Continuity daemon and sealed handoff tool — watch, sniff, verify, triage, reseal, police, and send continuity-bearing TBZ objects across local and cross-host lanes.
Project description
tibet-continuityd
Continuous integrity daemon and sealed handoff tool for continuity-native systems.
tibet-continuityd is the resident trust and continuity guardian of the
TIBET stack.
It watches an inbox, sniffs what arrived, classifies trust and mismatch, optionally verifies and forks sealed objects, reseals trusted forward state, emits audit records, and can now also send sealed envelopes across hosts.
In short:
- daemon
- watch, sniff, verify, classify, triage, seal, police
- CLI
- pack and send sealed continuity objects to another host
- discipline
- name is hint, content is truth, arrival is event
Why it exists
Modern agentic and stateful systems fail when they silently trust:
- filenames
- resumed state
- imported sessions
- unpacked blobs
- unexpected arrivals
- stale or disguised handoff material
tibet-continuityd exists to put a resident gate in front of those
arrivals.
It turns:
- file arrival
- cross-host handoff
- resumed state
- imported continuity material
into something that can be:
- sniffed
- verified
- classified
- quarantined
- triaged
- resealed
- audited
Core model
Arrival → Sniff → Classify → Verify/Fork → Trust → Seal → Police
The daemon treats every arrival as a meaningful event.
It does not assume:
- extension is truthful
- resumed state is safe
- transport success implies continuity legitimacy
Design axiom
Name is hint. Content is truth. Arrival is event.
What it does today
Daemon behavior
- watches inbox lanes for arrivals
- recognizes TBZ/ICC-style sealed bundles via magic bytes
- detects disguised payloads and extension/content mismatch
- classifies arrivals into trust/triage/quarantine/reject paths
- emits audit JSONL suitable for machine analysis and operator review
- supports:
passiveactivestrictmodes
- supports:
- coalescing
- verify-fork
- trust-kernel handoff
- reseal/outbox
- police scan for unpacked drift
- backpressure monitoring
CLI behavior
The tcd CLI now supports:
tcd run- run the daemon
tcd send FILE --to HOST:PATH- seal and send over
scp
- seal and send over
tcd send FILE --to jis:org:service@host- convention-based identity-bound routing
tcd send FILE --transport http --to http://host:port- sealed HTTP inbox delivery to a peer listener
This means tibet-continuityd is no longer only a passive inbox daemon.
It is also becoming the first practical post-email sealed handoff primitive in the stack.
Current feature surface
Watch
- inbox watcher on Linux
- arrival detection
- lane-local event flow
Sniff
- TBZ magic-byte detection
- sealed bundle recognition independent of extension
- detection of:
- executable
- JSON text
- empty payloads
- disguised vendor-style names
Classify
trusted-candidatetriage-disguisedreseal-candidatequarantinereject
Verify / Fork
- optional cryptographic verify path
- forward-only continuation discipline
- trusted fork semantics for admitted sealed material
Trust / Seal
- optional trust-kernel integration
- reseal to outbox
- forward continuity discipline instead of silent mutation
Police
- periodic scan for unpacked or policy-breaking material
- age-based alerting for lingering unsafe state
Backpressure
- queue pressure observation
- low/high watermark monitoring
- intended as part of larger lane health discipline
Send
- pack local file or directory as sealed envelope
- preserve semantic surface fields
- deliver through:
scphttp
- target peer daemon processes arrival through the same watcher/sniff pipeline as local files
Install
pip install tibet-continuityd
Optional stacks:
pip install "tibet-continuityd[verify]"
pip install "tibet-continuityd[phantom]"
pip install "tibet-continuityd[full]"
Quick start — local daemon
TIBET_CONTINUITYD_INBOX=/tmp/tibet/inbox \
TIBET_CONTINUITYD_QUARANTINE=/tmp/tibet/quarantine \
TIBET_CONTINUITYD_TRIAGE=/tmp/tibet/triage \
TIBET_CONTINUITYD_AUDIT=/tmp/tibet/continuityd-audit.jsonl \
tcd run
Drop a TBZ-prefixed file into the inbox:
printf 'TBZ\x01\x00\x00\x00' > /tmp/tibet/inbox/sample.claude.tza
The daemon will emit an arrival and sniff decision.
