trialmatch-mcp-bridge
A local stdio↔HTTPS bridge for Claude Desktop (THI-882). Deliberately not the real MCP
server — no tool logic here at all. It does PKCE + local-loopback login against Cognito, caches
a refresh token, and relays every MCP call from Desktop to the AgentCore Gateway over HTTPS with
Authorization: Bearer <token> attached. The actual tools live in
../src/trialmatch_criteria_mcp/, deployed to AgentCore
Runtime behind that Gateway.
Setup
Published to PyPI — this is the recommended way to run it, no repo access or git credentials needed at all:
uvx trialmatch-mcp-bridge --login \
--gateway-url https://your-gateway.gateway.bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/mcp \
--cognito-domain your-pool.auth.us-east-1.amazoncognito.com \
--client-id your-app-client-id
(One-time interactive sign-in; opens your browser. See Configuration below for what these three flags are and where to get real values for them.)
This matters beyond convenience: some MCP hosts run their server subprocesses in a sandbox that
can't reach your normal git credentials — confirmed live, Claude Desktop (an MSIX/Windows-Store
packaged app) runs in an AppContainer that can't access the interactive user's gh-configured
git credential helper, so a git+https:// dependency against this (private) repo fails there
even though it works fine from a plain terminal on the same machine. A public PyPI package has
no credential step to fail.
Alternative, if you're already working in a local clone of this repo:
cd bridge
uv sync
uv run trialmatch-mcp-bridge --login
Either way, this caches a refresh token at ~/.trialmatch-mcp/credentials.json (0600).
Subsequent runs refresh silently — you shouldn't normally need --login again. This refresh
happens mid-session too, not just at startup: the bridge process is long-lived (hours, sometimes
days), far outliving a single Cognito access token's own ~1hr lifetime, so BearerTokenAuth
(auth.py) attaches a freshly-checked token to every request and transparently retries once with
a silently-refreshed one if the Gateway ever rejects a request with 401/403 — a live session
shouldn't need a manual restart just because the token it started with went stale.
If the refresh token itself has expired or been revoked (e.g. after a long weekend, or an
explicit Cognito revocation), that retry falls back to a full interactive PKCE login — opening a
browser mid-session, the same login flow --login runs, on a background thread so it can't
freeze the rest of the relay while it waits. This exists because most MCP hosts (Claude Desktop
included) never restart or re---login this process on their own: without it, an expired refresh
token meant every tool call failed until you noticed and manually disabled/re-enabled the plugin
(which only "fixed" it by respawning the process, landing back on this same interactive fallback
at startup). If nobody's watching for the browser window within 5 minutes (e.g. this bridge is
running headless), the attempt times out and the original failure surfaces as normal — run
--login yourself from an interactive terminal in that case.
This covers a stale token specifically, not a stale MCP session: if the deployed Runtime itself gets redeployed to a new version mid-session, the underlying streamable-HTTP session this process already established can stop being honored regardless of how fresh the bearer token is — that still needs a manual restart of this process (or of Claude Desktop's connection to it) today.
Configuration
--gateway-url, --cognito-domain, and --client-id are required — there's no
TrialMatch-specific default of any kind, so a run with any of them missing fails immediately with
a clear error naming exactly which one to set, rather than silently connecting to the wrong
Gateway. Two sources, highest priority first:
- A CLI flag, always wins outright:
--gateway-url,--cognito-domain,--client-id,--scopes,--redirect-port,--credentials-path. - A
TRIALMATCH_BRIDGE_*env var already set in the shell — e.g.TRIALMATCH_BRIDGE_CLIENT_ID.
trialmatch-mcp-bridge --login \
--gateway-url https://your-gateway.gateway.bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/mcp \
--cognito-domain your-pool.auth.us-east-1.amazoncognito.com \
--client-id your-app-client-id
TrialMatch's own two known targets' real values are tracked as SSM parameters
(/thirdopinion/plugins/trialmatch-criteria/{dev,prod}/{gateway-url,cognito-domain,client-id},
published by agentcore/cdk/lib/plugin-ssm-parameters.ts on every deploy) and kept in sync with
ThirdOpinion.Plugins' own trialmatch-criteria-dev/-prod plugin.json — see that repo's
scripts/plugin-sync/ — rather than baked into this package. If you're not consuming this
bridge through one of those plugin configs, get the current values from SSM (or from whoever
manages the AgentCore target you're pointing at) instead of guessing at them.
--credentials-path defaults to a location derived automatically from --cognito-domain +
--client-id (a stable hash, not the values themselves) — switching between two different
configs never silently reuses or overwrites the wrong cached token, without needing to think
about --credentials-path at all for the common case of just one config.
Claude Desktop / Claude Code configuration
Add to claude_desktop_config.json (Desktop) or .mcp.json (Code), with the args this Gateway's
own real values (see Configuration above):
{
"mcpServers": {
"trialmatch-criteria": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"trialmatch-mcp-bridge",
"--gateway-url", "https://your-gateway.gateway.bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/mcp",
"--cognito-domain", "your-pool.auth.us-east-1.amazoncognito.com",
"--client-id", "your-app-client-id"
]
}
}
}
This is exactly the shape ThirdOpinion.Plugins' trialmatch-criteria-dev/-prod plugin.json
already ships, kept current from SSM by that repo's own sync workflow — copy the real values from
there rather than retyping this by hand if you're consuming one of those two targets.
