tibet-cbom
Continuity Bill of Materials and State of Manifest inspector for sealed TIBET envelopes.
This sandbox package sketches a tool family around two closely related ideas:
CBOM- continuity-aware bill of materials
- what is in the object, plus how that object sits in a continuity chain
SoM- State of Manifest
- who asserted what, when, and how the manifest/surface relationship evolved over time
The first operator surface is intentionally simple:
tibet-cbom inspect file.tza
tibet-cbom inspect file.tza --json
And the more human/forensic framing remains available through the alias:
tibet-som inspect file.tza
Semantic Surface Manifest (SSM)
A .tza output can carry any name or extension — file-voor.claude,
log-2026.jasper.aint-lane5.log_storageQ2. The name is a greeting and a useful
index; the sealed manifest is the truth.
tibet_cbom.ssm parses the surface into advisory hints (never authority) and
renders a posture card over an inspected object:
from tibet_cbom import ssm
ssm.parse_surface_facets("log-2026.jasper.aint-lane5.log_storageQ2")
# -> {"quarter": "Q2", "year": "2026", "lane": "5", "actor": "jasper.aint",
# "disposition": ["log", "storage"], "authority": "none — verify the manifest"}
print(ssm.ssm_card(doc).render())
# [SSM POSTURE: TZA#89421]
# │││││_ Surface : liquid (name + facets; a greeting)
# ││││__ Seal : byte-identical lock (Ed25519+PCLMULQDQ); magic = TBZ
# │││___ Causal : frozen at Lamport-tick #489201
# ││____ Origin : created by Route Posture #24358 (A5)
# │_____ Manifest : .tza (tibet-zip) inviolable core
Two laws: the surface carries no authority — verified on magic bytes + signature,
never the filename, so zombie-zips (name says .tza, magic says otherwise) are refused —
and the surface is still a useful index: tibet-audit may bucket by .log_storageQ2,
but the manifest always wins on a drift.
Why this exists
Normal file inspection answers:
- what is this file called
- how large is it
- what extension does it have
CBOM / SoM should answer richer questions:
- what class of sealed object is this
- what does its canonical surface appear to be
- what continuity identifiers are attached
- what events happened to it over time
- when was it renamed
- when was it verified
- when was a surface mismatch marked as partial or suspicious
That makes tibet-cbom feel less like file(1) and more like:
git log- for continuity-bearing envelopes
Current sandbox scope
This skeleton does not claim full TBZ parsing yet.
It provides:
- package layout
- datamodel sketch
- CLI shape
- human and JSON rendering
- a first local file inspector that can grow into real manifest/event extraction later
- optional continuityd audit JSONL merge for early SoM timelines
Commands
inspect
Compact human summary or JSON object.
tibet-cbom inspect 2026-05-12.peer-eval.claude.urgent.tza
tibet-cbom inspect vergadering-dinsdag.pdf
tibet-cbom inspect file.tza --json
tibet-cbom inspect file.tza --audit-file expected-audit-example.jsonl
timeline
Reserved for a later event-only view.
tibet-cbom timeline file.tza
tibet-cbom timeline file.tza --audit-file expected-audit-example.jsonl --json
authority
Compact current authority state.
tibet-cbom authority file.tza
tibet-cbom authority file.tza --json
verify
Explicit manifest and authority-step consistency check.
tibet-cbom verify file.tza
tibet-cbom verify file.tza --json
tibet-cbom verify file.tza --audit-file expected-audit-example.jsonl
rewrap
Sandbox ownership-transition event sketch.
tibet-cbom rewrap task.tza \
--audit-file audit.jsonl \
--actor jis:humotica:jasper.admin \
--authority-mode admin \
--transition-type freeze \
--status frozen \
--effective-assignee jis:humotica:agent.ai \
--reason "manual triage hold" \
--freeze-reason-code human-review
If you also want a sandbox sealed bundle:
tibet-cbom rewrap task.tza \
--audit-file audit.jsonl \
--actor jis:humotica:jasper.admin \
--authority-mode admin \
--transition-type freeze \
--status frozen \
--effective-assignee jis:humotica:agent.ai \
--reason "manual triage hold" \
--freeze-reason-code human-review \
--identity-dir ./admin-identity \
--emit-bundle /tmp/admin-freeze.tza
Basic policy guards now apply:
handoffrequires--handoff-targetfreezerequires--freeze-reason-codeauthority-mode=adminexpects an admin actor id- emitted bundle signing identity must match transition actor
Data model direction
The package uses two main record types:
CBOMDocument- file path
- human name
- canonical name hint
- continuity identifiers
- surface status
- material facts
- event timeline
SoMEvent- timestamp
- action
- actor
- action id
- notes / fields
This keeps the distinction clear:
- CBOM is the object summary
- SoM is the walkable event chain inside or around that object
Current known sealed payloads include:
- ownership transitions
- SAM gateway receipts
So a sealed sam_gateway_receipt is no longer treated as an opaque
payload; it lands as a first-class sam-executed event in the local
SoM timeline.
Likely next steps
- extract canonical surface from real manifests
- map continuity IDs from real payloads/manifests
- render surface status transitions:
MATCHPARTIALDISGUISEDRENAMED
- deepen
verifyinto fuller chain integrity / succession validation
Short framing
VCs answer:
- who are you
SoM answers:
- what did you manifest and when
CBOM then becomes the readable continuity-aware object view that ties those together.
Enterprise
For private hub hosting, SLA support, custom integrations, or compliance guidance:
| Enterprise | enterprise@humotica.com |
| Support | support@humotica.com |
| Security | security@humotica.com |
License
MIT
Credits
Designed by Jasper van de Meent. Built by Jasper and Root AI as part of HumoticaOS.
Stack-positie: Groep evidence · Bootstrap = OSAPI-handshake naar tibet + jis (fail → snaft-rule + tibet-pol-rapport) · ← tibet-continuityd · tibet-sbom → · See STACK.md · See demo/golden-path/ for the spine end-to-end.
Metadata
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