einvoice
A zero-dependency, embeddable, self-hostable conformance validator for
EN 16931 electronic invoices, targeting the German XRechnung CIUS
(UBL 2.1 Invoice and UN/CEFACT CII syntaxes, including Factur-X/ZUGFeRD
PDF containers via einvoice.report).
- Zero dependency. Python 3 (>=3.8) standard library only. No lxml, no
Java, no Schematron toolchain, no network calls.
python3 einvoice.py validate x.xmlfrom a checkout is the whole install;pip install .adds aneinvoiceconsole script (pyproject.tomlpinsdependencies = []— a tested contract, seetest_packaging.py). - Embeddable. The validator is a small pure-Python package
(
einvoice/parser.py,einvoice/rules.py,einvoice/validate.py,einvoice/cli.py); rules are plain functions over a parsed model, so an ERP or billing system can import it in-process instead of shelling out to a validator service — copying the bareeinvoice/package directory into your tree is a supported (and tested) install method. - Self-hostable. Runs fully offline — zero network egress, enforced at
the socket layer by
test_network_egress.py(seeSECURITY.md). The rule corpus and test fixtures are vendored in-repo (corpus/), so the thing you validate against is auditable and pinned — no dependency on a third-party validation API. The supply-chain posture (zero runtime deps, offline, vendored corpus) is written up for evaluators inSECURITY.md, backed by a committed CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM atsbom/bom.json. - CI-gateable.
ci/ships a copy-paste build gate (POSIX sh + GitHub Actions / GitLab CI recipes) that fails a build on any non-conformant invoice, naming the violated rule ID. See §4. - Deutsche Anleitung. A German-language quickstart whose shell commands
are kept byte-identical to the English docs by an automated parity check
(
test_install_command_drift.py):QUICKSTART.de.md.
Safe on untrusted input
Supplier XML is untrusted input, so every production parse entry point is
hardened against the classic xml.etree/expat attack classes — using only
the standard library (xml.etree.ElementTree + xml.parsers.expat, no
lxml, no defusedxml), so the zero-runtime-dependency contract above is
unchanged and still proven by test_packaging.py. Concretely, the parser:
- rejects any
<!DOCTYPE>/DTD — internal or external subset — at the expatStartDoctypeDeclHandler, before any entity can be defined; - therefore defines and expands no custom entity (a billion-laughs or
quadratic-blowup payload aborts in constant time and memory, never
materialising the expanded string), and resolves no external entity or
external DTD — expat opens no
file:///http://URL, so an XXE such as<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM 'file:///etc/passwd'>reads nothing (no file-read, no SSRF); - turns a refused payload into a bounded, actionable failure — the engine's
ordinary not-well-formed report finding and CLI exit code
3, identical to any ill-formed invoice — never a crash, a hang, or a silent pass.
Full guarantee (including the byte-length / element-count / nesting-depth
resource ceilings on well-formed-but-hostile input) is written up in
SECURITY.md under "Untrusted input / XML entity handling",
and is proven end-to-end by test_security.py (billion-laughs,
quadratic-blowup, file:// external-entity read with a secret-canary
leak check, /etc/passwd XXE, external-DTD SYSTEM) and test_robustness.py,
which also assert that a benign XRechnung invoice still parses and validates
unchanged.
Read §2 before trusting it with anything. The engine asserts 297 business
rules in total — the exact set the code fires, enumerated per rule in
COVERAGE.md / coverage_matrix.json and drift-gated by
test_coverage_matrix.py against the live rule registries. That total breaks
down as: 219 of the 223 official EN 16931 BR-* rule ids in each CEN
syntax universe (UBL and CII) — every official rule that can actually fire
(every fireable BR-CL-* code-list check is now implemented in both
syntaxes) — plus, with
--profile=xrechnung, the German XRechnung CIUS + extension layer
(all 55 BR-DE-*/BR-DE-CVD-*/BR-TMP-*/BR-DEX-* asserts the UBL
artifact carries, and all 49 the CII artifact carries — including the
CII-only BR-TMP-3 and BR-DEX-15) and the 21
PEPPOL-EN16931-R* rules KoSIT ships inside the official XRechnung
Schematron artifact — the KoSIT-vendored subset only, not Peppol BIS
Billing 3.0 support (see §2). The machine-checked gap of official rules
neither implemented nor documented as a deliberate exclusion is zero for
both universes (fireable_missing == 0): test_coverage_gap.py recomputes
it from the vendored official Schematron on every run and fails if the
fireable-missing count is ever nonzero. The last admitted gap in the KoSIT
XRechnung artifact — the Clean-Vehicle-Directive / temporary family
(BR-DE-CVD-*, BR-TMP-*) — is closed with differential proof in both
bindings as of 2026-07-11; the machine-checked KoSIT worklists
(cvd_tmp_family and peppol_kosit_family in coverage_matrix.json) are
empty.
The caveat that keeps that claim honest, stated adjacent to it rather than in
a footnote: 4 official ids (BR-CO-05–BR-CO-08) are shipped as literal
test="true()" tautologies in the CEN artifacts — asserts that can never
fire, in either universe, so implementing them with a differential proof is
impossible by construction. Those 4 tautologies are documented with
verbatim artifact evidence in
COVERAGE.md, the generated per-rule matrix that is the
authoritative inventory (it supersedes the static first-slice tables in §2
where they disagree). A related asymmetry worth knowing: the total-VAT
decimal pair BR-DEC-13/BR-DEC-15 is implemented and
differential-proven on the CII leg (that artifact ships real numeric
round2 tests), while the UBL artifact's asserts for the same pair are
vacuous-by-defect (a predicate-context bug means they can never fire there)
— the engine asserts the stated ≤2-decimals intent on UBL anyway, as
documented deliberate strictness. This is deliberately not an
uncaveated "100%" claim.
How correctness is proven: every implemented rule is differential-tested
against the official, normative compiled Schematron artifacts (the legal
rulesets). The 2026-07-11 run, all four legs at zero divergences:
EN 16931 core on UBL — 209 rules × 1145 real invoices = 239,305
comparisons; XRechnung + KoSIT-vendored Peppol on UBL — 76 graded ids ×
1067 invoices = 81,092 comparisons; EN 16931 core on CII — the 96-rule
graded subset × 111 invoices = 10,656 comparisons; XRechnung + Peppol on
CII — 52 graded ids × 117 invoices = 6,084 comparisons. See
CORRECTNESS.md for the method, corpora, and the honest
limits of those claims.
