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Twin Update

Update the same desktop apps on two Linux machines in one run, keep a verified rollback copy of what was installed, and roll back with one command.

It targets Debian/Ubuntu-family desktops (tested on Ubuntu 24.04-based systems with Python 3.12; needs Python 3.11+, systemd user sessions and apt) and apps installed as apt packages from their vendor repos. Built-in entries: Cursor (cursor), ChatGPT desktop (chatgpt) and Grok Bot desktop (grok-bot). Other apt-packaged apps can be added in the config. Snaps, Flatpaks, AppImages and CLIs are out of scope.

Machine labels are whatever you name them in the config; the examples below use desktop-a and laptop-b.

Security model, in short

  • Two machines you control, one trusted link. The machine you start the run on reaches the other over ssh (BatchMode, host keys checked): Tailscale SSH or an ordinary ssh key. Without that link only --local-only --dry-run works.
  • sudo is asked once per run and checked on both machines. The password goes only to sudo -S on stdin (over the run's ssh session for the other machine); never argv, environment, files, logs or reports. See SECURITY.md.
  • apt only. Root runs only apt-get update, apt-get install of a pinned version or of a stored, sha256-checked .deb, and apt-mark hold/unhold. Each machine installs from its own configured apt sources.
  • Graceful closes only. SIGTERM, never SIGKILL. If an app does not close in time, the run aborts on both machines before anything is updated.
  • Rollback copy before every update, verified against what dpkg installed; no verified copy on either machine means the app is skipped on both.
  • Nothing resident. No daemon, timer or listener; apps close only inside a run you start.
  • It restores program files, not app data (see below).

What a run does

twin-update run [--apps cursor,chatgpt] [--dry-run]
  1. Preflight on both machines: identity (whoami, optional machine-id) must match the config; apt/dpkg must be idle; every lock_paths file is locked for the whole run, so a sync or backup job cannot run during the update. Asks for the sudo password once and checks it on both machines, then apt-get update on both.
  2. Plan: an app is updated only if both machines have it installed, are offered the same candidate version, and no kept hold blocks it. Otherwise it is skipped on both, with the reason. The exact version is pinned.
  3. Rollback copy first: the installed .deb is stored in ~/.local/share/twin-update/rollback/<app>/<version>/ with a sha256, taken from the apt cache, apt-get download <pkg>=<installed>, or a matching local .deb. It is checked against dpkg's md5sums of the installed build (for vendor debs without an md5sums member, the deb's files are hashed in a stream and compared). A mismatch is refused. No copy on either machine = the app is skipped on both.
  4. Holds: holds on these apps that Twin Update did not set are cleared (one report line each) unless keep_holds lists them. Holds on other packages are only reported.
  5. Graceful close on both: SIGTERM (via pidfd) to the main processes of the app's process tree, found by executable path and the package's file list. No force-kill. If anything is still running after close_s, the run aborts on both machines before any update, names the app and process, and reopens what it closed.
  6. Update each machine from its own repo: apt-get install --only-upgrade <pkg>=<version>. Nothing is copied between machines.
  7. Verify: dpkg version, dpkg -V, and a launch smoke test in the graphical session (systemd-run --user): stays up smoke_s seconds, no crash in the journal, closes gracefully. On failure you are offered a rollback.
  8. Reopen only the apps that were open before.
  9. Prune: exactly one rollback copy per app is kept (the version before the latest update). Older copies are removed only after the new version passed its checks and a grace period (7 days or 2 good launches).
  10. Report: ~/.local/state/twin-update/runs/<ts>-run.json (0600, machine labels only) on both machines, plus a desktop notification such as Cursor laptop-b 2.4.1→2.5.0 ✓ (via notify-send, or gdbus when notify-send is not installed).

Apps are only ever closed inside a run you start. There is no daemon, timer, watcher or listener; the ssh session to the other machine exists only for the run. The run moves itself into its own systemd-run --user --scope, so closing the app whose terminal launched it does not stop it.

