VeriTool
Runtime trace invariant verification for multi-agent LLM systems. Z3 + Lean 4.
v = Verifier()
v.register_tool("deploy", action_type="DEPLOY", resource_fn=lambda a: a.get("env"))
v.register_tool("build", action_type="BUILD")
v.register_tool("test", action_type="TEST")
v.add_invariant(OrderingInvariant("DEPLOY", ["BUILD", "TEST"]))
deploy = v.wrap(my_deploy_fn)
build = v.wrap(my_build_fn)
test = v.wrap(my_test_fn)
Every tool call is checked against accumulated action traces before execution. Violations are blocked with counterexamples.
Architecture
Tool Call → Verifier.wrap() → Z3 encodes all 4 invariants as SMT constraints → UNSAT (permit) / SAT (block + counterexample)
↑
Lean proves:
Z3 encoding ⊧ invariant semantics
Four invariant types, all encoded as Z3 satisfiability queries:
| Invariant | Checks |
|---|---|
OrderingInvariant("DEPLOY", ["BUILD", "TEST"]) |
Before any DEPLOY, BUILD and TEST must have completed |
ExclusiveAccessInvariant("WRITE") |
No two agents concurrently WRITE to the same resource |
ApprovalInvariant("DEPLOY", "APPROVE") |
DEPLOY requires prior APPROVE by a different agent |
MonotonicInvariant("SPEND", resource_key="value") |
Values can only increase (per-agent, per-resource) |
Each check creates a z3.Solver, encodes the violation condition as a SAT query, and returns a counterexample model on violation. This uniform SMT pipeline enables formal soundness proofs in Lean.
Why Z3 + Lean?
Existing policy engines (OPA/Rego, AWS Cedar) check single actions against static rules. They cannot enforce invariants that span multiple agents across sequences of actions — e.g., "no deploy without prior build and test."
Z3 encodes the accumulated action trace and invariants as SMT constraints. Lean proves the encoding is sound — each invariant is defined as a Lean Prop with nil/snoc structural induction theorems showing that a Z3 permit preserves the invariant.
Related work: Lean4Agent (UIUC, June 2026) uses Lean 4 for design-time workflow verification. VeriTool targets runtime interception with Z3 for fast SMT checking and Lean for proof of encoding correctness.
Usage
from verifier.verifier import Verifier
from bridge.invariant import OrderingInvariant, ExclusiveAccessInvariant
v = Verifier(agent_name="ci-bot")
v.register_tool("deploy", action_type="DEPLOY", resource_fn=lambda a: a.get("env"))
v.register_tool("build", action_type="BUILD")
v.register_tool("test", action_type="TEST")
v.add_invariant(OrderingInvariant("DEPLOY", ["BUILD", "TEST"]))
v.add_invariant(ExclusiveAccessInvariant("DEPLOY"))
deploy = v.wrap(deploy_to_production)
build = v.wrap(run_build)
test = v.wrap(run_tests)
assert build() == ...
assert test() == ...
assert deploy(env="prod") == ... # only permitted if BUILD + TEST completed
v.reset() # clear trace for a new session
Project Structure
bridge/ # Action trace model + invariant types + Z3 encoding
verifier/ # Generic Verifier with wrap()
Lean/Trace.lean # Soundness proofs for invariant encoding (3 invariants proved)
policy_store/ # Versioned policy store + audit trail
tests/ # pytest suite
benchmark/ # Scalability, throughput, 3-way OPA comparison
Tests
make test # 14 tests, all pass
make verify # Lean theorem compilation check
Benchmark Results
Full results in BENCHMARK_RESULTS.md.
Detection Rate
| System | Correct | Rate |
|---|---|---|
| OPA (stateless) | 14/24 | 58% |
| OPA+history | 24/24 | 100% |
| VeriTool | 24/24 | 100% |
Latency & Throughput
| System | μs/action | Actions/sec |
|---|---|---|
| VeriTool | 175 | 5,703 |
| OPA stateless | 10,262 | 97 |
| OPA+history | 11,188 | 89 |
VeriTool is ~60x faster than OPA across both stateless and history modes.
Scalability
All invariants remain sub-millisecond up to 1000-trace entries. Per-check latency grows near-constantly (2-3x from size 1 to 1000).
Formal Soundness
Three of four invariant types are proved correct in Lean via structural induction:
ordering_invariant— nil/snoc theoremsexclusive_access_invariant— nil/snoc theoremsapproval_invariant— nil/snoc theorems
Each theorem's hcase (safety condition) corresponds exactly to the Z3 encoder's violation check.
Reproduce
make all # Lean verify → tests → benchmark → 3-way OPA comparison
Requires OPA installed:
curl -sL -o /usr/local/bin/opa https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa/releases/download/v1.2.0/opa_linux_amd64_static
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/opa
Docker
docker build -t veritool .
docker run --rm veritool make all
The Dockerfile pins Python 3.13, Lean 4.15.0, OPA 1.2.0.
License
Apache 2.0
Metadata
Release files for veritool 1.2.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| veritool-1.2.0.tar.gz | 19.7 kB | With provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| veritool-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 40.5 kB
Release files / veritool-1.2.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | veritool-1.2.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 19.7 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
6bb7f2302a8126a04b11969ce9a161e0560bdb600e3990f5b2e1b1d438684990
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
035191d619aefcf678fe005df40bdeed958b5ce3501c0bdfdff42423752165ec
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.1.0 CPython/3.13.12
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jul 6, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / veritool-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | veritool-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 20.8 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
84a1df4b4bc1fc1aeee27d37724295faf939c4ceb6225d379df58778859d2607
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
61143ac321edb4b465fe4c8f4aeeca8063bc217aea3694cabb12bf43636c4a71
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.1.0 CPython/3.13.12
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jul 6, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for veritool 1.2.0
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
All 2 files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for veritool-1.2.0.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jul 6, 2026.
Transparency logA note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.