Tenuo governance for Claude Code — warrants, hooks, MCP proxy, and Cloud lifecycle
Project description
Tenuo for Claude Code
PyPI package: tenuo-claude-code · CLI: tenuo-claude, tenuo-admin
Keep your AI coding agent inside the lines. Claude Code can read files, run shell, fetch URLs, and call MCP tools. Tenuo puts a signed policy in front of all of it so the agent only does what you allowed, on one laptop or across a Cloud-connected fleet.
Why: Claude's permission prompts are easy to bypass (--dangerously-skip-permissions, local settings edits). Hook-only guardrails trust the process. Tenuo adds limits you can prove were enforced: sandbox-scoped reads, shell allowlists, MCP argument checks, URL policy, and an audit trail per call.
What you get: one policy file (tenuo.yaml), a local authorizer that says allow/deny on every call, and optional Tenuo Cloud for verifiable receipts, human approval gates on high-risk calls, and fleet-wide revocation.
Try it
Requires Python 3.10+ and Docker or a native authorizer.
pip install tenuo-claude-code
mkdir my-project && cd my-project
tenuo-claude bootstrap
Open Claude Code here when verify passes. No Claude? bootstrap + verify is enough to prove enforcement.
Where to go next
| If you want to… | Start here |
|---|---|
| Day-to-day commands, ports, CLI reference | Use the tool |
| Edit or replace the example policy | Policy |
| Clone, hack, or run the sample project | Build from source |
| Connect to Tenuo Cloud | Cloud mode |
| Review security posture | Security |
| Plan org-wide rollout | Talk to us |
| Implementation depth | docs/DETAILS.md |
How it works
tenuo.yaml → init/up → warrant + authorizer + hooks + MCP proxy
|
|
v
native tools (PreToolUse hook) | MCP tools (proxy)
|
|
v
authorizer → allow / deny → log / receipt
Native tools (Read, Bash, WebFetch, and the rest) go through a PreToolUse hook. MCP tools go through a proxy in place of the downstream server. At init, Tenuo mints a session warrant; each call must prove it holds that warrant before the authorizer allows the action.
Both paths use the same warrant and authorizer.
More: docs/DETAILS.md
Prerequisites
- Python ≥ 3.10
- Authorizer runtime (pick one):
- Docker: Docker Desktop or your engine, then
tenuo-claude up(pulls the pinnedtenuo/authorizerimage). This is the default when Docker is running. - Native (no Docker):
tenuo-claude install-authorizer, thentenuo-claude up --native(orup --native --installon first run). Override the binary withTENUO_AUTHORIZER_BIN. The CLI checks the binary matches the package pin; setTENUO_AUTHORIZER_SKIP_VERSION=1only for local dev builds.
- Docker: Docker Desktop or your engine, then
- Claude Code for live agent use (optional for first eval —
verifyis enough).
Local mode: no Tenuo Cloud account. Good for one project or evaluation.
Cloud mode: cloud.tenuo.ai tenant for tenant-root warrants, central audit, fleet revocation, and org-wide rollout (Cloud mode).
Use the tool (PyPI)
After Try it, you have an example tenuo.yaml, a running authorizer, and passing verify. Stay in that project directory for every command below.
Day to day
| When | Command |
|---|---|
| Start work (authorizer down or warrant expired) | tenuo-claude up (Docker) or tenuo-claude up --native |
You edited tenuo.yaml |
tenuo-claude refresh |
| Something broken | tenuo-claude check |
| See decisions | tenuo-claude audit |
| Stop authorizer | tenuo-claude down |
If you always use native without Docker, set TENUO_AUTHORIZER_BACKEND=native in your shell so plain up picks the host binary.
Port conflicts
The authorizer listens on 127.0.0.1:9090 by default. If that port is taken, set TENUO_AUTHORIZER_PORT before init and up:
export TENUO_AUTHORIZER_PORT=9091
tenuo-claude init
tenuo-claude up --native
(PORT still works but is deprecated; it collides with other tools.)
The chosen URL is saved in .state/state.json. Hooks and verify read that file, so they stay aligned even if the env var is unset later.
Generated files (do not commit): .state/ (keys, warrant), .claude/settings.json (hooks).
Custom policy
Bring your own tenuo.yaml (see Policy), or edit the example bootstrap wrote, then:
tenuo-claude init
tenuo-claude up # Docker when the daemon is running; --native for host binary
tenuo-claude verify
First native run: tenuo-claude up --native --install. Interactive equivalent: tenuo-claude onboard --local.
Reference demo
Sample policy and sandbox are in demo/:
cd demo && tenuo-claude bootstrap
tenuo-claude demo # optional scripted tour
From a git checkout, see Build from source.
