vaid-mint (Python)
The Python mirror of the Rust vaid-mint crate: the open, self-hostable
reference mint for the VAID (Verifiable Agent Identity) standard.
mint_root— mint a root/operator VAID (BYO-key with proof-of-possession, or generate-and-discard), gated by an explicitAuthorizationGate.mint_child— attenuated delegation: an authenticated parent mints a child whose authority is always a subset of its own (child ⊆ parent).
Trust model — read this before using the mint
Upgrading from 0.1.1? Expiry enforcement is a ⚠️ breaking behavioral change despite the patch version bump:
verify_vaidnow returnsFalsefor expired VAIDs that previously passed. See CHANGELOG.md before upgrading.
| Concern | Reference mint (this package) | Hosted / commercial |
|---|---|---|
| Revocation | Pluggable, three-state & lineage-aware (RevocationCheck); default in-memory, non-durable |
Durable, hash-chained |
| Expiry (TTL) | Enforced at verification (hard reject) | Enforced |
| Auth | Pluggable (AuthorizationGate) |
Pluggable |
| Audit | Pluggable (AuditSink) |
Pluggable |
Revocation is a three-state, lineage-aware seam (0.2.0); the shipped default is
non-durable. Per docs/spec/revocation.md R.4 — a breaking replacement of the
0.1.2 boolean, leaf-only check — the verifier assembles the VAID's ordered ancestry
and hands it to RevocationCheck.check_lineage, which returns a RevocationStatus
of NOT_REVOKED, REVOKED, or UNAVAILABLE. A VAID is revoked if any ancestor
is (revoking a parent revokes its children), and verification fails closed on
UNAVAILABLE — an incomplete lineage (e.g. an empty resolver after restart) or an
unreachable store rejects rather than silently passing. Inject your own durable,
restart-surviving backend via ReferenceIssuer.with_revocation_check; what ships
by default is a non-durable in-memory store, so if the process restarts and you
have not wired a durable backend, previously revoked VAIDs may become revocable
again. The seam closes the "no extension point" gap; it does not by itself make
revocation durable. That is your responsibility to wire, or the hosted authority's
to provide.
from vaid_mint import InMemoryRevocationList, ReferenceIssuer, RevocationStatus
class MyDurableRevocations:
"""Your own restart-surviving store (or a refreshed snapshot of one). It is
handed the full ordered lineage, root first, and returns a three-state status —
return UNAVAILABLE when the backing store cannot be reached, so verification
fails closed rather than passing silently."""
def check_lineage(self, lineage: list[str]) -> RevocationStatus:
try:
deny = load_deny_list()
except StoreUnreachable:
return RevocationStatus.UNAVAILABLE
if any(vaid_id in deny for vaid_id in lineage):
return RevocationStatus.REVOKED
return RevocationStatus.NOT_REVOKED
# The injected check REPLACES the default store consulted at verification.
issuer = ReferenceIssuer.ephemeral(1).with_revocation_check(MyDurableRevocations())
# Or wire the seam with the shipped in-memory list before a durable backend exists:
revocations = InMemoryRevocationList.assume_nothing_revoked()
issuer = ReferenceIssuer.ephemeral(1).with_revocation_check(revocations)
revocations.revoke(vaid["vaid_id"])
assert not issuer.verify_vaid(vaid)
If you're running this in production, mitigate as follows:
- Mint short-lived VAIDs.
vaid_ttl_hourscontrols issuance TTL, andDEFAULT_VAID_TTL_HOURS(1h) is the recommended baseline. Expiry is now enforced at verification — an expired VAID hard-failsverify_vaid, not merely reported — so a short TTL is a real backstop that shrinks the exposure window for a leaked or compromised VAID even without durable revocation. Treat TTL as your primary control today. - Inject a durable
RevocationCheck(e.g. backed by a shared store or a periodically-refreshed snapshot of one) if you need revocation to survive restarts. It replaces the default store consulted at verification, and should returnRevocationStatus.UNAVAILABLEwhen its backing store is unreachable — verification then fails closed. - Or front the mint with a revocation-aware proxy or allowlist — e.g. a
sidecar or gateway that checks a durable deny-list before forwarding to
verify_vaid. - Do not rely on the default configuration alone for revocation guarantees that must survive a process restart.
