tibet-edge 0.1.0

IoT Firmware Sealer — full provenance chain verification for firmware updates on edge devices

tibet-edge — IoT Firmware Sealer

Not just hash verification. Full provenance chain for firmware updates.

Who built it, from what source, on what build server, why this version.

tibet-edge seals firmware images with a complete TIBET provenance chain covering every step from developer to device. A missing step means a rejected update. No exceptions.

The Problem: Hashes Are Not Enough

Everyone verifies firmware hashes. But a hash only proves "the binary hasn't changed." It doesn't prove:

• Who compiled it (intern or senior engineer?)
• What source code it came from (which git commit?)
• Where it was built (CI server or compromised laptop?)
• Why this version exists (security patch or backdoor?)

A supply chain attacker who compromises the build server produces a binary with a perfectly valid hash — of the wrong firmware.

The Firmware Envelope

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                     FIRMWARE ENVELOPE                               │
│                                                                     │
│  ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│  │ FIRMWARE BINARY                                                │ │
│  │ SHA-256: a1b2c3...  Size: 2.4MB  Version: 3.1.7              │ │
│  └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│                                                                     │
│  ┌─ BUILD CHAIN (every step = TIBET token) ─────────────────────┐  │
│  │                                                               │  │
│  │  [1] commit    dev@company    git:abc123    → src_hash       │  │
│  │       │                                                       │  │
│  │  [2] compile   ci-server-04   GCC 13.2      → obj_hash      │  │
│  │       │                                                       │  │
│  │  [3] test      ci-server-04   pytest 8.1    → test_hash     │  │
│  │       │                                                       │  │
│  │  [4] sign      hsm-prod-01   ECDSA P-256    → sig_hash      │  │
│  │       │                                                       │  │
│  │  [5] package   ci-server-04   fwtools 2.0   → pkg_hash      │  │
│  │       │                                                       │  │
│  │  [6] release   release-mgr    approved       → rel_hash      │  │
│  │                                                               │  │
│  └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
│                                                                     │
│  Missing step? → REJECT UPDATE                                      │
│  Broken chain? → REJECT UPDATE                                      │
│  Unknown actor? → REJECT UPDATE                                     │
│                                                                     │
│  TIBET Token: jis:fw:envelope:a1b2c3d4                              │
│  Sealed by:  jis:ci:build-pipeline-prod                             │
│  Sealed at:  2026-02-27T14:00:00Z                                   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Install

pip install tibet-edge

Quick Start

from tibet_edge import FirmwareSealer, BuildStep

sealer = FirmwareSealer(actor="ci-pipeline-prod")

# Record each build step
sealer.add_build_step(BuildStep(
    name="compile",
    actor="ci-server-04",
    input_hash="abc123...",
    output_hash="def456...",
    tool="GCC 13.2",
    environment="Ubuntu 24.04",
))

# Seal the firmware
envelope = sealer.seal(
    firmware_path="firmware-v3.1.7.bin",
    version="3.1.7",
    metadata={"reason": "Security patch CVE-2026-1234"},
)

# Verify: every step present, hashes match, chain unbroken
result = sealer.verify(envelope)
print(result.valid)           # True
print(result.steps_verified)  # 6
print(result.missing_steps)   # []

CLI

tibet-edge info           # Concept overview
tibet-edge demo           # Full demo: seal, verify, tamper detection
tibet-edge profiles       # Sector profiles (automotive, medical, etc.)
tibet-edge seal fw.bin    # Seal a firmware file (demo mode if no file)
tibet-edge verify env.json  # Verify a firmware envelope

Use Cases

Sector	Threat	tibet-edge Response
Automotive OTA (Tesla, VW)	Tampered ECU firmware via OTA	Full build chain from git to ECU, dual-sign required
Medical Devices (insulin pumps)	Unauthorized firmware modification	FDA-compliant provenance, clinical trial reference
Consumer IoT (cameras, routers)	Mirai-style botnet injection	Minimum viable provenance, rejects unsigned builds
Industrial SCADA	Stuxnet-style PLC manipulation	OT-specific fields, air-gap compatible verification

Sector Profiles

tibet-edge profiles

Profile	Required Steps	Min Trust	Dual Sign	Max Age
automotive	commit, compile, test, sign, package, release	0.95	Yes	90 days
medical	commit, compile, test, clinical_review, sign, fda_submit, release	0.99	Yes	365 days
industrial	commit, compile, test, sign, release	0.90	No	180 days
consumer_iot	compile, sign, release	0.70	No	30 days

EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) Compliance

tibet-edge's firmware envelope provides the technical evidence required by the EU CRA:

• Article 10(6): Identify and document vulnerabilities — ERACHTER layer records CVE references and patch intent
• Article 10(9): Security updates with provenance — the envelope IS the provenance
• Article 10(10): SBOM compatibility — build chain maps to SBOM components

TIBET Provenance Layers

Layer	Firmware Content
ERIN	Firmware version, hash, size
ERAAN	Build chain steps, git commit, parent envelope
EROMHEEN	Build server, compiler, OS, hardware
ERACHTER	"Security patch CVE-xxxx", release intent

Target Implementations

• Python — Reference implementation (this package)
• C — Embedded library for constrained devices (planned)
• Rust — Safety-critical embedded systems (planned)

Part of the TIBET Ecosystem

Package	Purpose
tibet-core	Protocol core
tibet-y2k38	Y2K38 Time Bridge
tibet-pol	Process Integrity Checker
tibet-pqc	Post-Quantum Crypto Router
tibet-overlay	Identity Overlay
tibet-twin	Digital Twin Guard
tibet-edge	IoT Firmware Sealer

License

MIT — Humotica / J. van de Meent 2025

Authors

• J. van de Meent — [e-mail]
• R. AI (Root AI) — [e-mail]