Other commands

twin-update check [--notify] [--json]      # read-only: are updates available? (no sudo)
twin-update status [--local-only]          # per machine/app: installed, candidate, running, rollback copy, hold
twin-update rollback <app> [--machine <label>|both] [--dry-run] [--no-hold]
twin-update holds
twin-update unhold <app> [--machine ...] [--dry-run]
twin-update doctor                         # identity, sudo group, apt idle, locks, session, ssh; exit 4 on problems
twin-update local --serve                  # per-machine engine; the peer runs this over ssh

Daily check (optional)

twin-update check asks both machines, without root, whether the enabled apps have newer versions. First it fetches fresh package lists for only the apps' own repositories into a user-owned cache (~/.cache/twin-update/apt, or $XDG_CACHE_HOME/twin-update/apt) with apt-get update pointed at that cache: the repositories' existing sources.list.d entries are linked in unchanged, so their Signed-By keyrings and apt's signature checks apply as configured; the system's apt update hooks are not run; /var/lib/apt is never written. Then apt-cache policy reads that same cache. If the fetch fails or times out (2 minutes), it uses the system lists and says so, with how long ago they were last refreshed. --no-fetch skips the fetch. It never asks for sudo, closes nothing, installs nothing and stores no rollback copies. (twin-update run still refreshes and installs with the system apt, as root.)

With --notify it sends a desktop notification on the machine it runs on when updates are available, or a short "check incomplete" notice when the other machine could not be reached or an error occurred. The same notice is sent at most once per day (state in ~/.local/state/twin-update/).

Unreachable machines are reported in plain words: name lookup failed, ssh login refused, connection refused, Tailscale SSH asked for an interactive check, or timed out (off, asleep or offline).

Exit codes for check: 0 no updates, 10 updates available (also when only one machine could be checked), 1 check incomplete (error or other machine unreachable, and no updates found), 2 usage or config error.

Example user timer (no root needed; runs while you are logged in, or always with lingering enabled):

# ~/.config/systemd/user/twin-update-check.service
[Unit]
Description=Twin Update: daily read-only update check

[Service]
Type=oneshot
ExecStart=%h/.local/bin/twin-update check --notify
SuccessExitStatus=10
TimeoutStartSec=5min
Nice=10
IOSchedulingClass=idle

# ~/.config/systemd/user/twin-update-check.timer
[Unit]
Description=Twin Update: daily update check

[Timer]
OnCalendar=*-*-* 09:13:00
Persistent=true

[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target

systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user enable --now twin-update-check.timer

rollback checks the stored copy's sha256, closes the app gracefully, installs it with apt-get install --allow-downgrades ./<deb>, sets apt-mark hold (recorded as Twin Update's own hold; the next deliberate run releases it), verifies, and reopens the app if it was open.

A rollback restores program files, not app data. If a new version migrated its settings or databases, keep your own data backups. Twin Update never opens, copies or modifies app databases.

Install (each machine)

pipx install twin-update          # or: uv tool install twin-update

or the single-file zipapp from a release:

install -D -m 0755 twin-update.pyz ~/.local/bin/twin-update

Install it at the same path on both machines (remote_command in the config points to it). Then create ~/.config/twin-update/config.toml (mode 0600) from config.example.toml. The same file works on both machines. Check with twin-update doctor, then twin-update run --dry-run.

Transport

The machine you run on reaches the other with plain ssh (BatchMode, host keys checked, no password prompts). The remote side runs twin-update local --serve for the length of the run. Two options:

Tailscale SSH. On each machine that should accept runs: sudo tailscale set --ssh. "Shields up" blocks incoming connections, Tailscale SSH included, so it must be off on those machines; let the policy do the limiting instead. Example policy fragment with tags (merge it into your policy; tagging a device makes it tag-owned rather than user-owned):

