Usenet, unseen - now in a window.
Discussions you read and answer, chats you chat in, over Tor. Portable on Windows, macOS and Linux, booted from a USB stick - or in any browser, on a phone too, through a web entrance.
A modern client for Unseenet, the decentralised, encrypted discussion network over Tor onion services, built on the unseenet core with the look of unseenet.org.
Pre-alpha prototype. Neither this client nor the unseenet core has had a security review. Play with it, pick it apart - do not rely on it to protect anyone yet.
A discussion is not a chat. Discussion groups work like a newsreader - the
same way as unseenet's terminal client: the posts as a tree, the selected one
below to read, ↑ ↓ through the thread and Space to the next unread, and
R to answer in a compose window with the post quoted and your signature
below. Chat groups are chats. The group's owner decides which a group is, and
V lets you see it the other way.
| Read a discussion | Answer it, quoting |
|---|---|
| Chat where it is a chat | Light, or dark |
Booted from a stick
The bootable image starts with the Unseenet splash and then the client full screen - network, Wi-Fi, keyboard and power at the top. The splash is the image's own; the picture of the client is taken by the image's self-test, which boots it in QEMU on every build.
In a browser, on a phone or a computer
The same client runs in an ordinary browser, with nothing to install, through a web entrance (unseenet-entrance, UN-RFC 0043) - for example the project's own, https://129.151.209.26/. There the client's Python backend - this repository's server code and the unseenet core - runs in the browser itself (WebAssembly), so the keys stay in the browser; the entrance only carries the connections to the nodes over Tor. It can be added to the home screen like an app, keeps the vault on the device if you want, and updates itself to signed versions. The entrance sees your IP address (not in Tor Browser), and the page says so at all times: for the hidden way in, use the portable client or the stick.
On a narrow screen - a phone - the client shows one thing at a time: your groups, then a group, then a post or the chat. ⋯ holds what does not fit, and the compose window has its Send button at the top, above the keyboard.
How it works
browser window ──HTTP/WebSocket──▶ unseenet-gui ──▶ unseenet core ──Tor──▶ nodes
(127.0.0.1 only) (local server) vault, keys, postage
unseenet-gui is a small local server around the core's Session - the same
one the TUI uses. (On the web the same server code runs inside the browser
instead, see above; nothing in this repository is different for it.) It opens the same encrypted vault, starts the same bundled
Tor and talks to the same nodes. The browser only draws what you would see on
screen: keys, signing, encryption and postage never leave Python, and the
passphrase is only sent once, to unlock.
The client follows the terminal client's way of working, so you can switch
between them without learning anything new: the same keys, the same icons
(≡ discussion, » chat, ∩ closed), the same compose window.
Download
Every push to main is built and self-tested; the newest builds are the
development pre-release.
- Portable - unzip and start, from a USB stick or a folder. Tor is included,
and everything stays in
data/beside the programs.unseenet-gui-…-usb.ziphas every platform; or take only yours:- Windows:
Unseenet Graphical.exe(an app window through WebView2, no console) - macOS:
Start Unseenet Graphical.command(an app window) - Linux:
sh start-graphical-linux.sh(Chromium, Chrome, Edge or Brave without tabs if you have one, else your browser)
- Windows:
- Bootable -
unseenet-gui-…-x86_64.img.xz: write it to a USB stick (for example with Raspberry Pi Imager, balenaEtcher orxz -dc FILE | sudo dd of=/dev/sdX bs=4M), boot from it, and Unseenet starts full screen and runs from memory. Set up Wi-Fi and the keyboard on the first screen. The same stick also starts the portable client on a running computer, with the samedata/. It needs 4 GB of memory; "safe graphics" in the boot menu helps if the screen stays black, and "text only" starts unseenet's terminal client instead.
Both use the same Unseenet/ folder and data/ as unseenet's own portable
build, so the terminal client and this one can share a stick and a vault.
From source
You need Python 3.11+.
pip install unseenet-gui
unseenet-gui # opens your browser
unseenet-gui --vault /path/to/unseenet.vault
It uses the same vault as the TUI (unseenet.vault in the current folder, or
the portable build's data/), so your identity, groups and read marks are the
same in both. Do not run both on the same vault at the same time.
In its own window
pip install "unseenet-gui[window]"
unseenet-gui --window
This uses pywebview: the system's web view (WebView2 on Windows, WebKit on macOS and Linux) in private mode, so nothing ends up in your browser's history or cache. On Linux it needs the GTK WebKit libraries.
A playground without Tor
git clone https://github.com/unseenet/unseenet-gui && cd unseenet-gui
pip install -e .
tools/dev.sh # a local node, three people, groups and a closed chat
Passphrase test. Everything is in ./dev; tools/dev.sh clean deletes it.