CII proof parity — the worklist is now CLOSED. The two bindings share one
rule registry, but a rule only earns syntax = UBL + CII in the matrix once
it is differentially proven on the CII artifact too, and which rules have that
proof is machine-tracked: test_cii_parity.py recomputes the worklist
(cii_parity.json) from the live coverage matrix plus a real XML parse of the
vendored CII Schematron, and fails on any drift, so the parity gap can neither
be hand-edited nor go stale. As of 2026-07-23 the arc is terminal: 281 of
the 297 asserted rules are differential-proven on both the UBL and CII
bindings, 12 are officially UBL-only, and 4 are CII-only (BR-TMP-3 and
BR-DEX-15, whose asserts exist only in the CII artifact, plus
BR-DEC-13/BR-DEC-15, whose UBL asserts are artifact-vacuous — see the
caveat in §1). The German KoSIT layer is complete on BOTH bindings: all
55 UBL and all 49 CII German-family asserts
(BR-DE-*/BR-DE-CVD-*/BR-TMP-*/BR-DEX-*) the vendored artifacts carry
are implemented and differentially graded — including the extension-profile
scheme-id and attachment checks BR-DEX-01/04/05/06/07/08 on CII.
Zero rules remain on the cii-fireable worklist — every one of the 12
UBL-only rules the vendored CII artifacts were measured against is resolved
with evidence: 4 are cii-artifact-defective (the CII artifact ships them
as a test="true()" tautology or bound to a row whose every $rate in () is
vacuously true — they can never fire) and 8 are binding-inapplicable
(BR-DEX-02/03/09/10/11/12/13/14: carried by no vendored CII artifact at all, so a
CII proof is impossible by construction). Every one of those reasons is
re-verified live against the vendored artifacts on each run; the committed
worklist and COVERAGE.md are the authoritative state.
1. Why this exists: the legal forcing function
Structured e-invoicing is stopping being optional in the EU. If you issue or receive B2B invoices there, a conformance validator moves from "nice tooling" to "the thing that decides whether your invoice legally exists."
- Germany (2025–2028). Since 1 January 2025 every German business must be able to receive EN 16931-conformant e-invoices (XRechnung or ZUGFeRD); the obligation to issue them phases in through 2027–2028 depending on turnover, as legislated in the Wachstumschancengesetz. Public-sector suppliers have been required to send XRechnung since 2020.
- France (2026–2027). Reception of structured e-invoices becomes mandatory for all VAT-registered businesses in September 2026; the obligation to issue phases in September 2026 (large/mid-size) through September 2027 (SMEs), via the PDP/e-reporting reform. The French formats (Factur-X, UBL, CII) are all EN 16931 profiles.
- EU ViDA. The "VAT in the Digital Age" package (adopted 2025) makes structured e-invoicing the default for intra-EU B2B and adds digital reporting requirements on a ~2030 horizon — again on the EN 16931 core.
Dates above reflect the legislation as understood at time of writing (mid-2026); phase-ins shift, so verify against current law before relying on them. The direction, however, is one-way: every invoice will need to pass machine-checkable conformance rules, and the party that fails them eats the rejection, the payment delay, or the VAT problem. Buyers on a deadline need a validator they can run themselves, embed in their pipeline, and audit — not a black-box web form.
2. HONEST coverage — read this before using it
Profile: XRechnung 3.x (the German CIUS of EN 16931-1:2017), UBL 2.1
Invoice and UN/CEFACT CII syntaxes.
The static tables below are the FIRST-SLICE inventory (108 core + 32 BR-DE
rules), kept for the family-by-family orientation they give; the engine has
since grown to 219 core + 55 German-layer rules, and the machine-generated
COVERAGE.md / coverage_matrix.json (regenerated from the
live rule registries by gen_coverage.py, drift-gated by
test_coverage_matrix.py) is the authoritative per-rule inventory wherever
the two disagree.
Implemented — EN 16931 core (the first-slice 108 rules)
| Family | Rule IDs |
|---|---|
| Header existence/cardinality | BR-01, BR-02, BR-03, BR-04, BR-05, BR-06, BR-07, BR-08 |
| Seller/Buyer postal address | BR-09 (seller country code), BR-10 (buyer postal address), BR-11 (buyer country code) |
| Payee & Seller tax representative | BR-17 (payee name when payee differs from seller), BR-18 (tax representative name), BR-19 (tax rep postal address), BR-20 (tax rep country code) |
| Payment instructions | BR-49 (payment means type code), BR-50/BR-61 (credit-transfer account id), BR-51 (card PAN truncation — official warning flag, non-blocking) |
| References & addresses | BR-55 (preceding invoice reference), BR-57 (deliver-to country code), BR-62/BR-63 (seller/buyer electronic-address scheme id) |
| Document totals presence | BR-12 (Σ line net), BR-13 (total w/o VAT), BR-14 (total with VAT), BR-15 (amount due) |
| Invoice-line cardinality | BR-16, BR-21, BR-22, BR-24, BR-26 |
| Invoice-line content | BR-25 (item name), BR-27 (net price not negative), BR-28 (gross price not negative), BR-29/BR-30 (invoicing / line period end >= start), BR-CO-04 (line VAT category code) |
| Allowance/charge existence | BR-31, BR-32, BR-33, BR-36, BR-37, BR-38, BR-41, BR-42, BR-43, BR-44 |
| Code list | BR-CL-01 (UNTDID 1001 invoice type code) |
| Arithmetic co-constraints | BR-CO-10, BR-CO-13, BR-CO-14, BR-CO-15, BR-CO-16, BR-CO-17 |
| VAT breakdown presence | BR-CO-18 |
| VAT breakdown group (BG-23) | BR-45 (taxable amount), BR-46 (tax amount), BR-47 (category code), BR-48 (category rate) |
| VAT-category consistency | BR-S-01, BR-Z-01, BR-AE-01, BR-E-01, BR-G-01, BR-IC-01, BR-O-01 |
| Standard-rated (S) category | BR-S-02/03/04 (Seller VAT id for S line/allowance/charge), BR-S-05/06/07 (S rate > 0), BR-S-09 (tax = taxable × rate), BR-S-10 (no exemption reason on S) |
| Zero-rated (Z) category | BR-Z-02/03/04 (Seller VAT id for Z line/allowance/charge), BR-Z-05/06/07 (Z rate = 0), BR-Z-08 (taxable = Σ Z line nets − allowances + charges), BR-Z-09 (tax = 0), BR-Z-10 (no exemption reason on Z) |
| Exempt (E) category | BR-E-02/03/04 (Seller VAT id for E line/allowance/charge), BR-E-05/06/07 (E rate = 0), BR-E-08 (taxable = Σ E line nets − allowances + charges), BR-E-09 (tax = 0), BR-E-10 (exemption reason text/code REQUIRED on E) |
| Decimal precision (max 2 places) | BR-DEC-01, BR-DEC-02, BR-DEC-05, BR-DEC-06, BR-DEC-09, BR-DEC-10, BR-DEC-11, BR-DEC-12, BR-DEC-14, BR-DEC-16, BR-DEC-17, BR-DEC-18, BR-DEC-19, BR-DEC-20, BR-DEC-23 |
Plus two structural checks: S-WF (well-formed XML) and S-ROOT (UBL Invoice-2
root). Rule wording follows the vendored EN 16931 Schematron
(corpus/cen-en16931/ubl/schematron/abstract/EN16931-model.sch) verbatim.
