TurboDRF
Dead simple Django REST Framework API generator with role-based permissions.
Turn your Django models into fully-featured REST APIs with a mixin and a method. Zero boilerplate.
Install
pip install turbodrf
# Optional: faster JSON rendering with msgspec
pip install "turbodrf[fast]"
Quick start
1. Settings. Add the apps, and roles that grant each action:
INSTALLED_APPS = [
# ... Django's default apps ...
'rest_framework',
'drf_yasg', # serves the Swagger / ReDoc pages
'turbodrf',
'shop',
]
TURBODRF_ROLES = {
'editor': [
'shop.author.read', 'shop.author.create', 'shop.author.update', 'shop.author.delete',
'shop.book.read', 'shop.book.create', 'shop.book.update', 'shop.book.delete',
],
'viewer': ['shop.author.read', 'shop.book.read'],
}
2. Models. Add the mixin and a turbodrf() classmethod:
from django.db import models
from turbodrf.mixins import TurboDRFMixin
class Author(models.Model, TurboDRFMixin):
name = models.CharField(max_length=100)
email = models.EmailField()
@classmethod
def turbodrf(cls):
return {'fields': ['id', 'name', 'email']}
class Book(models.Model, TurboDRFMixin):
title = models.CharField(max_length=200)
author = models.ForeignKey(Author, on_delete=models.CASCADE)
price = models.DecimalField(max_digits=10, decimal_places=2)
@classmethod
def turbodrf(cls):
return {
'fields': {
'list': ['id', 'title', 'author', 'author__name', 'price'],
'detail': ['id', 'title', 'author', 'author__name', 'author__email', 'price'],
},
'searchable_fields': ['title'],
}
3. Give users roles. TurboDRF reads user.roles, a list of role names.
For example, use the names of the user's Django groups, in your app's
AppConfig.ready():
from django.contrib.auth.models import User
User.add_to_class('roles', property(lambda user: [g.name for g in user.groups.all()]))
Other options: Assigning roles to users.
4. URLs.
from django.urls import include, path
urlpatterns = [
path('api/', include('turbodrf.urls')),
]
Run makemigrations and migrate, put a user in the editor group, and
the API is up:
GET /api/books/ # List
GET /api/books/1/ # Detail
POST /api/books/ # Create
PUT /api/books/1/ # Update
DELETE /api/books/1/ # Delete
GET /api/books/?search=django # Search
GET /api/books/?price__lt=20 # Filter
GET /api/books/?fields=title,price # Select fields
A user with no role gets a 403 on every endpoint, and a nested field such as
author__name needs read on the related model (shop.author.read). Roles
don't scope rows: every editor sees every book until the model declares an
owner_field or tenant_field (see Tenancy).
The quick start guide runs these steps in a new project, with users and requests.
Documentation
Full docs: https://turbodrf.com/docs/
- Installation -- requirements, extras, checking the configuration
- Configuration -- all
turbodrf()options: field selection, nested & computed fields, custom endpoints (actions), read-only endpoints, method allow-lists,full_cleanvalidation - Permissions -- role-based, field-level, and Django default permissions
- Tenancy & row-level access -- predicates, multi-tenancy, FK injection defense
- Platform scope -- an API for your own staff across tenants: opt-in per model, a gate on every route, separate roles
- Performance -- compiled read path, fast JSON rendering, benchmarking
- Filtering & Search -- filtering, search, ordering, OR queries
- Integrations -- allauth, Keycloak, drf-api-tracking, Sentry (all experimental)
- Security -- sensitive fields, secure defaults, error responses
- Management Commands -- turbodrf_check, turbodrf_benchmark, turbodrf_explain
- Settings Reference -- every TURBODRF_* setting in one place
Permissions and access control
TurboDRF answers four standard authorization questions, in three layers that all apply to every request (AND'd together):
| Question | Layer | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| Can this user reach this endpoint? | RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) | Roles in TURBODRF_ROLES map to permissions. permissions.py checks <app>.<model>.<action> for the request method. |
| Which rows can this user see? | Row-level access | Predicates declared in turbodrf() config. Mandatory tenant boundary + discretionary within-tenant predicates (Owner, Members, Either, Custom). |
| Which fields can this user read or write? | Field-level permissions | Per-field rules <app>.<model>.<field>.read / .write in TURBODRF_ROLES. Hidden fields are stripped from responses, search, ordering, filters, and OPTIONS metadata. |
| Are FK targets the user provides actually theirs? | Write validation | On every create/update, FK and M2M values in the request body are validated against the related model's tenant boundary and predicate stack, on every model (shared ones included). Cross-tenant or invisible targets return 400. |
Field rules bind anonymous callers too: public_access: True gives them model-level read, and a field that any role has a read rule for needs a grant from a guest role. See Permissions.