{
  "tagOwners": {
    "tag:twin-a": ["autogroup:admin"],
    "tag:twin-b": ["autogroup:admin"]
  },
  "grants": [
    { "src": ["tag:twin-a"], "dst": ["tag:twin-b"], "ip": ["tcp:22"] },
    { "src": ["tag:twin-b"], "dst": ["tag:twin-a"], "ip": ["tcp:22"] }
  ],
  "ssh": [
    { "action": "accept", "src": ["tag:twin-a"], "dst": ["tag:twin-b"], "users": ["alice"] },
    { "action": "accept", "src": ["tag:twin-b"], "dst": ["tag:twin-a"], "users": ["alice"] }
  ]
}

Use "action": "accept": "check" needs an interactive browser login and a BatchMode run cannot answer it. If your policy still has an allow-all rule, it also lets everything else in the tailnet reach these machines; narrow it. Keep only the direction you need if you always start runs on the same machine.

Plain ssh key. A dedicated key without a passphrase prompt (or one held by your agent) in the other machine's authorized_keys, ideally limited with from="<the other machine's address>", and its host key already in known_hosts.

Development

PYTHONPATH=src:tests python3 -m unittest discover -s tests
python3 tools/build_zipapp.py        # -> dist/twin-update.pyz

Standard library only. Exit codes (check differs, see above): 0 ok / dry-run, 4 doctor found a problem (including an unreachable other machine; a busy sync lock is only a warning), 1 failed, 2 usage or config, 3 aborted (nothing changed).

License

Apache License 2.0. See LICENSE.

Cursor launch policy and optional life-raft (0.3.0 draft)

Cursor is in apps.no_launch by default. If it is open when an update or rollback needs to close it, it is closed gracefully and updated, then left closed. Neither the smoke check nor reopen starts it. The opt-in raft hook never overrides this policy. Existing per-app no-launch lists are preserved. Other apps retain their configured launch behavior. No installed tool or machine configuration changes as part of this draft.

The optional [raft] hook applies only when Cursor reopening is explicitly permitted, a real smoke check passed, and the machine is allowed. It takes the configured shared backup lock before checking processes and database holders, then creates a private local SQLite snapshot. It checks holders again and discards a raced or failed snapshot. Hook errors and timeouts cannot suppress reopening for apps whose policy permits it; no_launch apps remain closed throughout.

The snapshot is queued to a bounded user service after reopen. Its helper takes the same lock with a 30-second wait, logs lock/start/upload failures, and retains the snapshot on failure. The latest two snapshots are retained by default; older ones are pruned under the shared lock. A successful upload must pass a downloaded content comparison before the local snapshot is deleted. Folders use 0700 and files 0600. Snapshot data and external adapters are never included in this repo.

raft.lock_path and raft.remote are required when enabling this feature. Use the actual nightly-backup lock; do not invent a second lock. remote_command must resolve to the installed executable's absolute path for the background service; the interpreter is also absolute. A custom --config path is retained.

External snapshot-only adapter protocol 1 is required in script_dir:

  • twin-update-raft.json: exactly {"protocol": 1}.
  • backup_cursor.py --source DB --output SNAPSHOT_DB: read-only SQLite backup, local only; no upload or application launch.
  • export_cursor_return.py SNAPSHOT_DIR: prepare SNAPSHOT_DIR/payload using only the captured database, never the live profile.
  • verify_cursor_payload.py SNAPSHOT_DIR: verify the prepared payload; nonzero aborts the upload.
  • make_return_manifest.py SNAPSHOT_DIR: add the payload integrity manifest.

Legacy fixed-path scripts are incompatible and must not be relabeled as protocol

  1. Prepare separate adapters outside the repo, test with invented data, and retain existing nightly scripts. The hook skips safely until compatible adapters exist.

The smoke-test reaper is relevant only to apps explicitly allowed to launch. For Cursor it records pre-existing worker identities, obtains the smoke main process start tick, then uses guarded SIGTERM only for newly started same-user workers under Cursor's worker directory (executable or first two argv paths). No known main start tick means no reaping. It never sends SIGKILL.

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