Implemented — XRechnung CIUS layer (--profile=xrechnung, first-slice 32 BR-DE table; now 55 incl. BR-DE-CVD-*/BR-TMP-*/BR-DEX-*)
| Family | Rule IDs |
|---|---|
| Mandatory German fields | BR-DE-1 (payment instructions), BR-DE-15 (BuyerReference), BR-DE-2/5/6/7 (seller contact + name/phone/email), BR-DE-3/4 (seller city/post code), BR-DE-8/9 (buyer city/post code), BR-DE-10/11 (deliver-to city/post code), BR-DE-14 (VAT rate per breakdown) |
| Seller VAT identification | BR-DE-16 |
| Type-code / spec-id restrictions | BR-DE-17, BR-DE-21, BR-DE-26 |
| Payment-means grouping | BR-DE-23-a/-b (credit transfer), BR-DE-24-a/-b (card), BR-DE-25-a/-b (direct debit), BR-DE-30, BR-DE-31 (SEPA mandate fields) |
| Content quality (warnings) | BR-DE-19, BR-DE-20 (IBAN mod-97), BR-DE-27 (phone), BR-DE-28 (email), BR-DE-18 (Skonto grammar, fatal) |
| Delivery-date recommendation | BR-DE-TMP-32 (information) |
That is every BR-DE-* assert in the official KoSIT XRechnung 3.0.2 UBL
Schematron (the numbering has official gaps: no BR-DE-12/13/29 exist there).
Severities mirror the official flags — only fatal rules affect the exit
code; warnings/information are reported in --json. The 15 BR-DEX-*
extension-profile rules have since been implemented as well (14 UBL asserts
plus the CII-only BR-DEX-15 — sub invoice lines unsupported, warning; the
seven extension asserts the CII artifact carries — BR-DEX-15 plus the
scheme-id/attachment group BR-DEX-01/04/05/06/07/08 — are all graded on the
xrechnung-cii differential leg), and so has the
complete CVD/TMP family the same artifacts carry: the Clean-Vehicle-Directive
profile (BR-DE-CVD-01–05, BR-DE-CVD-06-a/-b, BR-TMP-CVD-01 — gated on
the CVD CustomizationID …xrechnung:cvd_0.9, inert on plain invoices),
BR-TMP-2 (BT-124 must be an absolute URL; warning), and BR-TMP-3 — which
exists only in the CII binding (the vendored UBL artifact carries no such
assert), so it is implemented and proven on CII only (syntax = CII in
COVERAGE.md). Every family rule is differential-proven in each binding
whose artifact carries it, with dedicated FIRE and PASS fixtures; the family
enumeration is machine-checked (cvd_tmp_family in coverage_matrix.json,
recomputed live by test_coverage_gap.py). All 21 PEPPOL-EN16931-R* rules
the same KoSIT artifact vendors are implemented in both bindings
(differential-proven; the family enumeration stays machine-checked in
COVERAGE.md) — that is the KoSIT-vendored subset only, not Peppol BIS
Billing 3.0 support.
Differential result vs. the OFFICIAL Schematron (this run)
The strongest correctness evidence: differential.py runs each invoice through
the official, normative compiled Schematron artifacts (Saxon → SVRL) and
through our validator, then compares — for every invoice and every graded rule
ID — whether each engine fires. The Schematron is the legal artifact; any
disagreement is our bug. The 2026-07-11 run:
LEG 1 EN 16931 core, UBL ............... 1145 invoices x 209 rules = 239,305
LEG 2 XRechnung + Peppol batch, UBL .... 1067 invoices x 76 rules = 81,092
LEG 3 EN 16931 core, CII ............... 111 invoices x 96 graded = 10,656
LEG 4 XRechnung + Peppol batch, CII .... 117 invoices x 52 graded = 6,084
TOTAL AGREEMENT ...... 100.0000% on every leg
divergences .......... 0 false-positives + 0 misses, all legs
All implemented rules agree with their official Schematron on every graded
invoice. Reproduce it (needs saxonche importable): python3 differential.py
(or ... en / ... xrechnung for one leg). Method, corpus breakdown, the
divergences that were found and fixed, and the honest scope limits are
documented in CORRECTNESS.md. This proves faithfulness
only for the graded rule × syntax pairs — the per-rule graded sets, and
the reasons some implemented rules are not graded on CII, are enumerated in
COVERAGE.md — not EN 16931 or XRechnung as a whole (see §2
"NOT covered").
Conformance result (this run)
conformance.py drives the real CLI as a subprocess over every vector in
corpus/vendored/ (14 valid + 52 invalid). The invalid vectors are Difi
<testSet> files, so the harness extracts every embedded <Invoice>
fragment and checks each <error>/<success> assertion individually —
284 embedded assertions in total.
total vendored vectors ............. 66 (14 valid + 52 invalid)
VALID-vector pass rate ............. 14/14 100.0% (miss = FALSE POSITIVE)
COVERED-INVALID detection rate ..... 52/52 100.0% (correct rule id fired)
OUT-OF-SCOPE invalid vectors ....... 0
embedded-block detail (Difi assertions):
<error> fragments: 140 total -> 140 detected, 0 missed, 0 wrong-id, 0 oos
<success> fragments: 144 total -> 144 clean, 0 FALSE POSITIVE, 0 oos
HARD FAILS: 0 -> RESULT: PASS
Every covered invalid vector is detected with the correct labeled rule ID across all 140 error fragments; every valid vector and all 144 must-pass fragments come back clean — zero false positives on this corpus.
The harness itself was mutation-tested (then the code restored
byte-identical): neutering br_06 produced 4 WRONG RULE ID hard fails;
forcing br_01 to always fire produced 13 FALSE POSITIVE hard fails;
removing BR-Z-01 was correctly reported as out-of-scope, not silently
passed. A green run means something because the harness demonstrably goes red.