All commands
| Command | Does |
|---|---|
init |
Mint warrant, wire hooks and .mcp.json |
bootstrap |
Example policy (if missing) + check + init + up + verify |
up / down |
Start / stop authorizer. up flags: --native, --docker, --install (native, first run) |
install-authorizer |
Install tenuo-authorizer to ~/.tenuo/bin (no manual cargo) |
refresh |
Re-apply tenuo.yaml (restarts authorizer if up) |
check |
Preflight: deps, credentials, wiring drift |
verify [--deep] |
Policy self-test against the authorizer |
status |
Warrant, posture, Cloud summary |
onboard |
Interactive local or Cloud setup wizard |
bench [--json] |
Per-tool-call overhead |
audit [--tail N] |
Receipt trail |
revoke |
Revoke session warrant |
See also: Policy · Cloud mode · docs/DETAILS.md
Build from source
For hacking on the CLI, running the reference demo from git, or using ./bin/tenuo-claude instead of a PyPI install.
git clone https://github.com/tenuo-ai/claude-governance.git
cd claude-governance
uv venv && uv sync && chmod +x bin/tenuo-claude
source .venv/bin/activate # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate
Without Docker, install the authorizer binary once: uv run tenuo-claude install-authorizer
Run commands via the repo launcher or editable install:
./bin/tenuo-claude --help
# or: uv run tenuo-claude --help
# or: pip install -e . && tenuo-claude --help
Reference demo (from a git checkout):
cd demo
tenuo-claude bootstrap
tenuo-claude demo # optional scripted tour
Use tenuo-claude up --native instead of plain up if you are not running Docker.
Open Claude Code in demo/. See demo/README.md and Reference demo above.
Re-run tenuo-claude init or refresh after switching Python venvs. Hooks pin sys.executable in .claude/settings.json.
Contributors: CONTRIBUTING.md.
Policy (tenuo.yaml)
One file drives the warrant, authorizer routes, hooks, and MCP proxy. bootstrap writes a minimal example and sets name: from your folder name — edit before production.
name: acme-backend # bootstrap uses your project directory name
sandbox: ./workspace
mode: enforce
enforce:
Read: "subpath:{sandbox}"
Bash: "shlex:ls,pwd,echo,date"
WebFetch:
domains: ["api.github.com", "*.githubusercontent.com"]
default: deny
subagents:
analyst:
tools: [Read, Grep, Glob]
mcp:
downstream: ./your_mcp_server.py
enforce:
read_file: "subpath:{sandbox}"
enforce: allowed and argument-checked.audit: harness tools from bundled list (extend withaudit_extra:).default: deny: everything else blocked with a receipt.mode: audit: receipt allow/deny without blocking (rollout).subagents:: DETAILS.md.
Policy templates: ready-made patterns in examples/policies/. Download one, save as tenuo.yaml in your project directory, adapt sandbox paths and tool lists, then run tenuo-claude init. To contribute a template, see that folder's README.
Cloud overlays: templates/tenuo.yaml.cloud.example, templates/tenuo.yaml.advanced.example. Download from this repo or use tenuo-claude init --cloud / --advanced.
Cloud mode
Requires a cloud.tenuo.ai tenant.
Use Cloud when you need organization-scale governance, not just a single laptop:
- Tenant-root warrants: session credentials chain to your tenant, not a local issuer key
- Central audit: signed allow/deny/spawn/approval receipts in one stream
- Fleet revocation: revoke a warrant id; authorizers pull the SRL within ~30s
- Split keys: admins run
tenuo-admin setuponce; developers use runtime keys only - Optional approver gates: high-risk governed tool calls can pause for Cloud identity sign-off before proceeding (setup)
- Managed rollout: wire hooks via Claude Code managed settings; keep team
tenuo.yamlin git - Org-wide baseline: with managed settings, the signed warrant is enforced on
every tool call at the hook and MCP proxy. Engineers cannot disable it with local
Claude permission edits or
--dangerously-skip-permissions
Local mode (no Cloud account) remains fully supported for evaluation and single-project use.
Two keys, two files (runtime never sees the admin key):
| Key | File | Used by |
|---|---|---|
| Runtime (Quick Connect) | .state/cloud.env |
tenuo-claude up, hooks |
| Admin | ~/.tenuo/admin.env |
tenuo-admin setup once |
Wizard (recommended):
tenuo-claude onboard --cloud
Manual setup (copy credential templates from templates/):
cd my-project # your tenuo.yaml lives here
mkdir -p .state ~/.tenuo
# templates/cloud.env.example → .state/cloud.env (Quick Connect token)
# templates/admin.env.example → ~/.tenuo/admin.env (tenant-admin key)
tenuo-claude init --cloud
tenuo-admin setup
tenuo-claude up
tenuo-claude verify
Re-run tenuo-admin setup when Cloud capabilities change. Re-run tenuo-claude refresh for local policy edits.
Human approval (Cloud)
Approval is a third outcome on any governed tool call: not just egress.
When the warrant includes an approval gate for a capability, the authorizer can return approval-required instead of allow/deny. The hook creates a Cloud approval request, waits for an approver on their notification channel, then re-authorizes with signed approvals in X-Tenuo-Approvals.
