touchstone-verify 0.5.0

Touchstone SDK — verify a disclosure (zero deps) and mint one (the [record] extra).

touchstone-verify

Independently verify a Touchstone disclosure — in pure Python, with zero dependencies. Read it before you trust it: it's a small, self-contained file.

A disclosure is a tamper-evident slice of an agent's action log. This package re-derives, with no trust in Touchstone, that the slice is intact (entry hashes recompute), attributed (the subject's Ed25519 signature holds, epoch-aware across key rotation), and ordered (hash-chained, with checkpoints that are append-only, server-signed, and witness-co-signed). It also checks selective-disclosure field proofs and reports the external anchors. It proves tampering by anyone who is not Touchstone — it does not prove completeness, and says so.

It agrees byte-for-byte with the other two Touchstone verifiers (verify.php, verifier.js): all three are tested against the same conformance corpus.

Install

pip install touchstone-verify

Use

Command line — pass a file, a URL, or a disclosure token:

touchstone-verify https://touchstone.cv/d/833cd4ca23fbb940dd71843ca47a807e
touchstone-verify ./bundle.json
touchstone-verify 833cd4ca23fbb940dd71843ca47a807e        # fetches from touchstone.cv

Exit code 0 = verified, 1 = a load-bearing check failed, 2 = couldn't load.

Library:

from touchstone_verify import verify_disclosure
import json, urllib.request

bundle = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen("https://touchstone.cv/d/<token>"))
result = verify_disclosure(bundle)
print(result["ok"])           # True / False
for e in result["entries"]:
    for c in e["checks"]:
        print(c["ok"], c["msg"])

Grade a receipt's columns by k

from touchstone_verify import grade_columns, find_columns
import json, urllib.request

doc = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen("https://touchstone.cv/columns/<recorder>/<seq>"))
cols, digest = find_columns(doc)
r = grade_columns(cols, digest)
print(r["coherent"], r["min_k"])     # True / cheapest falsehood path (min k across load-bearing columns)

k is the minimum number of independent parties who must collude before a column can be false, computed from the evidence (never the declared grade): k=0 re-derivable, k = 1 + distinct-control witnesses (co-sigs collapse on a shared key or a receipt-carried controller binding, so it's an upper bound), k=1 testimony. Declaring more strength than the evidence supports fails closed.

Mint a receipt (the producer half)

Verification is dependency-free; minting needs an Ed25519 signer, so it lives behind an extra:

pip install "touchstone-verify[record]"

from touchstone_verify import Recorder

# reads TOUCHSTONE_RECORDER / _API_KEY / _SUBJECT / _SIGNING_KEY (or _KEY_FILE={"seed_b64":…})
r = Recorder.from_env()
rc = r.record({"kind": "invoice", "amount": 100}, event_type="invoice")
print(rc.seq, rc.entry_hash)          # the server's assignment; local_entry_hash_ok() confirms it

rc.wait_for_anchor()                  # blocks until the next checkpoint sweeps this seq
print(rc.verify())                    # payload_hash → entry_hash → checkpoint root  (ok: True)

Your key never leaves the process, and the payload is canonicalized locally using the same jcs / entry-hash code this package verifies with — one crypto core, no drift — so a malicious server cannot make you sign a different commitment than you intended. Receipt.verify() walks the receipt to its Bitcoin-anchored checkpoint (finish with ots verify on your own node). For a fully trustless recorder whose every entry is inclusion-provable, provision it with app:provision-recorder --inclusion-public.

What it checks

• Integrity — every entry_hash recomputes from its fields, including the beacon fold: a beacon_binding recorder's entries carry server_beacon = {chain, round, randomness} as a final beacon:<chain>:<round>:<randomness> line of the preimage (a checkable not-before). Absent → the exact legacy 7-field preimage, so older entries verify unchanged.
• Attribution — the subject signature verifies over the canonical signed content; genesis proof-of-possession; key_rotation new-key PoP; counterparty co-signatures.
• Ordering — prev_hash chain linkage; Merkle inclusion in the cited checkpoint.
• Checkpoints — server signature over each Merkle root; append-only linkage between consecutive checkpoints; independent witness co-signatures.
• Selective disclosure — each revealed field proves Merkle inclusion in payload_hash; withheld fields never appear in the bundle.

For split-view / Bitcoin-anchor cross-checking across independent relays, see the companion gossip_check.py at https://touchstone.cv/gossip_check.py.

License

Apache-2.0.