Reproduce it: cd einvoice && python3 conformance.py (exit 0 = pass; exit 1
prints the offending file, block, and expected vs. actual rule IDs).
KoSIT test-suite conformance headline
End-to-end, on KoSIT's own official documents: 39 of 39 in-scope
XRechnung test-suite documents in UBL syntax (the plain xrechnung_3.0
CIUS) are classified exactly as the suite labels them — accepted as valid. The
same holds for the CII (UN/CEFACT) binding: 39 of 39 in-scope
*_uncefact.xml documents, routed through the shipped CII engine
(parser_cii + rules.ALL_RULES + rules_xrechnung.evaluate_cii), are
classified exactly as the suite labels them. The 8 out-of-scope documents (the
extension and CVD guidelines, in both syntaxes) are machine-listed with their
exact reason in
testsuite_conformance.json; see
CORRECTNESS.md §4a for provenance and scope.
NOT covered yet (deliberate first-slice cuts — do not rely on these)
BR-TMP-3andBR-DEX-15are CII-only by artifact design — theBR-DE-*CIUS core, theBR-DEX-*extension layer AND the Clean-Vehicle-Directive/temporary family (BR-DE-CVD-*,BR-TMP-CVD-01,BR-TMP-2,BR-TMP-3) are all implemented (seeCOVERAGE.md), but the vendored UBL artifact carries noBR-TMP-3orBR-DEX-15assert, so those two rules are asserted and proven on the CII syntax only — a UBL differential proof is impossible by construction.- No Peppol BIS Billing 3.0 support. All 21
PEPPOL-EN16931-R*rules KoSIT ships inside the official XRechnung Schematron artifact ARE implemented (both bindings, differential-proven; the enumeration stays machine-checked inCOVERAGE.md), but the OpenPeppol ruleset proper (its own Schematron + test corpus) is a separate, not-vendored artifact — nothing beyond the KoSIT-vendored asserts is claimed. - French national CIUS not yet checked (the EN 16931 core for French
invoices IS). This is a technical scope statement distinct from the French
legislative timeline in §1
(reception mandatory Sept 2026, issuance phasing to Sept 2027). A French B2B
invoice — Factur-X (a CII payload in a PDF/A-3 container), UBL, or CII — is an
EN 16931 profile, so the full EN 16931 core (
BR-*semantic model) already applies to it here, and the Factur-X path is first-class: the shipped PDF container extractor (einvoice.pdf_container) pulls the embeddedCrossIndustryInvoiceXML and validates it to EN 16931 depth via the exact same core engine (einvoice.rules.ALL_RULES) — measured end-to-end bytest_facturx_profile_scope.py, and detailed inCOVERAGE.mdunder "French CIUS scope". What a French CIUS adds on top of EN 16931 — the FNFE-MPE / Chorus Pro Factur-X French national business rules and code lists — is not checked: that official Schematron is not vendored incorpus/, so those French-CIUS-specific rules are out of scope until it is (nothing French-specific is fabricated or approximated from prose). So "validates the EN 16931 core for a French invoice" is TRUE and useful, while full French CIUS conformance is NOT claimed — the same honesty label this README applies to Peppol BIS Billing 3.0 above. - 4 official
BR-*ids per CEN universe are documented deliberate exclusions, NOT coverage: the 4 official tautologiesBR-CO-05–BR-CO-08, shipped as literaltest="true()"asserts in both CEN universes, so no implementation could ever be differentially proven for them. TheBR-CL-*code-list class carries no deferrals — the engine asserts every fireable code-list check in both syntaxes. Per-rule reasons and verbatim artifact evidence:COVERAGE.md§Exclusions. - No XSD (structural schema) validation. Layer S-XSD is deferred; only well-formedness and the root element are checked structurally.
- UBL
CreditNoteIS validated; no signatures. A UBL 2.1CreditNote(rootCreditNote-2:CreditNote) is routed through the SAME EN 16931 core engine as anInvoice(the official Schematron binds both roots symmetrically), differentially proven at 0 divergences over the vendored CreditNote corpus — seeCOVERAGE.md§"UBL CreditNote scope". CII (CrossIndustryInvoice) and Factur-X/ZUGFeRD PDF containers ARE also validated (viaeinvoice.report), with the graded CII rule subsets inCOVERAGE.md. XML signatures are not checked. - The 100% figures are agreement/pass rates for the implemented, graded
rule × syntax pairs only (the
differential.pylegs and theconformance.pyvendored vectors quoted above). They are 100% of a limited, honest scope, not 100% of the standard (structural XSD validation is not performed, and the national CIUS layers beyond German XRechnung are out of scope).
See SPEC.md §6 for the full deferred list.
3. Install / embed / usage
New here?
QUICKSTART.mdis a tested 5-minute copy-paste path: install, validate a passing and a failing sample invoice, and read the exit code +--json— every command in it is run against the live engine bytest_quickstart.py.
Three ways in, one code path (einvoice/cli.py — proven identical by
test_packaging.py):
# a) straight from a checkout — nothing to install
python3 einvoice.py validate <invoice.xml> [--json] [--profile=en16931|xrechnung]
python3 -m einvoice validate <invoice.xml> [--json] [--profile=en16931|xrechnung]
# validate a whole folder or glob in one run (reuses the same rule engine):
python3 -m einvoice validate-batch <dir|glob> [--json] [--quiet] [--profile=…]
# b) pip-install (from a checkout/vendored copy — NOT on PyPI yet, on purpose)
python3 -m pip install /path/to/einvoice # zero runtime dependencies
einvoice validate <invoice.xml> [--json] [--profile=en16931|xrechnung]
einvoice validate-batch <dir|glob> [--json] [--quiet] [--profile=en16931|xrechnung]
c) embed in-process — vendor the bare einvoice/ package directory (the
pure-Python package alone, no corpus needed at runtime) or pip-install it,
then:
from einvoice import validate_file, NotWellFormed
result = validate_file("invoice.xml", profile="xrechnung")
if not result.ok:
for v in result.violations: # each: rule_id, message, element
print(v.rule_id, v.message) # e.g. "BR-DE-15 The element ..."
--profile=xrechnung layers the 55 German BR-DE-*/BR-DE-CVD-*/
BR-TMP-*/BR-DEX-* rules on top of the core (default profile: core only).