The default store, InMemoryRevocationList.assume_nothing_revoked(), is named for
its posture, not its state: it vouches NOT_REVOKED over an empty set and, being
non-durable, cannot detect its own restart — after a restart it is
reconstructed empty and again vouches clean, so a VAID revoked before the restart
verifies clean. That is a fail-open posture reached by assumption. The two safe
alternatives are to inject a durable RevocationCheck, or to hold the store in
absent state (the default InMemoryRevocationList() constructor, which reports
UNAVAILABLE and so fails closed) until you have re-loaded revocation state into
it. The hosted product additionally offers a durable, hash-chained revocation
store; the open package gives you the seam to plug your own into.
Unguarded defaults: authorization and delegation
This is a reference implementation with two deliberate, unguarded defaults:
mint_roothas no authorization gate by default (PermitAll). Anyone who can call this code can mint a root VAID. Supply a realAuthorizationGatefor anything beyond local experimentation.mint_childis intentionally ungated — attenuation is the authorization. Any holder of a valid parent VAID can mint children from it; a child can only narrow scope/capabilities relative to its parent, never widen (child ⊆ parent). Possession of a parent VAID is itself the authorization boundary for delegation here. Treat parent-VAID custody with the same care as a credential.
Neither of these is a security recommendation for production use — they are the honest defaults of a self-hostable reference mint. See the sections below for where each is enforced in code.
from vaid_mint import ReferenceIssuer, InMemoryAudit, MintService, VaidSeed
issuer = ReferenceIssuer.ephemeral(24)
mint = MintService(issuer, InMemoryAudit())
root = mint.mint_root(VaidSeed(
agent_class="orchestrator", version="1.0.0", tenant_id="acme",
scope_boundary=["data.acme"], capability_set=["read", "write"],
))
assert issuer.verify_vaid(root)
The split
This is the open engine of a HashiCorp-Vault-style split. KMS-backed kernel keys
and the durable, hash-chained audit-of-record are the closed managed
authority and are not here. The audit seam is here — AuditSink, with
InMemoryAudit and NoopAudit — so what is closed is the durable ledger, not
the ability to audit.
Revocation is the seam worth naming plainly rather than filing under
"commercial": as of 0.2.0 this package ships a three-state, lineage-aware
RevocationCheck seam (spec R.4), with a non-durable in-memory default, and VAID
expiry (TTL) is hard-enforced at verification. What stays commercial is durable
revocation itself: a restart-surviving, hash-chained store. The package ships the seam, not
the durability.
| Concern | Here (open) | Hosted / commercial |
|---|---|---|
| Kernel signing key | ephemeral or caller/seed-supplied bytes | KMS-backed, rotated |
| Revocation | pluggable (RevocationCheck), in-memory default — see Trust model |
durable, hash-chained |
| Expiry (TTL) | enforced at verification (hard reject) | enforced |
| Audit | in-memory / no-op sink | audit-of-record |
| Policy / mesh / federation | — | control plane |
mint_root is gated by an AuthorizationGate that defaults
to PermitAll — a reference-implementation choice, not a security
recommendation; production deployments should pass a real gate to MintService.
mint_child is intentionally ungated because attenuation is the
authorization: any holder of a valid parent VAID can mint children from it, and
a child can only narrow scope/capabilities relative to that parent, never widen
(child ⊆ parent). So possession of a parent VAID is itself the authorization
boundary for delegation — treat parent-VAID custody with the same care as a
credential.
Cross-language byte-identity
Proof-of-possession reuses the vaid-pop primitive verbatim. The signed VAID
document is proven byte-identical to the Rust mint by the vendored frozen
vector vaid_mint/vectors/mint_v1.json (the same mint_v1.json the Rust
mint_conformance test asserts). Run the packaged firewall:
vaid-mint-conformance # exit 0 = PASS (installed mint == frozen vector)
Per Decision B this is self-consistent within this repo (Rust == Python); it is not byte-conformant against the managed authority's (still-moving) VAID format.
Install
From PyPI (pulls vaid-pop, cryptography, rfc8785 automatically):
pip install vaid-mint
Local dev only — from a repo checkout, install both editable:
pip install -e python/vaid-pop
pip install -e python/vaid-mint --no-deps
--no-deps is used only here, and only because vaid-pop was just installed
editable from the same checkout on the line above — without it, pip would fetch the
published vaid-pop from PyPI and shadow your local one. Do not use --no-deps
with the PyPI install above; there you want pip to resolve the dependencies.
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