset is plugged in; otherwise it is simply omitted. -
Never shared: no IMEI or serial (the FOTA protocol uses a fixed placeholder), no IP, no account, no personal name, no location, and no user-set device nickname — nothing that identifies you or your specific handset.
-
Opt-out, disclosed on first run. Turn it off any time:
tcl-fw sharing --off # stop sharing; --on to resume tcl-fw sharing # status + exactly what's recorded
The desktop app shows the same notice once and a checkbox at the bottom of the window. Submissions are fire-and-forget: if the server is unreachable the tool proceeds normally and simply skips the record.
The device list refreshes automatically (once a day, in the background, gated on
the same opt-out); tcl-fw sync pulls it on demand. Everything it learns shows
up in tcl-fw devices, which marks each entry built-in, bundled, or
community so you can see what the network taught your install. The registry is
public — browse what's recorded at the server's /about and /api/curefs.
The server also re-validates itself: every ~12h it re-checks each known
device against TCL and records the current build, so new firmware releases
grow the history on their own — even for a device nobody's looked up lately.
Server code, the self-updating logic, and privacy details live in
curef-server/.
How it works
TCL's FOTA server delivers each partition in one of two ways, and tcl-fw
handles both automatically:
-
Large partitions (
super,system,vendor,boot,md1img, …) — the plaintext body is the image; it's streamed straight to disk (with resume and SHA-1 verification against the server'schecksum.php). -
Small partitions (
lk,preloader,tee/atf,vbmeta,spmfw,scatter, …) — the body is empty; the real image lives inside an encrypted ~4 MiB header fetched fromencrypt_header.php. That blob is AES-128-ECB with the single universal keyKEY = ascii( md5("TeleExtTest" + "t0523" + "jP7GHdmuBz").hexdigest()[:16] ) = e26baba108b08a28The header is padded with a constant filler block, which
tcl-fwdetects and trims to recover the exact image.
Partitions are named authoritatively, never guessed. In order of preference
tcl-fw uses:
- The
.scascatter — thecheck_new.phpmanifest joined to the scatter'srename_prefix → file_namemap (real names likelk.img,vbmeta.img). - An embedded manifest — some devices serve no top-level scatter but
bundle one inside a
target_fileszip.tcl-fwreads itsmisc_info.txt,scatter_emmc.txt, andota_update_list.txtto name filesystem partitions by size (this is the scatter-first source TCL's own OTU engine relies on) and drops those descriptors next to the images. - Content identification — MTK GFH partition name, the ext4 / f2fs /
erofs superblock read through the Android sparse container (so a sparse
vendor/cache/userdatacomes out named, not as an anonymoussparse), AVB / boot / dtbo magic, and zip-wrapped payloads by their first entry.
Output
pkg_<curef>/
lk.img boot.img vbmeta.img vendor.img cache.img userdata.img …
<device>.sca # the flash-tool scatter (when the server serves one)
scatter_emmc.txt # recovered partition layout (embedded-manifest devices)
misc_info.txt # partition fs types + sizes (embedded-manifest devices)
manifest.json # what was pulled, sizes, checksum results, manifest
Feed these to SP Flash Tool, fastboot, or mtkclient. Filesystem partitions
land as Android sparse images — flash them as-is, or expand to raw with
simg2img when you want to mount and inspect.
Make it flashable (pack)
A service pack names every file only by a numeric ID, but it ships the device's
MTK scatter. tcl-fw reads that scatter to rename the images to their real
partition names and write a ready-to-load SP Flash Tool scatter:
tcl-fw pull T702Z-EARXUS12-V --pack # pull, then auto-pack
tcl-fw pack pkg_T702Z-EARXUS12-V # or pack a folder you already pulled
tcl-fw pack pkg_… --dry-run # preview the mapping, rename nothing
In the GUI, click ⚡ Make flashable after a pull. Result:
pkg_<curef>/
boot.img init_boot.img vendor_boot.img dtbo.img vbmeta*.img
system.img vendor.img product.img system_ext.img preloader_*.bin …
MT6835_Android_scatter.txt # load this in SP Flash Tool / mtkclient
Partitions are matched by content (MTK-GFH name, AVB descriptors, dtbo/boot magic, ext4/erofs label) and, for the big filesystem images, by size-fit against the scatter. Anything it can't place confidently is left untouched and listed for you to name by hand — it never guesses a partition into a wrong name.
Related — Image Anarchy
Pulled a package and want to flash, repack, or explore it? Check out
Image Anarchy — a companion
toolkit for working with Android firmware images. tcl-fw gets you the clean,
named partitions; Image Anarchy helps you do something with them.
Legal / ethical use
This tool downloads firmware that TCL's own servers serve publicly, for the purpose of repairing, restoring, or inspecting a device you own. It uses no exploit against the device and asks the servers only for what the on-device updater already requests. Respect your local laws and TCL's terms.
Credits
- Littlenine Ennea — cracked the
AES-128-ECB header-decryption scheme and the universal key; the reference
implementation lives in
mode4/tcl-fw.py. Mode 4 is theirs. - vehoelite — the original
tcl-fota-toolFOTA protocol client (check/download signing, fileset parsing), preserved inlegacy/, and the companion Image Anarchy firmware toolkit. - Predecessor protocol research:
mbirth/tcl_ota_check,thurask/bbarchivist.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.
Metadata
Release files for tcl-fw 4.1.1
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| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
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| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| tcl_fw-4.1.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for tcl_fw-4.1.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 139.4 kB
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