Exit codes (stable contract):
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0 | passes every implemented fatal rule (warnings may still be reported) |
| 1 | at least one implemented fatal rule failed |
| 2 | usage error (bad args, missing file, unknown profile) |
| 3 | input is not well-formed XML |
Default output on failure is the first fatal violated rule, human message,
and offending element. --json emits the full machine-readable result:
{
"source": "invoice.xml",
"valid": false,
"violation_count": 2,
"violations": [
{"rule": "BR-06", "message": "...", "element": "...", "severity": "fatal"}
]
}
A valid: true result means "no implemented fatal rule fired" — given §2, it
does not yet mean "legally conformant XRechnung."
CLI contract
The command line is a small, stable surface. Everything below is pinned by
test_cli.py (ergonomics) and test_cli_sb.py / test_packaging.py (the
exit-code and packaging invariants).
Exit codes — the whole point of the tool is to gate a build, so the exit
code is the contract, not the prose. The receipt subcommand collapses code
3 into a FAIL receipt (exit 1) because a receipt must always emit a
document; codes 2 and 3 below therefore describe validate. A receipt's
tamper-evidence is a recompute-and-compare of content_sha256 over the
canonical body. einvoice receipt --verify <receipt.json> runs exactly that
check for you in one command (details under receipt --verify below); the
same check is reproducible in any language without our binary — see
RECEIPT-VERIFICATION.md for the exact recipe and its
honest limit (the outer hash is a body digest, not self-covering).
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 |
passes every implemented fatal rule (advisory warnings may still be reported) |
1 |
at least one implemented fatal rule failed |
2 |
usage error — bad/missing arguments, no such file, or an unknown --profile |
3 |
input is not well-formed XML (or a rejected DTD/entity/XXE payload, folded to the same not-well-formed outcome) — validate only |
Syntax-binding warnings and XRechnung warning/information findings are
advisory: they are reported but never move the exit code off 0/1.
Flags
--version— prints the packagedeinvoice.__version__(read from the installed package, not a hardcoded string) and exits0. It takes precedence over everything: no subcommand or file is required (einvoice --version/python3 -m einvoice --version).--help/-h— print the usage synopsis plus a one-line description of every command (validate,validate-batch,receipt,info,--show-config,--version) to stdout and exit0. Like--versionit is an informational precedence flag — handled before any subcommand or file, soeinvoice --helpis a valid first command;-his a byte-identical alias. It changes no validation behaviour and reads no input file. The two-word set of commands it lists is bound to theVALID_SUBCOMMANDSregistry bytest_cli_help.py, so a new subcommand cannot go silently undocumented.--json— emit the full machine-readable result instead of the human summary (shape below and inREPORT-SCHEMA.md).--quiet— suppress the humanPASS/FAIL/Syntax-binding warningssummary on stdout. The exit code is unchanged, and--quietdoes not suppress--json:validate --quiet --jsonstill prints the JSON (quiet only silences the human summary). It has no effect onreceipt, whose canonical JSON is its output.--profile=en16931|xrechnung— select the rule set (defaulten16931).--lang=en|de— language of the human failure message only (defaulten). Underdea rule that has an official German assert renders it; all other rules keep their English message. It changes nothing else — same rules fire, same offending element, byte-identical--json, same exit code. See §German-language messages for the exact coverage.--show-config— read-only observability: resolve the effectiveformat/fail-on/langexactly as a realvalidaterun would (explicit flag > config file > built-in default) and print each with its source —flag, the config filename (.einvoice.toml/pyproject.toml), ordefault— then exit0. It reads no input file and runs no validation; likeinfoit writes only stdout, nothing on stderr on success. A misconfigured config file still errors (2) with the same message a real run gives — the resolution and vocabulary checks are shared, never re-implemented. Purely additive: omitting the flag leaves everyvalidaterun byte-identical to today. Pinned bytest_show_config.py; the config-file layer it reports is documented inQUICKSTART.md§6.
Input — validate <invoice.xml> reads a file; validate - reads the
invoice XML from stdin (e.g. curl -s … | einvoice validate -). The stdin
bytes are staged to a temporary file and validated through the identical
DTD/XXE/resource-hardened parser used for on-disk files — piping in does not
get a relaxed parse path (see SECURITY.md). receipt reads a
file only.
receipt --verify <receipt.json> — the one-command integrity check for a
receipt einvoice receipt previously emitted. It re-hashes the receipt's
canonical body with the exact same canonicalizer that built it and compares to
the stored content_sha256, then reports the result. It validates nothing and
changes no verdict — it only re-hashes bytes already in the receipt:
$ einvoice receipt invoice.xml > receipt.json
$ einvoice receipt --verify receipt.json
VERIFIED: receipt.json
content_sha256 = 6459697e0a75de9454eeac449a0c79f5a172945470fa6e1db4dbf49e6699b391
Exit codes reuse the existing taxonomy (no new code): 0 + VERIFIED when the
hash matches; 1 + TAMPERED (with the recomputed vs stored hash) when the
body no longer matches its hash — whether a field was altered or content_sha256
itself was corrupted; 2 + an error: line on stderr (no traceback) when the
file is not a readable receipt (non-JSON / garbage / truncated, valid JSON that
is not a receipt, or a nonexistent path). --verify is valid only for receipt.
This is a convenience over the manual recipe, not a stronger guarantee: it shares
the recompute-and-compare limit documented in
RECEIPT-VERIFICATION.md, which also gives the
zero-trust recipe for consumers who won't run our binary.
Batch — validate-batch <dir|glob> validates a whole set of invoices in one
run. The argument is either a directory (every *.xml/*.pdf invoice file
under it, recursively; dotfiles and dot-directories skipped) or a shell-style
glob (invoices/*.xml, or 'invoices/**/*.xml' for a recursive match — quote
it so your shell doesn't pre-expand it). Every file goes through the same
hardened parser and rule engine as validate, so a hostile DOCTYPE/entity file
is reported as an ERROR (never parsed, never aborts the batch), and the
directory and glob forms produce byte-identical aggregate counts over the same
file set. It reuses the batch engine in einvoice/report.py
(build_batch_report / build_batch_report_from_files / batch_exit_code /
build_batch_text) verbatim — no aggregation or rule logic is re-implemented, and
each per-file report is byte-identical to validating that file on its own. Output
is a per-file PASS/FAIL/ERROR summary plus an aggregate tally, or the
aggregate einvoice-conformance-batch/v1 dict with --json; --quiet suppresses
the human summary but keeps the exit code (and still emits JSON under --json). An
empty directory or zero-match glob is reported honestly as file_count: 0
with a note, exit 0 — never a traceback. The exit code follows the
documented report precedence (fatal outranks parse): 0 when every file passes,
1 if any file has a fatal violation, 3 if some file only errored
(not-well-formed / unsupported container) and none had a fatal. Pinned by
test_cli_batch.py.