Included policy example: off-allowlist WebFetch (URLs that pass SSRF checks but
are not on your domain allowlist). Other capabilities can carry approval gates in the
Cloud trigger warrant config the same way.
- Configure a notification channel and identity binding in Cloud (channels, identity bindings).
- Add
approval:underenforce.WebFetchand setcloud.approver_identityto that identity's display name. See templates/tenuo.yaml.advanced.example. - Run
tenuo-claude init --advanced --approver "<identity display name>", thentenuo-admin setup.
For the WebFetch example: allowlisted domains pass directly. SSRF cases remain hard-denied.
Details: docs/DETAILS.md § Human approval.
Security
Tenuo works alongside Claude Code permissions. It does not replace managed settings.
You still deploy hooks. Tenuo adds a signed session warrant, a local authorizer on every tool call, and a decision log per call. Policy is one file (tenuo.yaml).
vs. Claude Code permissions
| Claude Code permissions | Tenuo warrant | |
|---|---|---|
| Policy | Allow/ask/deny in settings | Signed credential; Cloud chains to tenant root |
| Expiry | Until edited | Session TTL (~1h); up refreshes |
| Revocation | Edit rules; sessions may keep prior allowances | Revoke warrant id → ~30s SRL sync (Cloud) |
| Evidence | Optional hook logs | Local JSONL log; signed audit stream in Cloud |
| Delegation | Project/user tool policy | Per-role child warrant; session is the ceiling |
| Org-wide deployment | Per-user settings; users can edit local hooks | Managed settings + shared policy; hook/proxy enforcement is not user-editable |
--dangerously-skip-permissions |
Bypasses Claude permission prompts | Hook and MCP proxy still enforce the warrant |
That flag skips Claude's permission UI, not the warrant.
Org admins can block it in managed settings (disableBypassPermissionsMode).
Organization-wide policy
For teams that need a global configuration engineers cannot bypass:
- Store
tenuo.yamlin version control and deploy the same policy to every project. - Push hook and MCP wiring through Claude Code managed settings (org admin), not
per-developer
settings.local.json. - Use Cloud for tenant-root warrants, central audit, and revocation across machines.
Talk to us about managed-settings rollout and Cloud deployment.
Receipts
Every governed tool call must prove possession of the session key (proof-of-possession) when asking the authorizer for allow/deny.
What you can read back depends on mode:
Local (always): the hook appends a JSON line to .state/receipts.jsonl. Inspect
with tenuo-claude audit:
{"phase": "pre", "decision": "deny", "claude_tool": "Read", "governed": true,
"args": {"file_path": "/etc/passwd"}, "reason": "Constraint not satisfied", "ts": "…"}
In mode: audit, denials show as WOULD-DENY in audit output (shadow: true in the file).
Cloud (when connected): the authorizer emits signed audit events (Ed25519 over a CBOR payload) to your tenant.
These are the non-repudiable receipts for compliance and fleet audit, not the local JSONL file.
More: docs/DETAILS.md § Receipts.
Cloud audit
With Tenuo Cloud, session warrants chain to your tenant root.
Allow, deny, spawn, and approved exceptions appear in one signed audit log. Revoke a warrant id from status or the dashboard without touching the laptop.
Admin and runtime keys stay split: tenuo-admin setup (once) vs tenuo-claude up (daily).
Runtime refuses to start if an admin key is in the environment.
Rollout
- Start on one project with Try it or the demo/ sample.
- Set
mode: auditto compute allow/deny in receipts without blocking. ReviewWOULD-DENYrows, tune policy, then setmode: enforce. - Organization-wide rollout: managed-settings hooks, Cloud warrants, shared
tenuo.yamlin version control, and the Cloud capabilities above. See Tenuo Cloud docs.
Scope and fail-closed
Governance covers agent tool calls (Read, Bash, MCP, subagent spawns), not interactive ! shell in the Claude TUI (Map vs Territory).
Missing or broken tenuo.yaml denies every call until restored.
Keys and credentials in .state/ must be owner-only (0600 in a 0700 directory).
The authorizer reads gateway config from .state/authorizer/ (Docker mount or native process). Holder keys and cloud.env stay on the host. Session-key signing runs in the hook.
Report vulnerabilities: SECURITY.md.
Implementation depth: docs/DETAILS.md.
Performance
Run tenuo-claude bench after up.
On a typical laptop, Tenuo authorization is about 1-3 ms per call. Command hooks add about 100-200 ms (mostly process startup). Use bench --json on your machines.
This repo
GitHub: tenuo-ai/claude-governance
PyPI: tenuo-claude-code
| Path | Contents |
|---|---|
src/tenuo_claude_code/ |
Package source |
templates/ |
Starter tenuo.yaml and credential examples |
examples/policies/ |
Ready-made policy templates |
demo/ |
Reference project and scripted tour |
docs/ |
Architecture diagram, implementation notes |
Project details
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