Keys
| Key | |
|---|---|
Ctrl K or Ctrl P |
Commands and groups |
N |
New post |
R |
Reply: a compose window with the post quoted |
↑ ↓ |
Previous / next post in the tree |
Space |
Next unread post (then the next group with unread posts) |
Enter |
Read the post full screen (Esc goes back); in a chat: write |
M |
Write to someone (paste their key) |
V |
Switch between chat and threads |
G |
Find groups on your nodes |
K |
Show your key |
? |
About this group |
Ctrl S |
Send, in the compose window |
Esc |
Leave the text box, close a dialog |
Security
The local server is reachable from your own computer, so it guards itself. These are the rules of UN-RFC 0046, kept by the core's local API:
- It listens on 127.0.0.1 only, on a random port.
- Every start makes a random token. It is in the address the client opens
(
…/#t=…, in the fragment, so it is never sent in a request line), kept in that tab only and removed from the address bar. Every API call and the event socket must carry it. Other programs on the computer and web pages in your browser do not know it. - The Host header must be our own address, which stops DNS rebinding, and an Origin header, when sent, must be our own origin.
- A strict Content-Security-Policy: the page loads nothing from anywhere but the local server - no fonts, images, scripts or styles from outside. A post can never make the browser fetch something past Tor.
- Everything people wrote is put on the page as text, never as HTML, and links in posts are not clickable: following one would leave Tor.
- Nothing is logged: the server has no access log.
What it does not protect against: someone who can read your screen, run
programs as you or read your memory. When you run it in your normal browser,
the window title and address can end up in its history - --window avoids
that.
What the prototype can and cannot do
It can: unlock or create a vault, choose a name and node, follow and leave groups, read threads and chats (closed groups decrypted), post, reply, chat, "For you", private messages (write to anyone by key, conversations as chats, private replies), contacts, create groups (open, moderated, channel, closed; threads or chat; fast delivery), invite to your closed groups, your signature, edit your own posts, names (@you), moderation, roles, bans and member removal, reporting, ignoring people, a light and a dark theme, the command palette, and phones and other narrow screens. On the bootable image also: network and Wi-Fi, keyboard layout, restart and shut down. In a browser: everything above, through a web entrance.
Not yet - use the TUI: Tor bridges and several identities. Updating a stick or portable folder of this client is not there yet either: its builds are not signed yet, and unseenet's own updater does not touch them (it would remove the graphical client). Download the new build from the releases for now; signed builds, a notice and an Update button (already in the code, switched off) are coming (unseenet#264).
Versions and releases
Versions follow semantic versioning on the same
principles as unseenet:
tags vX.Y.Z on main, the changes in CHANGELOG.md, and
releases on PyPI and here with the
portable builds and the image. Each release names the minor version of
unseenet it works with (unseenet[api]>=0.4.1,<0.5).
To release: move the entries under ## [Unreleased] in CHANGELOG.md to a
new ## [X.Y.Z] - YYYY-MM-DD section, set __version__ in
src/unseenet_gui/__init__.py, and the core release the builds use
(CORE_REF in .github/workflows/build.yml); commit, then
git tag -a vX.Y.Z -m "unseenet-gui X.Y.Z" && git push origin vX.Y.Z.
release.yml publishes to PyPI and makes the release with the changelog
notes, build.yml adds the builds. Afterwards set __version__ on main to
the next .dev0, so development builds are named after it.
Built on the core
Everything but the page is the core's: this client is unseenet's local
client API (UN-RFC 0046, unseenet.client.localapi) with its page and a few
routes of its own under /x/gui/ - the bootable image's network, keyboard and
power, updating, and what the page shows about this machine. The same runtime,
threads, names and safe Markdown tree serve every front end, so this client
shows what the TUI shows. CORE-NEEDS.md records how it got there.
Layout
src/unseenet_gui/
__main__.py command line: how to open it, --self-test
opening.py app window, browser in app mode, or the browser
server.py the core's local API with this page, and /x/gui/
update.py updating a stick or portable folder (off for now)
system.py the bootable image's network, keyboard and power
boot.py the bootable image's session (cage) and its self-test
splash.py the boot splash, drawn on the framebuffer
selftest.py does this build work?
static/ the page: index.html, app.css, app.js (no build step)
tests/ the server: the core's guards, the page, /x/gui/
tools/
dev.sh a playground without Tor (seed_dev.py fills it)
record_demo.py the demo and screenshots in this README, from the playground
build_portable.py, portable/ the portable builds (with unseenet's Tor tooling)
image/ the bootable image (adapted from unseenet's)
.github/workflows/build.yml Tor, four portable builds, USB zip, image, releases
The front end is plain JavaScript with no dependencies and no build step, so the client is easy to read and audit.
Code Apache-2.0. Logo CC BY 4.0, from the Unseenet project.
Metadata
Release files for unseenet-gui 0.1.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unseenet_gui-0.1.1.tar.gz | 88.6 kB | With provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unseenet_gui-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 169.8 kB
Release files / unseenet_gui-0.1.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | unseenet_gui-0.1.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 88.6 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Transparency logRelease files / unseenet_gui-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl
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| Size | 81.2 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
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Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 23, 2026.
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Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 23, 2026.
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