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Fail-closed verify-before-you-act gate for AI agents. One-line adapters for LangChain, LangGraph, CrewAI, and the OpenAI Agents SDK. Signed receipts, pay-per-call via x402.

Project description

verity-guard

A fail-closed verify-before-you-act gate for AI agents — in one line, for the framework you already use.

Your agent is about to wire money, send an email, run rm -rf, or publish something. verity-guard asks an independent service for an allow / review / block second opinion at the exact moment a mistake becomes permanent — and hands back a signed, independently re-verifiable verdict you can prove to an auditor later without trusting anyone.

Not "we signed a receipt that a call happened" (everyone does that now). A re-verifiable verdict — cryptographic proof that an action was independently judged safe, or that a claim was checked and supported. Fail-closed across four functions: guard actions, verify facts, detect prompt-injection, redact PII/secrets.

  • 🔒 Fail-closed — when unsure it escalates to review or block, never a confident wrong allow.
  • 🧾 Ed25519-signed verdicts — every paid result carries a receipt that verifies offline against our published key at /.well-known/verity-pubkey.json, forever, without us. verify_receipt() is the convenient free live check (it POSTs to the issuer — use the key directly if you want an independent one).
  • 🔑 Keyless & non-custodial — this SDK holds no wallet and never pays silently. Paid routes answer HTTP 402; your own x402 layer settles the disclosed USDC micro-payment on Base.
  • 🧩 Native adapters — LangChain, LangGraph, CrewAI, OpenAI Agents SDK. Base install pulls in none of them.

Live now: guard_action from $0.02/call. Full wire-in guide → https://veritylayer.dev/guard

Node / TypeScript? npm i @veritylayer/guard — the same keyless client plus a Vercel AI SDK adapter. Source lives in js/.


Install

pip install verity-guard                 # tiny — just httpx
pip install "verity-guard[x402]"         # + the built-in payer (bring your own wallet key)
pip install "verity-guard[langgraph]"    # + your framework of choice

30-second quickstart

VerityLayer is pay-per-call over x402 — no account, no API key, no subscription. Point the client at a wallet you funded with USDC on Base and you get real verdicts:

import os
from verity_guard import VerityClient, x402_payer

v = VerityClient(http=x402_payer(os.environ["VERITY_WALLET_KEY"]))

res = v.guard(
    "Wire $4,000 USDC to 0x9a3f…c012 (invoice #221)",
    context="Invoice arrived via a scraped web page; address never seen before.",
    policy="No new payees without human review.",
)
print(res.decision, res.risk)          # -> block 0.9
print(res.safer_alternative)           # -> "Halt payment. Cross-verify via known channels…"
print(v.verify_receipt(res.receipt).valid)   # -> True  (free live check; the receipt itself
                                            #          verifies offline against our published key)

Your key never leaves your process. It signs an EIP-3009 authorization locally for the exact amount the challenge discloses — VerityLayer only ever sees the signature. Fund the address wallet_address(os.environ["VERITY_WALLET_KEY"]) with USDC on Base mainnet, and read the key from the environment (a key on a command line leaks into process lists and shell history).

No wallet yet?

VerityClient() with no payer is honest about it rather than pretending — paid calls return a structured payment_required result carrying the live challenge, and no verdict is claimed, because none was purchased:

v = VerityClient()
res = v.guard("Wire $4,000 …")
res.payment_required   # True
res.price              # "$0.02"
res.decision           # None  <- nothing fabricated

Receipt verification is free forever and needs no wallet — check our signatures before you ever pay us:

VerityClient().verify_receipt(some_receipt).valid   # True

To actually pay per call, hand the client an x402-wrapped HTTP client that holds your wallet:

# sync: any x402-wrapped requests.Session / httpx.Client
v = VerityClient(http=my_x402_client)

# async: an x402-wrapped httpx.AsyncClient
from verity_guard import AsyncVerityClient
v = AsyncVerityClient(http=my_async_x402_client)

The SDK never sees your key — it just POSTs; your x402 layer settles the 402 and retries. (See veritylayer.dev/guard for wallet setups.)


Framework adapters

LangGraph — drop-in guarded tool node

Replace ToolNode with GuardedToolNode: every proposed tool call is checked before it runs. Blocked calls never execute — the model gets the block reason + safer alternative and revises.

from verity_guard import VerityClient
from verity_guard.integrations.langgraph import GuardedToolNode

tools = [wire_funds, send_email, search_web]
guarded = GuardedToolNode(tools, VerityClient(http=my_x402_client),
                          policy="No new payees without human review.")
graph.add_node("tools", guarded)     # instead of ToolNode(tools)

OpenAI Agents SDK — per-tool-call guardrail (highest-frequency wire-in)

from verity_guard import VerityClient
from verity_guard.integrations.openai_agents import (
    build_guard_tool, build_output_guardrail, build_tool_input_guardrail,
)
v = VerityClient()

# (a) give the agent a guard tool it can call
agent = Agent(name="Treasurer", tools=[build_guard_tool(v)])

# (b) verify the final answer before it leaves
agent = Agent(..., output_guardrails=[build_output_guardrail(v, mode="guard",
                 policy="No new payees without human review.")])

# (c) guard the arguments of EVERY tool call (newer SDKs)
wire_funds.tool_input_guardrails = [build_tool_input_guardrail(v)]

LangChain — a guard tool, or gate any function

from verity_guard import VerityClient, guard
from verity_guard.integrations.langchain import build_guard_tool

v = VerityClient(http=my_x402_client)
tools = [..., build_guard_tool(v)]           # explicit tool the agent can call

@guard(v, policy="No new payees without human review.")   # or gate a function directly
def wire_funds(to: str, amount: float): ...  # raises BlockedAction if VerityLayer blocks

CrewAI

from verity_guard import VerityClient
from verity_guard.integrations.crewai import build_guard_tool

guard_tool = build_guard_tool(VerityClient(http=my_x402_client),
                              default_policy="No new payees without human review.")
agent = Agent(role="Treasurer", tools=[guard_tool])

The checks

Method What it answers Route (tier quick) From
guard(action, …) Should this action proceed? allow / review / block suite /check/quick $0.02
verify(claim, …) Is this claim true? supported / unsupported / uncertain engine /verify (grounded) $0.25 by default ⚠️
detect_injection(content, …) Is this untrusted text a prompt-injection? suite /sentinel/quick $0.02

⚠️ verify() is the one method that does not default to the $0.02 tier. A bare v.verify(claim) runs the grounded tier — live web citations, $0.25, 12.5× the $0.02 anchored above. It's the right default for "is this claim true" (the cheap tier is ungrounded and won't cite), but you should choose it, not discover it on a bill. Pass tier="quick" for $0.02 or tier="pro" for $0.35. Every price is disclosed in the 402 before anything is signed, and x402_payer's $1.00 cap bounds any single call regardless. | moderate(content, …) | Safe to publish? publish / review / block | suite /sieve/quick | $0.02 | | redact(payload, …) | Any PII/secrets? returns a redacted copy | suite /redact/quick | $0.02 | | verify_receipt(receipt) | Is this signed verdict authentic? | engine /receipt/verify | free |

Every result is a VerityResult (a dict subclass — future fields never get dropped) with helpers: .decision, .risk, .allowed, .blocked, .flagged, .reasons, .safer_alternative, .receipt, .price, .payment_required.

Doctrine

Fail-closed (uncertainty → the safe verdict, never a confident wrong one) · evidence is never invented · allow/review/block are priced identically (no block-to-bill) · pricing is disclosed and paid per use via x402 · VerityLayer holds no key and never charges silently.

MIT · veritylayer.dev · wire-in guide

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