ToolClad

Declarative tool interface contracts for agentic runtimes.

ToolClad is a manifest format (.clad.toml) that defines the complete behavioral contract for a tool: typed parameters, validation rules, invocation mechanism, output parsing, and policy metadata. Three execution modes share a common governance layer:

• Oneshot (default): Single CLI command execution
• Session: Interactive CLI tools via PTY (msfconsole, psql, redis-cli) with per-interaction Cedar gating
• Browser: Governed headless browser via CDP/Playwright with URL scope enforcement and page state policies

The Problem

Every team building agentic systems writes custom glue code per tool: argument sanitization, timeout enforcement, output parsing, evidence capture, Cedar mappings, DSL capabilities, and policies. That's 7 steps per tool. It doesn't scale.

The Solution

# tools/whois_lookup.clad.toml
[tool]
name = "whois_lookup"
version = "1.0.0"
binary = "whois"
description = "WHOIS domain/IP registration lookup"
timeout_seconds = 30
risk_tier = "low"

[args.target]
position = 1
required = true
type = "scope_target"
description = "Domain name or IP address to query"

[command]
template = "whois {target}"

[output]
format = "text"
envelope = true

[output.schema]
type = "object"

[output.schema.properties.raw_output]
type = "string"

The agent fills typed parameters. The executor validates, constructs the command, executes with timeout, and returns structured JSON. The agent never sees or generates a shell command.

Security Model

ToolClad inverts the sandbox approach:

• Sandbox: LLM generates command -> sandbox intercepts -> allow/deny (deny-list)
• ToolClad: LLM fills typed parameters -> policy gate -> executor validates -> constructs command from template (allow-list)

The dangerous action cannot be expressed because the interface doesn't permit it.

Security Features

• Shell injection prevention: All string types reject metacharacters (;|&$\(){}[]<>!\n\r`) by default
• Array-based execution: Commands dispatched via direct execve (no sh -c shell interpretation)
• Process group isolation: Tools spawned in new PGID; timeout kills entire process group (no zombies)
• Absolute path blocking: path type rejects /etc/shadow, C:\... style paths
• Newline injection blocking: \n and \r rejected in all string-based types
• No eval: Conditional evaluators use closed-vocabulary parsers, never dynamic code execution

Packages

Install from your language's package registry:

cargo install toolclad        # Rust / crates.io
pip install toolclad           # Python / PyPI
npm install toolclad           # JavaScript / npm

Reference Implementations

Each implementation provides:

• Manifest parsing -- load and validate .clad.toml files (oneshot, session, browser modes)
• 14 type validators -- 10 core + 4 extended, all with injection sanitization
• Command construction -- template interpolation with mappings, conditionals, defaults
• Execution -- direct argv dispatch, process group kill on timeout, SHA-256 evidence hashing
• Output parsers -- builtin:json, builtin:xml, builtin:csv, builtin:jsonl, builtin:text, custom scripts
• Output schema validation -- validates parsed results against [output.schema]
• MCP schema generation -- auto-generate inputSchema + outputSchema for LLM tool use
• Evidence envelopes -- structured JSON with scan_id, timestamps, exit_code, stderr, output_hash
• CLI -- validate, run, schema, test (dry run) subcommands

Quick Start

# Rust
cd rust && cargo run -- test ../examples/whois_lookup.clad.toml --arg target=example.com

# Python
cd python && pip install -e . && toolclad test ../examples/whois_lookup.clad.toml --arg target=example.com

# JavaScript
cd js && npm install && node src/cli.js test ../examples/whois_lookup.clad.toml --arg target=example.com

# Go
cd go && go run ./cmd/toolclad test ../examples/whois_lookup.clad.toml --arg target=example.com

Type System

Core Types

Extended Types

Custom Types

Define reusable types in toolclad.toml at the project root:

[types.service_protocol]
base = "enum"
allowed = ["ssh", "ftp", "http", "https", "smb", "rdp"]

[types.severity_level]
base = "enum"
allowed = ["info", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"]

Reference in manifests: type = "service_protocol"

Output Handling

Built-in Parsers

Custom Parsers

[output]
parser = "scripts/parse-outputs/parse-nmap-xml.py"

Custom parsers receive the raw output file path as argv[1] and emit JSON to stdout.

Evidence Envelope

Every execution returns a structured envelope:

{
  "status": "success",
  "scan_id": "1711929600-12345",
  "tool": "nmap_scan",
  "command": "nmap -sT -sV --max-rate 1000 10.0.1.0/24",
  "duration_ms": 4523,
  "timestamp": "2026-03-20T12:00:00Z",
  "exit_code": 0,
  "stderr": "",
  "output_hash": "sha256:a1b2c3...",
  "results": { "hosts": [...] }
}

On error, exit_code and stderr are included so LLM agents can self-correct.

Symbiont Integration

ToolClad is the tools/ directory convention for Symbiont:

• Runtime auto-discovers .clad.toml files at startup
• Registers each tool as an MCP tool in the ORGA reasoning loop
• Cedar policy evaluation using manifest-declared [tool.cedar] resource/action
• Scope enforcement against scope/scope.toml
• Cedar policy auto-generation from manifest risk_tier
• Hot-reload in development mode
• symbi tools list/validate/test/schema/init CLI

symbi tools list                    # show discovered tools
symbi tools test nmap_scan --arg target=10.0.1.0/24 --arg scan_type=service
symbi tools schema nmap_scan        # output MCP JSON Schema
symbi tools init my_scanner         # scaffold new manifest

SchemaPin Integration

SchemaPin signs .clad.toml files directly as first-class artifacts:

schemapin-sign tools/nmap_scan.clad.toml

The signature covers the entire behavioral contract. If anyone tampers with a command template, validation rule, scope constraint, or output schema, the hash changes and verification fails.

See TOOLCLAD_DESIGN_SPEC.md for the full specification.

License

• Protocol specification (manifest format, type system, evidence envelope): MIT
• Symbiont integration (Cedar gating, ORGA enforcement, scope enforcement): Apache 2.0