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veltro-suite-auth

Veltro-owned suite session and service-token contracts with signed-realm compatibility.

This package is derived from the AGPL-3.0-or-later veltro-suite-auth 1.3.0 implementation originally maintained in VectorFlow. See NOTICE for provenance.

Removed in 3.0.0

3.0.0 drops the authority-revision module: verify_authority_revision_v1, the watermark apply, restore and availability helpers, their constants and types, and the REV_* error codes. Identity never minted revisions, and revocation already applies on the next request because identity re-reads grants for every assertion, token call and exchange (veltro#129). A product that imported any of these has to delete that receiver before it takes 3.0.0.

Native roles

APP_ROLES lists the roles each product accepts. From 2.5.0, VectorFlow and CHAD also accept approver, which maps to the coarse editor suite role on service tokens and authority envelopes, as Warden's already did. An older decoder rejects the whole session or token when it sees a role it doesn't know, so a product has to ship 2.5.0 or later before an admin grants anyone the VectorFlow or CHAD approver role.

Authority envelope v2

From 2.6.0, the actorless settings:read and settings:write scopes are valid for the vectorflow audience too, not just chad and warden. Identity uses them to write each product's AI settings (veltro#1150).

From 3.1.2, vectorflow:bootstrap:operator authorizes identity's one-time first-admin operator delivery. It is valid only for the vectorflow audience, with sub and azp both veltro-identity and no actor claims, including null actor fields. The scope implies no other scope. HS256 compatibility tokens cannot mint or verify it. Receivers still provide the existing issuer, generation, public key ring and replay consumer.

verify_authority_envelope_v2 verifies and consumes short-lived ES256 veltro-suite-service+jwt envelopes. The receiver supplies the exact issuer, exact audience, active generation, that audience's public P-256 JWK ring, required scope, and an atomic synchronous or asynchronous replay consumer. The consumer runs exactly once after all stateless checks and must return literal True.

This package deliberately provides no v2 minting/signing API, private-key type, key generator, JWKS/network fetcher, settings/environment adapter, or consumer runtime wiring. Existing HS256 v1 compatibility remains separate and unchanged.

Actor envelopes may also carry actor_sub (identity's subject for the person, a lowercase uuid) and the pair actor_scope_kind/actor_team_id (the grant the exchange picked: realm with a null team, or team with a team id). They're only valid next to the actor tuple. The verifier returns all three, as None when the token leaves them out, so a product can resolve the actor by subject first and fall back to email for older tokens.

Account-section write

From 3.1.0, chad:peer:account:write and warden:peer:account:write are valid scopes. Identity mints them when a person saves their own CHAD or Warden section of Settings > Account (veltro#1411). Before that, saves rode on the read-named <product>:peer:status:read (veltro#1211). Each grants only itself, so it doesn't satisfy a peer:status:read check and a status token doesn't satisfy it. Like chad:alerts:write, an envelope carrying either must have an actor, so an actorless one is refused with V2_INVALID_ACTOR. VectorFlow has no account section and no such scope.

To keep accepting saves from an older identity that sends peer:status:read, a product can accept both by verifying with required_scope set to the account write and, only on V2_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE, verifying again with the status read. The scope check runs before the replay consumer, so the first attempt doesn't spend the jti.

Product grant read

product_grants_path(subject=None) builds the path for identity's GET /api/authority/grants, and parse_product_grant_list(body, product=..., subject=None) checks the response strictly: the right product, canonical subjects, native roles, a team id exactly when the grant is team scoped, and at most the one requested subject. Bad bodies raise SuiteAuthError with GRANTS_INVALID_RESPONSE. The product makes the HTTP call itself with its workload credential; this package does no network I/O.

Browser request assertion verifier

From 2.6.1, duplicate member names are checked per JSON object, so a nested object (a team entry's role beside the grant's role) is no longer refused. Older verifiers refuse any assertion that carries the grant's teams list.

verify_browser_request_assertion verifies and consumes short-lived ES256 veltro-browser-request+jwt request assertions minted by Veltro identity. The receiver supplies the exact issuer, exact audience, active generation, that audience's public P-256 JWK ring, the request being authorized (request with method and path), and an atomic synchronous or asynchronous replay consumer.

The verifier enforces every binding the mint records: exact typ, alg=ES256 allowlist, audience key ring and kid, signature, issuer/audience, active generation, nbf/iat/expiry capped at 60s, fixed realm default, grant-product consistency, and — the point of the artifact — that the signed method and canonical path match the request being authorized, using the same shared normalize_request_path contract the mint uses. An assertion minted for GET /chad/api/alerts never authorizes POST /chad/api/rules.

One-use semantics are the receiver's: after all stateless checks, the verifier calls the replay consumer exactly once with a frozen {issuer, audience, generation, jti, expires_at} tuple. The consumer must return literal True only if it has not previously seen that tuple; a replayed jti is rejected when the consumer returns False. The consumer must persist at least {issuer, audience, generation, jti} until expires_at to enforce one-use semantics across the token's validity window.

This package deliberately provides no request-assertion minting/signing API, private-key type, key generator, JWKS/network fetcher, settings/environment adapter, or consumer runtime wiring.

Session team pick

From 3.0.0, a session's selectedTeamId is kept only when it matches the chrome manifest's team id shape, ^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$, and is null otherwise. Nothing is trimmed. The TS and Python decoders share the rule and the session-v3 vectors that pin it.

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