Or, from a local clone:
{
"mcpServers": {
"trialmatch-criteria": {
"command": "uv",
"args": [
"run", "--directory", "/absolute/path/to/TrialMatch-Criteria-MCP/bridge",
"trialmatch-mcp-bridge",
"--gateway-url", "https://your-gateway.gateway.bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/mcp",
"--cognito-domain", "your-pool.auth.us-east-1.amazoncognito.com",
"--client-id", "your-app-client-id"
]
}
}
}
(Or point command at the installed trialmatch-mcp-bridge console script directly if you've
installed this package outside a uv-managed venv.)
Not Claude Code's built-in remote-MCP OAuth support (/mcp add <gateway-url> or
.mcp.json's "type": "http" + oauth block) — confirmed live (claude mcp add --transport http ... <gateway-url> against this exact Gateway) that this fails immediately with
Incompatible auth server: does not support dynamic client registration, before PKCE or token
exchange are even reached. Cognito has no OAuth Dynamic Client Registration endpoint (RFC 7591)
at all — a permanent Cognito limitation, not a bug on Cognito's side — and Claude Code's MCP
OAuth client currently has no fallback when the auth server doesn't support DCR, even when a
pre-configured client id is available
(anthropics/claude-code#67258; this
project hit the identical symptom against Cognito, adding to that report's existing Box
repro). (An earlier version of this note cited
anthropics/claude-code#35846 —
Cognito's discovery document not advertising code_challenge_methods_supported — as the reason;
that condition is real and independently confirmed against this pool too, but it was never
actually the failure this bridge exists to route around, since the DCR failure above happens
first.) This bridge sidesteps the whole problem by using a real, pre-registered Cognito App
Client (created via this repo's own CDK stack) and doing PKCE itself — it never attempts DCR in
the first place.
Publishing
Automatic, via .github/workflows/ci.yml's publish-bridge job — no manual version bump, no
git tags, no stored PyPI token (uses PyPI's OIDC "Trusted Publishing"). On a merge to main
that touches bridge/**: bumps the PATCH version (computed from PyPI's own current "latest",
not from anything in this repo) and publishes it.
Gated behind the pypi GitHub Environment (repo Settings → Environments → pypi), which has a
deployment-branch policy restricting it to main only — per PyPI's own Trusted Publishing
guidance, a dedicated environment for the publishing workflow is "strongly encouraged,
especially if your repository has maintainers with commit access who shouldn't have PyPI
publishing access." (No pre-release/dev-version channel — deliberately kept to just this one
path; testing a specific in-progress change is simpler done straight from a local clone, see
Setup above, than by publishing and pinning a throwaway version.)
One-time setup (already done, noted here in case the project is ever re-created):
- Create the
pypiGitHub Environment with a deployment-branch policy restricting it tomain(done viagh api repos/Third-Opinion/TrialMatch-Criteria-MCP/environments/pypi, no UI needed — see git history for the exact call). - A PyPI account with access registers a pending trusted publisher at
https://pypi.org/manage/account/publishing/ for project
trialmatch-mcp-bridge, ownerThird-Opinion, repoTrialMatch-Criteria-MCP, workflowci.yml, environment namepypi.
Test
uv run pytest
uv run ruff check . && uv run ruff format --check .
uv run mypy src
Unit tests mock the Cognito token endpoint and the loopback callback — no browser or real
Cognito pool needed to run them. A real end-to-end test still needs an actual browser login
once (--login), since PKCE Authorization Code flow is inherently interactive by design.
Metadata
Release files for trialmatch-mcp-bridge 0.1.11
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| trialmatch_mcp_bridge-0.1.11.tar.gz | 85.7 kB | Without provenance | Details for trialmatch_mcp_bridge-0.1.11.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| trialmatch_mcp_bridge-0.1.11-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for trialmatch_mcp_bridge-0.1.11-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 107.8 kB
Release files / trialmatch_mcp_bridge-0.1.11.tar.gz
| Download URL | trialmatch_mcp_bridge-0.1.11.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 85.7 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
bef0eb15a3a37a21846d5324907f26217be9876608922b2edd895cbe5739152e
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
ba40f725e632def6785e91a5534b006ba02f778f11fc0e8418d2c3852da86482
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
uv/0.12.7 {"installer":{"name":"uv","version":"0.12.7","subcommand":["publish"]},"python":null,"implementation":{"name":null,"version":null},"distro":{"name":"Ubuntu","version":"24.04","id":"noble","libc":null},"system":{"name":null,"release":null},"cpu":null,"openssl_version":null,"setuptools_version":null,"rustc_version":null,"ci":true}
|
Release files / trialmatch_mcp_bridge-0.1.11-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | trialmatch_mcp_bridge-0.1.11-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 22.1 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
7b41b1f564dcb687339d6628cd9baa2c652c31335c4f78f6e468524d90ed7c91
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
96fd6a646b59bcf9eff0c6e92332e0c77306e2f7db33fa7beb177a82b8c3b569
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
uv/0.12.7 {"installer":{"name":"uv","version":"0.12.7","subcommand":["publish"]},"python":null,"implementation":{"name":null,"version":null},"distro":{"name":"Ubuntu","version":"24.04","id":"noble","libc":null},"system":{"name":null,"release":null},"cpu":null,"openssl_version":null,"setuptools_version":null,"rustc_version":null,"ci":true}
|
Security for trialmatch-mcp-bridge 0.1.11
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
No provenance found
None of the files in this release were uploaded with provenance metadata.
A note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.