Universal Agent Interface (UAI)
Cross-vendor agent collaboration with acceptance governance: agents from different runtimes (Codex, Claude Code, DeepSeek Harness, any CLI) work under one hub — with enforced acceptance gates so that "an agent says DONE" is never trusted until a third-party verifier signs off.
Honest scope: proven in a real multi-agent delivery pipeline (4 seats, 3,000+ ledger records, 7 fabricated-completion incidents caught). Single-developer small tasks don't need this — deploy cost > benefit.
Why
LLM agents fabricate completions. Prompting can't fix it; mechanisms can. UAI separates execution state from acceptance verdicts:
SUCCEEDEDonly means "stopped and submitted a claim" — externally projected as "pending verification" until a VERDICT lands.- Verifier seat is never the implementer (ENFORCED, tested).
- Evidence levels E1–E4; self-reported evidence cannot impersonate independent verification.
Quickstart (30 minutes, Linux/macOS/WSL)
git clone https://github.com/3338902669-ops/universal-agent-interface.git
cd universal-agent-interface
# 1. deps
pip install nats-py jsonschema cryptography
# 2. NATS (any server ≥2.9)
nats-server -c prototype/nats-test.conf # listens 127.0.0.1:43321
# 3. hub
python prototype/hub.py --base prototype --nats-url nats://127.0.0.1:43321
# 4. verify acceptance gate projection (read-only, no deps on runtime)
python stage2/test_projection.py # 10/10
python stage2/test_a2a_server.py # 12/12
Full suite (24 suites, 300+ cases) and a real-lab end-to-end (A2A request → envelope → hub → real runtime → ledger) live in stage2/DEVELOPMENT.md.
What's inside
| Layer | Path | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| Contract | protocol/contract-v1.md, schemas/ |
v1 envelope (11 required fields), canonical verdict vocabulary, JSON Schema, conformance suite |
| Prototype | prototype/ |
NATS hub: idempotency, leases+fencing, single-writer resources, ledger hash-chain |
| Governance (stage2) | stage2/ |
A2A projection (AgentCard/Task/events), inbound message/send, SSE stream, webhook push (HMAC), OIDC/Ed25519 verifiers, unified cross-repo model |
| Bridges | stage2/paseo_uai_bridge.py |
Paseo daemon orchestration ↔ UAI acceptance |
Architecture in one picture
runtime seats (codex / claude / dsh / yours)
│ provider CLI
Paseo daemon (or any orchestrator)
│ envelope (contract v1)
UAI hub — ledger (append-only, hash-chained) + verdicts
│ projection (AgentCard / Task / SSE / webhook)
external A2A consumers
Design rule: reuse A2A semantics (AgentCard, task states), replace the transport; acceptance/verdict logic is internal and never outsourced.
Key invariants (ENFORCED, each with a test)
- SUCCEEDED ≠ passed — projection writes "pending verification" without a verdict
- idempotency treats loss only; fabrication is handled by the verdict seat
- verifier ≠ implementer; unknown side-effect state forbids auto-retry
- no verifier configured → identity stays
asserted, never upgraded experimental_test_onlygate on event_bridge until a real cross-vendor consumer exists
Status / honest gaps
- Cross-vendor identity: OIDC verifier ready (production JWKS verified against Microsoft), real IdP issuance is account-side work
- A2A streaming: SSE done; push notifications done (webhook, HMAC); gRPC binding not planned
- event_bridge v1/v2 remain behind
experimental_test_onlyuntil a real external consumer exists
License: see LICENSE. Paseo bridge operates under AGPL-3.0 constraints of the upstream project.
Metadata
Release files for uai-governance 0.15.4.post1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| uai_governance-0.15.4.post1.tar.gz | 58.5 kB | Without provenance | Details for uai_governance-0.15.4.post1.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| uai_governance-0.15.4.post1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for uai_governance-0.15.4.post1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 126.0 kB
Release files / uai_governance-0.15.4.post1.tar.gz
| Download URL | uai_governance-0.15.4.post1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 58.5 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
645af200084a80c12c8c5db790091302938cfc84a35bc20184fb0f1ea2eeac0f
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
f47387148b91e54520cb148e43c78bf2ae45264f5a0e58f35e862ea56a547b94
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.12.14
|
Release files / uai_governance-0.15.4.post1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | uai_governance-0.15.4.post1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 67.6 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
4656fa9ea1ab0a2801ae37bd312a357394f7e2c15d6bfa56cdd9f22ce2d98f5c
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
d2beb9d349e15b11251e1e14dc55743f0ca1f247d3af42de1c203715da50a6f9
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.12.14
|
Security for uai-governance 0.15.4.post1
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
No provenance found
None of the files in this release were uploaded with provenance metadata.
A note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.