Build introspection — einvoice info reports what this build contains,
read-only: no input file, nothing validated, exit 0 (extra arguments are a
usage error, exit 2). Human form is stable key: value lines; einvoice info --json emits the same payload as one sorted-keys JSON object with exactly
the keys version, profiles, formats, rule_count, coverage and
attestation_sha256. Every value is read or recomputed at runtime from the
package and its committed artifacts — the packaged __version__, the PROFILES
tuple, the einvoice.report.REPORT_FORMATS constant, the committed coverage
matrix, the live syntax-binding evaluator plus its catalog totals, and
attestation.json's content_sha256 — never retyped literals, so the output
can't silently drift from the build (pinned by test_info.py). Example:
python3 -m einvoice info --json | python3 -m json.tool
A tested fail-fast CI recipe built on this output — assert a required
profile/format in one line before your validate step — is in
QUICKSTART.md §5 (pinned by test_ci_capability_recipe.py).
--json shape — the exact field-by-field schema of the --json result
(including the syntax_bindings array and its two count fields) is documented
in REPORT-SCHEMA.md. A machine-readable JSON Schema
(report.schema.json) for this shape is planned; once published it will live
alongside REPORT-SCHEMA.md, and this contract is written to stay compatible
with it — the CLI does not depend on that file existing.
German-language messages (--lang de)
--lang de swaps the language of the human-facing failure message only.
Which rules fire, the offending element, the --json payload and the exit code
are all unchanged — the JSON output is byte-identical with or without the flag
(pinned by test_lang.py). The coverage is deliberately narrow, and stated here
without spin:
- Exactly 50 rules carry an official German message, surfaced by
--lang de. These are precisely theremediation_catalog.jsonentries taggedde_source == "kosit"— the rules whose vendored KoSIT XRechnung<sch:assert>text is itself German (theBR-DE-*/BR-DE-CVD-*/BR-TMP-*/BR-DEXGerman-authored family).test_lang.pypins that count and re-extracts each German string from the vendored.schon disk to prove it is genuinely present, not fabricated. The number here is the count ofmessage_defields in the catalog; a build gate fails if the prose and the catalog ever disagree, so it cannot silently drift. - That German text is lifted VERBATIM from the vendored KoSIT XRechnung
Schematron (
corpus/xrechnung-schematron/schematron/{ubl,cii}/XRechnung-*-validation.sch), byte-for-byte, eachmessage_detagged with the{artifact, assert_id}it came from. We do not machine-translate and do not hand-translate any error text: amessage_deis only ever the official KoSIT assert as KoSIT wrote it. - Every other rule is English-only by design. The EN 16931 core
(
BR-*,BR-CO-*,BR-CL-*) and the other non-German-sourced rules (e.g. the English-authored PEPPOL asserts) have no official German assert text to quote, so under--lang dethey fall back to their English message unchanged. This is silence-with-reason, not a coverage gap: showing the authoritative English assert is more honest than inventing a German one. There is no machine translation anywhere in this surface.
This official-German message is a CLI / report human-message feature: it is
not injected into --json, and this task added no field to the generated
www/ rule pages. (Those bilingual rule pages already render the catalog's
German title/fix verbatim from the same source, each honestly labelled by
its de_source as either the official KoSIT assert or a clearly-marked
translation — pre-existing behaviour, not part of the --lang de message
surface.)
Syntax-binding findings (syntax_bindings)
Alongside the EN 16931 / XRechnung BR-* business rules, the two vendored CEN
preprocessed Schematron artifacts also carry syntax-binding asserts
(UBL-CR-*/UBL-DT-*/UBL-SR-* for UBL, CII-DT-*/CII-SR-* for CII) — pure
syntax-layer restrictions such as "this element MUST NOT appear", "at most one of
X", or a decimal-place cap, not semantic business rules. A restricted,
data-driven evaluator (einvoice/syntax_binding_eval.py — a closed XPath subset,
not a general processor) mirrors 735 of 756 UBL + 506 of 583 CII of them, each
differential-proven equivalent to the official CEN Schematron at 0 divergences
over the corpus; the remaining 98 (21 UBL + 77 CII) are left machine-listed as
known-open in COVERAGE.md — never guessed, never silently
dropped. These counts are kept strictly separate from the 297 business rules
and are recomputed live by test_syntax_binding.py.
einvoice validate --json surfaces the UBL findings under a distinct
syntax_bindings array (each with id, category "syntax-binding",
severity, flag, message, element), plus syntax_binding_fatal_count and
syntax_binding_warning_count. All implemented ids carry the official
flag=warning, and this category is advisory only: a syntax-binding finding
never changes valid and never changes the exit code — the 0/1
verdict above stays driven solely by fatal BR-* violations. The human summary
adds one line, Syntax-binding warnings: N. The CLI validates UBL Invoice
documents (a CII document hits the S-ROOT structural rule under either profile),
so it emits the UBL ids; the CII binding's syntax-binding layer is exercised
through the report/library path. Full field docs:
REPORT-SCHEMA.md.
Reproduce this yourself
The whole "machine-proven-coverage" claim rebuilds from the vendored official artifacts with one committed command:
PYTHONPATH=$HOME/.local/lib/python3.10/site-packages python3 prove.py
prove.py runs, end to end and exiting non-zero on any failure:
-
differential.pyover all six legs — for every one of our implemented rule and syntax-binding ids it asks the same yes/no question ("does rule R fire on this document?") of the OFFICIAL vendored CEN / KoSIT Schematron (via Saxon) and of our engine, across the whole corpus, and counts divergences (a false positive or a miss).prove.pyasserts and echoes that this count is 0. -
conformance.py— the targeted invalid/valid fragment corpus — and asserts 0 hard fails (no false positives; every covered invalid vector detected with the correct rule id). -
the coverage headline, recomputed live this run and printed in the shape:
N business rules / 0 divergences across all differential legs / U of Ut UBL + C of Ct CII syntax-binding asserts differential-proven per binding
prove.py reads no headline number from a string literal. What each field means
and where it comes from:
- business rules —
coverage_matrix.json['rule_count'], the EN 16931 + XRechnung/PeppolBR-*rules our engine implements. Independently re-checked bytest_coverage_matrix.py(the JSON is a live re-render of what the engine fires, andCOVERAGE.mdis a byte-identical render of the JSON). - divergences — the step-1 total; 0 means our verdict never departs from
the official Schematron over the corpus. This is the differential harness's own
OVERALL DIVERGENCES ACROSS LEGSline. - U of Ut UBL / C of Ct CII — the per-binding syntax-binding asserts our
restricted evaluator proves equivalent (
differential.pyLEG 5sb/ LEG 6sbcii). The totals come fromeinvoice.syntax_binding.accounting()and the proven counts fromeinvoice.syntax_binding_eval.implemented_ids()/cii_implemented_ids()— the same recomputationtest_syntax_binding.pyasserts.