How it actually works (concrete walk-through)
A multi-tenant SaaS has two workspaces (ABC and XYZ) and three roles: member, manager, admin. A Project model is configured:
class Project(models.Model, TurboDRFMixin):
title = models.CharField(max_length=200)
workspace = models.ForeignKey(Workspace, on_delete=models.CASCADE)
owner = models.ForeignKey(User, on_delete=models.CASCADE)
@classmethod
def turbodrf(cls):
return {
'tenant_field': 'workspace', # mandatory wall
'owner_field': 'owner', # within-tenant rule
'bypass_owner_roles': ['manager', 'admin'], # roles ignore owner check
'fields': ['title', 'workspace', 'owner'],
}
Plus two project-wide settings:
TURBODRF_TENANT_MODEL = 'accounts.Workspace'
TURBODRF_TENANT_USER_FIELD = 'workspace' # request.user.workspace → tenant
Now a request GET /api/projects/ from Alice (member at ABC) goes through:
- Permission gate — Alice's role
memberhasapp.project.read. Pass. - Tenant filter (mandatory, applied first, never bypassable):
WHERE project.workspace_id = <Alice's workspace>
- Owner filter (Alice has no bypass role, so this layer applies):
AND project.owner_id = <Alice's user id>
- Field stripping — Alice's role has read on
title,workspace,ownerbut maybe not all configured fields. Hidden ones are removed from the response.
If Alice tries cross-tenant tricks:
GET /api/projects/<XYZ_project_id>/→ 404 (not 403, no existence leak)PATCH /api/projects/<her_project_id>/ {"workspace": <XYZ>}→ 400 (tenant reassignment rejected)POST /api/tasks/ {"project": <XYZ_project_id>}→ 400 (FK injection: she can't reference another tenant's project)
If a manager (with bypass) at ABC asks for /api/projects/:
WHERE project.workspace_id = <ABC's workspace id>
-- no owner filter (manager bypassed it)
Manager sees all ABC projects, but still can't see XYZ — the tenant boundary is mandatory and applied separately from the predicate algebra (it's a setting, not a predicate). This rules out an entire class of compositional bugs where bypass roles could OR-compose their way past the tenant wall.
Quick recipes
# Multi-tenant SaaS — most common case
{'tenant_field': 'store', 'owner_field': 'customer', 'bypass_owner_roles': ['staff']}
# Personal data app (no TURBODRF_TENANT_MODEL; with one, owner_field alone fails the startup check)
{'owner_field': 'author', 'bypass_owner_roles': ['admin']}
# Reference data (currencies, country codes — not tenant-scoped)
{'tenancy': 'shared'}
# M2M membership (Slack channels, Linear projects)
{'tenant_field': 'workspace', 'visibility': [Members('participants')]}
# Several owner columns (a match on any of them shows the row)
{'tenant_field': 'workspace', 'owner_field': ['author', 'reviewer']}
# Power-form composition: shared_with users can edit the row, not reassign its owner
{'tenant_field': 'workspace', 'visibility': [Either(Owner('owner'), Members('shared_with'))]}
See Tenancy for the full predicate vocabulary, hard-fail-at-startup behavior, and 404-vs-403 semantics.
Staff across tenants
An operator's own staff console reads and acts on every tenant's rows. Give a
model a 'platform' block and mount a second router with a gate:
# Job.turbodrf(): no tenant endpoint, a read-only console endpoint
{'enabled': False, 'tenant_field': 'workspace',
'platform': {'endpoint': 'jobs', 'read_only': True,
'fields': ['id', 'kind', 'status', 'workspace__name'],
'actions': [retry]}}
# console/urls.py
console = TurboDRFRouter(scope='platform', gate=[IsPlatformStaff])
Platform roles (TURBODRF_PLATFORM_ROLES) are separate from tenant roles. See
Platform scope.
License
MIT License. See LICENSE for details.
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