tersign (Python)

pip install tersign

Tersign — the evidence layer for the agent economy. This package is the verification-first Python SDK: zero dependencies, standard library only — the verify path a tribunal, examiner, or CI job can run with nothing installed.

python3 -m tersign verify receipt.json --signer 0x<issuer address>   # offline — no network, ever
python3 -m tersign verify 0x<digest> --ledger https://tersign.ai     # chain lookup (explicit network)

from tersign import verify_receipt, digest_of, chain_link_digest, verify_link, verify_commitment

result = verify_receipt(signed_receipt, expected_signer="0x<issuer address, out-of-band>")
# {'valid': True, 'signer': '0x…', 'signerBound': True, 'digest': '0x…'}

Bind the signer, or a PASS proves little. A signature recovers to some address for any payload, so a receipt checked without --signer (CLI) or expected_signer (library) comes back with signerBound false, and the CLI's verdict says what that means: it proves neither who signed nor that the receipt is unmodified, because an edited receipt recovers a different address and still verifies. Take the issuer's address from a channel you trust, never from the receipt. A receipt signed with a published test key — the Hardhat/Anvil default dev accounts #0–#19, or private keys 0x1, 0x2 and 0x3 — is flagged testKey whether or not it is bound: anyone can produce that signature.

verify_receipt (the library) returns valid, signer, signerBound and digest, plus testKey, unsignedFields (fields in the file that the signature does not cover) and reason when they apply. The CLI prints that result and adds tersign, verdict, signerStatus (BOUND, UNAUTHENTICATED or MISMATCH), expectedSigner, and, for an evidence-bundle record file, checked and recordFieldsNotChecked. A record file's own chain fields are reported as not checked (the bundle verifier checks them), and a file carrying any other field beside the nested artifact is refused. Exit status: 0 PASS (read verdict), 1 FAIL, 2 usage — an unknown or valueless flag is refused, never ignored. A digest lookup (verify 0x<digest> --ledger URL) prints the ledger's answer and the verdict PASS (ledger-reported) or FAIL (ledger-reported): nothing in it is verified locally.

What it covers (v0.1):

• RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical form + the Tersign artifact digest (keccak256(utf8(JCS(v)))) and chain-link constructor — byte-compatible with the TypeScript reference, pinned by shared cross-implementation vectors.
• EIP-712 recovery for the upstream x402 receipt domain (the merged offer-receipt extension) — pure-python secp256k1. A receipt's signature must be the one canonical encoding (0x + 130 lower-case hex digits, v 27/28, low-s); a re-encoding of a genuine signature (v 0/1, upper-case hex, the high-s twin) also recovers the issuer, under a different digest, so it is refused.
• Counter-signature verification (verify_link): EIP-191 over the raw 32-byte chain-link digest, recovered against the published ledger signer (https://tersign.ai/v1/ledger).
• Chain commitment recompute (verify_commitment): since 2026-08-28 each anchor stamps a chain commitment — an accumulator over every counter-signed link — so one anchored digest covers the whole prefix; rows anchored earlier bind the head record only and say so (subjectSchema).

The bundled copy is a convenience, not a trust root. A frozen bundle ships this verify core inside itself, which is fine for a worked example and wrong for evidence handed to you by an interested party — a bundle can ship a checker that blesses it. For adversarial input fetch the checker out-of-band from https://tersign.ai/verify/v1/ (digests at SHA256SUMS beside it) and diff it against the bundled copy; a difference is itself the finding.

Check this package against the public corpus yourself. Since 0.1.4 the sdist carries the subset of the two-sided conformance corpus these primitives decide — 19 vectors across canonical bytes, digest recompute, chain link and chain commitment, both accept and reject arms. python3 -m unittest discover -s tests runs them. A package whose job is letting you check us without trusting us should ship the means to check the package.

Issuing/signing lives in the TypeScript SDK (npm tersign); this package is the independent second implementation of the verification surface — cross-implementation by construction. Frozen evidence bundles (tersign-evidence-bundle-v1) ship their own copy of this verify core inside the artifact, so bundle verification never depends on an install.

No console script on purpose: the tersign bin name belongs to the npm package; the Python surface is python3 -m tersign.