Because it re-runs the full differential (all legs) plus the conformance corpus,
prove.py takes a few minutes. It always pays that full cost: prove.py sets
DIFF_NO_CACHE=1 for every child it spawns, bypassing the local proof cache
that speeds up ordinary differential.py gate runs, so a reproduce run is
always a fully live Saxon re-proof — even on a warm development machine. test_prove.py runs it and
asserts it exits 0, prints 0 divergences, and that the UBL / CII / rule numbers
it printed equal a fresh independent recompute — so the entrypoint is verified to
report live truth, never a frozen string.
Independently verify our conformance claim
prove.py above rebuilds the claim from scratch (a few minutes, needs Saxon).
If you instead want a fast, single-command check that the published claim has
not drifted from the committed source, run:
python3 verify_attestation.py
This reads attestation.json — a byte-reproducible record
that pins the exact numbers we publish — and confirms they still match the live
source tree. It exits 0 only if nothing has moved. attestation.json pins:
- 297 business rules asserted by the engine (the frozen
rules.count); - the frozen syntax-binding coverage headline: 741 of 756 UBL + 554 of 583 CII syntax-binding asserts differential-proven per binding;
- the in-scope KoSIT test-suite pass rates: 39 of 39 UBL and 39 of 39 CII official documents accepted;
- the SHA-256 of each of the 3 vendored official corpora (CEN EN 16931 1.3.16, XRechnung Schematron 2.5.0, XRechnung test-suite).
verify_attestation.py runs two independent checks and exits non-zero on any
drift: (1) it regenerates the attestation fresh from the four live source
artifacts (export/rules.json, export/coverage.json,
testsuite_conformance.json, sbom/bom.json) and requires it byte-for-byte
equal to the committed attestation.json — so changing any recorded number (a
rule count, a coverage figure, a pass rate, or a recorded corpus hash) fails the
byte compare; (2) it re-walks each vendored corpus tree and requires its digest
to equal the pinned SHA-256 — so editing a corpus byte without regenerating the
attestation is caught too. A skeptical ERP or procurement evaluator can run this
against the source and confirm the conformance claim for themselves.
test_attestation.py asserts this command exits 0, that
every number stated here equals the value in attestation.json, and that the
tamper paths fail closed.
4. CI conformance gate
The distribution artifact an ERP/billing vendor actually wants: a build gate
that makes "a non-conformant invoice reached the repo" a red build, with
the violated rule ID named in the job log. Everything lives in
ci/:
ci/validate-invoices.sh— the gate. POSIX sh, zero deps beyond python3. Exit0= all conformant; exit1= at least one invoice failed (rule IDs printed); exit2= the gate itself is misconfigured — including finding no invoices at all (an empty gate is a broken gate, opt out withEINVOICE_ALLOW_EMPTY=1).ci/github-actions.yml— copy to.github/workflows/invoice-conformance.yml.ci/gitlab-ci.yml— merge into your.gitlab-ci.yml.
Zero-install alternative (GitHub only): the committed composite Action.
Instead of copying a workflow and pip-installing a vendored copy, pin the
Action that ships in this repo at action/ — the
zero-dependency validator travels inside the pinned ref, so there is nothing
to install, and it additionally merges per-file SARIF for
github/codeql-action/upload-sarif → inline PR annotations:
- uses: verifyhash/verifyhash/einvoice/action@<ref> # pin a full commit SHA you trust
with:
path: invoices/
fail-on: fatal
It is a thin wrapper around the same python3 -m einvoice.report entrypoint
(no second engine, no new rules) and is gated by test_action.py. Full inputs
(path, format, fail-on, sarif-file, profile), the fail-on →
exit-code mapping, and the SARIF-upload step live in
action/README.md. It is referenced by in-repo path as
shown — it is not listed on the GitHub Marketplace.
The 60-second version (any CI system):
python3 -m pip install ./third_party/einvoice # vendored copy; zero deps
sh third_party/einvoice/ci/validate-invoices.sh invoices/
and a failure looks like:
FAIL: invoices/2026-04-017.xml
BR-DE-15: The element 'Buyer reference' (BT-10) must be transmitted.
offending element: cbc:BuyerReference
conformance gate: 1/12 invoice(s) NON-CONFORMANT (profile=xrechnung) — FAIL
Same honest scope as §2: the gate proves your invoices pass the
implemented rule set (219 core + 55 German-layer rules — the
authoritative list is COVERAGE.md), not the full standard. The gate's behaviour
(fails naming the rule ID, passes conformant sets, refuses empty input) is
itself under test in test_packaging.py.
Machine-readable report (python3 -m einvoice.report)
When a CI step needs the outcome as structured data (to archive, diff, or
feed a dashboard) rather than a log line, einvoice.report emits a single
versioned JSON document to stdout and mirrors the same exit-code contract
(0 clean, 1 fatal violation, 3 not-well-formed XML):
python3 -m einvoice.report --profile xrechnung invoices/2026-04-017.xml
# {"report_version":1,"schema":"einvoice-conformance-report/v1",...,
# "valid":false,"fatal_count":1,"violations":[{"rule":"BR-DE-15",...}]}
Every violation record carries exactly rule, severity, message, field;
add --pretty for indented output. It re-uses einvoice.validate verbatim
(no rule logic of its own, zero deps). The full field-by-field contract and
its report_version/schema versioning semantics are documented in
REPORT-SCHEMA.md (and mirrored in the REPORT_SCHEMA
constant of einvoice/report.py).
Batch / folder validation
Point the same command at a directory (or pass --recurse) to validate a
whole folder of invoices in one run. Every *.xml / *.pdf file under the
directory is walked recursively (dotfiles and dot-directories such as .git
are skipped), the file list is sorted for deterministic output, and each file
is validated through the exact same build_report — this is a wrapper, not
a second engine.
python3 -m einvoice.report --profile xrechnung invoices/
# {"report_version":1,"schema":"einvoice-conformance-batch/v1","root":"invoices/",
# "file_count":42,"fatal_count":3,"warning_count":11,"failed_file_count":2,
# "files":[{...single-file report...}, ...]}
The aggregate document uses its own independently-versioned schema id
(einvoice-conformance-batch/v1) and wraps the per-file reports unchanged —
each entry in files is byte-for-byte identical to validating that file on its
own. It carries the summed fatal_count / warning_count / violation_count
plus failed_file_count (files that errored or hold a fatal).