Quick start — send over SCP
tcd send hello.txt \
--to root@target-host:/var/lib/tibet/inbox \
--surface-context first-real-cross-host-push \
--surface-profile claude \
--surface-priority normal
What happens:
- local file is packed as a sealed
.tzaenvelope - Ed25519 signing is applied through the TIBET drop toolchain
scpdelivers the bundle to the peer inbox- peer
continuitydsees the arrival and runs the normal intake flow
Quick start — send over HTTP
Start the peer daemon with an HTTP inbox listener:
TIBET_CONTINUITYD_INBOX=/tmp/tibet/inbox \
TIBET_CONTINUITYD_AUDIT=/tmp/tibet/audit.jsonl \
TIBET_CONTINUITYD_HTTP_PORT=8443 \
tcd run
Then send:
tcd send hello.txt \
--transport http \
--to http://target-host:8443 \
--surface-context http-proof \
--surface-profile claude \
--surface-priority normal
Flow:
- pack sealed envelope
- HTTP
POST /inbox/<filename> - peer HTTP inbox writes to the daemon inbox
- inotify watcher sees the new object
- sniff/classify path runs normally
Note:
- the HTTP inbox listener is transport-friendly, but in this release the HTTP layer itself is not the trust source
- the sealed bundle remains the integrity-bearing object
Quick start — identity-style target
Convention-based target form:
tcd send hello.txt --to jis:humotica:continuityd@p520
Current behavior:
- resolves to default SSH user + default inbox path by convention
- can optionally consult the AINS resolve API
- is a stepping stone toward richer identity-bound routing
Modes
passive
- observe
- classify
- audit
- advise
active
- verify/fork/seal behavior enabled where configured
- operational continuity handling
strict
- stronger policy expectations
- suited for sealed-only or higher-trust lanes
Disposition table
| Intake class | Trigger | Disposition |
|---|---|---|
sealed-tbz |
TBZ magic + recognized surface | trusted-candidate |
sealed-tbz-no-ext |
TBZ magic, no/unknown extension | trusted-candidate |
disguised |
vendor-like name, no TBZ magic | triage-disguised |
json-text |
raw JSON state in sealed-oriented lane | reseal-candidate |
executable |
ELF / PE / executable signature | quarantine |
pdf |
PDF magic | reject |
unknown |
everything else | quarantine |
empty |
zero-byte file | reject |
Proven proofs so far
Portable evaluation
The external evaluation kit proves:
- preflight passes on fresh hosts
- conformance vectors classify correctly
- mini-pipeline runs end-to-end
Dual-node host simulation
The dual-node lab proves:
- node A to node B handoff shape
sniff → verify-fork → sealon both sides- same stage/disposition pattern despite reseal
Real cross-host SCP handoff
Proven:
- real host A packs and sends
- real host B receives and sniffs
- sealed bundle survives host boundary
- older peer daemon versions still recognize the container by magic bytes
Real HTTP transport handoff
Proven:
tcd send --transport http --to http://host:port- peer HTTP inbox listener receives the bytes
- writes them into the inbox
- daemon watcher processes the arrival normally
This is the first practical proof that sealed continuity objects can be carried through a simple HTTP ingress without changing the continuity discipline.
Operational paths
The package now has three practical deployment/use surfaces:
- package runtime
tcd run
- cross-host push
tcd send
- reference deployment kit
- portable eval
- systemd appliance
- dual-node lab
Reference deployment kit:
FHS and first-run note
Production defaults are FHS-oriented:
/var/lib/tibet/.../var/log/tibet/...
For laptop or peer-eval use, set user-writable env vars explicitly.
That split is intentional:
- production appliance defaults
- local/peer override paths
Why this is different from plain file transfer
scp, HTTP, or future mux transport are not the core innovation by
themselves.
The important thing is that what moves is a:
- sealed
- signed
- continuity-bearing
- sniffable
- classifiable
- triageable
object.
Transport is replaceable.
Continuity discipline is the point.
Related stack pieces
tibet-drop- pack/verify/seal primitives
tibet-phantom- resumable state and ICC bridge
tibet-mux- future unified transport lane
tibet-overlay- identity-oriented routing substrate
tibet-triage- human-visible escalation surface
Project direction
Near-term direction includes:
- richer identity-bound routing via AINS/JIS
- mux-backed transport as an alternative carrier
- stronger mirrored surface checking
- safer first-run ergonomics for non-root hosts
- deeper causal record integration
License
MIT — Humotica + Root AI + Codex (2026)
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