Aggregate exit code (documented precedence — fatal outranks parse):
0— every file passed (eachfatal_count == 0, no error), or the directory held no invoice files (reported honestly asfile_count: 0with a"no invoice files found"note — never a fake pass, never a traceback);1— at least one file has a fatal violation;3— at least one file errored (not-well-formed XML / unsupported PDF container) and no file had a fatal violation.
Batch mode supports --format json (default, --pretty for indented),
--format junit (an aggregate <testsuites> with one <testsuite> per file)
and --format text (a concise one-line-per-file summary). --format sarif/html/badge validate a single file and are rejected on a directory with
a clear error. Single-file invocation is completely unchanged.
Use as a pre-commit hook
The CI gate above catches a bad invoice after it is pushed. To catch it one step
earlier — at the commit itself — this repository ships a provider-side hook
manifest at the repo ROOT
(.pre-commit-hooks.yaml) that
pre-commit resolves remotely. Any repo can adopt
the check with a repos: reference; nothing is copied or vendored in.
Add this to your repo's .pre-commit-config.yaml:
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/verifyhash/verifyhash
rev: v0.1.1 # pin to a tag or commit sha
hooks:
- id: einvoice
then run pre-commit install once. On every commit, pre-commit clones this
repo at rev, reads the root manifest, and runs the einvoice hook over the
*.xml you staged. A fatal EN 16931 / XRechnung violation blocks the commit and
prints the offending rule id(s) — the same outcome CI would produce, because the
hook drives the same python3 -m einvoice.report entrypoint (no second
validator, no new format). It stays inert on any commit that stages no XML.
Prerequisite — the one thing you must install. The manifest deliberately
declares language: script, not language: python. The validator is the
einvoice package under this repo's einvoice/ subdirectory (its
pyproject.toml sits at einvoice/pyproject.toml, not the repo root), so
language: python would make pre-commit pip-install the repo ROOT — the
Node/Hardhat project, which is not the package — and fail. language: script
runs the committed wrapper (einvoice/ci/pre-commit-einvoice.sh) directly and
installs nothing, which means the einvoice validator must already be
importable in the environment pre-commit runs in. Install it once:
python3 -m pip install verifyhash-einvoice
# (pending first publish — until then, install from a checkout/vendored copy:
# python3 -m pip install /path/to/einvoice)
(or export EINVOICE_CMD / PYTHONPATH to point the wrapper at a source
checkout). If the validator is not importable the hook exits 2 with an install
hint rather than passing silently — a broken hook fails loud, never quiet. Honest
limit: because the hook reuses the validator, its scope is the validator's scope
(§2) — a passing commit means "no implemented rule fired", not full legal
EN 16931 conformance.
5. Intended revenue model
If this continues past the first slice, the model is boring on purpose: a small, flat, self-serve commercial license for vendors (ERP, billing, e-invoicing platforms) who embed the validator in their product. Two prices, one-time, no contract and no sales call:
- $29 — single developer: email support, rule-corpus update notices, and a ready-made vendor key.
- $290 — whole vendor team: the same, for an entire company, with priority on support and update notices.
The license sells convenience, not permission: Apache-2.0 already lets anyone embed the engine in a closed-source product at no cost, so this is never a usage fee, never a compliance requirement, and never metered by request volume.
Explicitly ruled out, permanently: no token, no coin, no on-chain payment instrument of any kind. Nothing about invoice validation needs one, and this project will never fund itself by selling one.
No customer today, and nothing has been sold. This section exists so the incentive structure is on the record before the first conversation with a vendor, not after.
6. KILL / CONTINUE metric
A first slice earns further investment or it doesn't. The signal, timeboxed:
CONTINUE if, within 90 days of this README, at least one of:
- One ERP/billing/e-invoicing vendor agrees in writing to pilot or embed the validator (even unpaid) — evidence that "embeddable, zero-dependency, auditable" is a real wedge against the incumbent Java/Schematron stacks; or
- The validator reaches 60+ implemented rules including the full
BR-DE-*set, passing the full KoSIT XRechnung test suite (not just the curated 32-vector corpus) with zero false positives — evidence the rule engine scales to real coverage without an architecture rewrite.
KILL if neither happens: write up what was learned, archive the repo, and stop. The corpus and harness remain useful artifacts either way.
Current status against this metric: 219 core rules + the 55-rule XRechnung
CIUS/CVD/extension layer shipped (each batch differential-proven at 100% against
its official Schematron, UBL and CII legs; fireable-missing = 0 in both CEN
universes, with the 4 official test="true()" tautologies BR-CO-05–08
documented as the only never-provable ids), 0 vendors contacted. Metric #2's
rule-count/BR-DE half is comfortably met; metric #1 (a vendor) is now the
whole game.
Licensing
Everything in einvoice/ is open source under
Apache-2.0 — free for everyone, including commercial use and
integration into closed-source products, subject to the usual Apache-2.0
conditions: keep the license text and the attribution in
NOTICE with redistributions, and mark changed files.
Because Apache-2.0 already permits closed-source embedding for free, the optional commercial license does not sell permission or "compliance" — it adds support, prioritised rule-corpus update notices, and vendor-key convenience at a flat, self-serve price:
- $29 — single developer.
- $290 — whole vendor team (any number of developers).
Both are one-time, with no contract to negotiate and no sales call. Buy or
ask via hello@verifyhash.com (the private commercial contact); the
self-serve page is the licensing page
(www/licensing/, published at
https://verifyhash.com/einvoice/licensing/). The checkout link is bound at
deploy from a single CHECKOUT_URL placeholder in gen_site.py; until it is
set the page shows an honest "checkout opening shortly — email
hello@verifyhash.com" line rather than a dead link. You never need the
commercial license to use, embed or redistribute the engine.
Sources / licenses
- EN 16931 corpus & Schematron:
github.com/ConnectingEurope/eInvoicing-EN16931(EUPL-1.2), vendored undercorpus/cen-en16931/. - XRechnung test suite:
github.com/itplr-kosit/xrechnung-testsuite(Apache-2.0), vendored undercorpus/xrechnung-testsuite/. - XRechnung Schematron v2.5.0 (XRechnung 3.0.2):
github.com/itplr-kosit/xrechnung-schematron(Apache-2.0), vendored undercorpus/xrechnung-schematron/(see itsVENDORED.md). - Rule text quoted verbatim from the vendored
EN16931-model.sch/EN16931-syntax.sch/XRechnung-UBL-validation.sch.
Metadata
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