vex-ioc 1.6.1

VirusTotal IOC Enrichment Tool for SOC/DFIR workflows

vex

IOC enrichment hub for SOC triage and DFIR — VirusTotal + AbuseIPDB / Shodan / WHOIS / MISP / OpenCTI, straight from your terminal.

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vex takes an indicator (a hash, IP, domain, or URL) and turns it into a verdict with context. It started as a VirusTotal CLI and grew into an enrichment hub: one primary source (VirusTotal) plus optional secondary sources that add reputation and your own threat-intel. It runs standalone, and it slots into a pipeline (barb → vex → sift) over stdin/stdout.

[!NOTE] Current release: vex 1.5.0 (on PyPI). Full manual: docs/.

Install

pip install vex-ioc          # core
pip install vex-ioc[ai]      # + Anthropic / OpenAI explanations (Ollama needs no extra)

Quickstart

vex config --set-api-key YOUR_VT_KEY     # or set VT_API_KEY
vex triage 8.8.8.8
vex triage evil.com --explain            # add an AI narrative
vex investigate <sha256> -o rich         # deep dive

IOC: 8.8.8.8 (ipv4)
Verdict: CLEAN
Detections: 0 malicious / 0 suspicious / 94 engines
Reputation: 0

What you get

• Two modes — triage (fast verdict, minimal API calls) and investigate (deep DFIR: PE info, sandbox behavior, passive DNS, relationships, MITRE ATT&CK, timeline).
• Multi-source enrichment — VirusTotal primary; AbuseIPDB, Shodan, WHOIS, MISP, and OpenCTI as secondary enrichers (key-gated, fail-open).
• Batch correlation — --correlate clusters a batch of IOCs by shared infrastructure (ASN, malware family, contacted IPs/domains).
• AI explanations — opt-in --explain narratives (Claude / OpenAI / local Ollama / deterministic template), with prompt-injection defense on the untrusted data fed to the model.
• Pipeline-ready output — JSON, NDJSON (streaming), CSV, STIX 2.1, ATT&CK Navigator, self-contained HTML; verdict-mapped exit codes.
• Quota-aware batches — IOC dedup, an up-front ETA, and a --max-quota budget guard.
• Local knowledge base — vex tag / note / watchlist annotate IOCs in ~/.vex/.

Verdicts

Verdict	Meaning
🟢 CLEAN	No engine flagged it.
🟡 UNKNOWN	Not enough data, or the IOC was not found.
🟠 SUSPICIOUS	Low-confidence detections.
🔴 MALICIOUS	Meets the malicious-detection threshold.

Enrichment sources

VirusTotal is the primary source; it produces the verdict. The others are secondary enrichers that augment an investigate result.

Source	IOC types	Enable via
VirusTotal	all	VT_API_KEY / --api-key / vex config
AbuseIPDB	IP	VEX_ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY
Shodan	IP	VEX_SHODAN_API_KEY
WHOIS	domain	core (no key)
MISP	all	MISP_URL + MISP_API_KEY
OpenCTI	all	OPENCTI_URL + OPENCTI_TOKEN

[!IMPORTANT] Secondary enrichers run on investigate only, not triage (triage stays fast). Each is no-op without its key, fail-open (a failure or timeout never blocks the run), and they run concurrently. Run vex doctor --probe to see which are configured and reachable.

Correlation

vex triage -f iocs.txt --correlate            # deterministic cluster table
vex triage -f iocs.txt --correlate --explain  # + per-cluster AI campaign narrative

--correlate groups a batch by shared ASN, malware family, contacted IPs, and contacted domains — surfacing likely campaigns. It is deterministic by default; the AI narrative is added only when --explain is also set.

AI explanations

--explain adds a narrative and next steps; --explain-model overrides the model. Providers: Anthropic, OpenAI, local Ollama, and a deterministic template fallback when none is configured.

export VEX_AI_PROVIDER=ollama        # local, no cloud key
vex investigate evil.com --explain

[!WARNING] Enrichment data (sandbox strings, file names, family labels) is attacker-influenceable. Before it reaches an LLM, vex scans it for prompt-injection patterns and redacts critical attempts, and the system prompt instructs the model to treat the data as untrusted. This is defense-in-depth, not a guarantee.

Output formats

-o rich (default TTY) · -o console · -o json · -o ndjson (one result per line, streamed) · --csv · --stix · --navigator (ATT&CK layer, investigate) · --html <path> (self-contained report). All formats show real IOCs by default; --defang defangs them (e.g. evil[.]com); HTML reports always defang.

sift triage alerts.json -o json | vex triage --from-sift -o ndjson

Pipeline

flowchart LR
    barb -->|URLs / IOCs| vex
    vex -->|enriched IOCs| sift
    sift -.->|extracted IOCs| vex

vex is the enrichment hub. --from-barb reads barb JSON; --from-sift reads a sift TriageReport, extracts its IOCs, and enriches them — closing the sift ↔ vex loop. NDJSON output and verdict exit codes make it scriptable downstream.

Scale

For large batches, such as IOCs extracted from a SIEM export:

• Dedup — duplicate IOCs are collapsed before any query, which saves quota; --no-dedup disables it.
• ETA + counters — an up-front estimate and a processed (N from API, M cached) summary on stderr.
• --max-quota N — caps fresh API lookups; cached IOCs are still served, the rest are skipped with a notice. Re-run to continue — the SQLite cache resumes where you left off.

Configuration

Priority: --api-key flag → environment variable → ~/.vex/config.yaml → defaults.

vex config --show        # active config, masked secrets
vex doctor               # what's configured (no network)
vex doctor --probe       # + live connectivity, surfaces the actual error

Variable	Purpose
VT_API_KEY	VirusTotal
VEX_AI_API_KEY / VEX_AI_PROVIDER / VEX_AI_MODEL	AI provider
VEX_ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY	AbuseIPDB enricher
VEX_SHODAN_API_KEY	Shodan enricher
MISP_URL / MISP_API_KEY	MISP lookup
OPENCTI_URL / OPENCTI_TOKEN	OpenCTI lookup

enrichment.stix_tlp_version (1.0 default, 2.0) selects which STIX TLP marking ids the export emits.

Security

[!WARNING]

• Secondary enrichers (AbuseIPDB / Shodan / WHOIS / MISP / OpenCTI) fail-open — never block a run — and are no-op without a key.
• The VT API key is never hard-coded — env var, config, or --api-key.
• Premium calls are gated behind config.is_premium; the free tier is never broken.
• Restricted TI: TLP/markings are carried through; marked intel is never emitted unmarked.
• Machine output stays clean — all notices go to stderr, not stdout.

Exit codes

Computed from the highest-severity verdict in the run:

Code	Meaning
0	CLEAN / UNKNOWN
1	SUSPICIOUS — or a runtime error / bad input
2	MALICIOUS

Known limitations

• MISP (v2.5.38) and OpenCTI (demo v7.26) lookups are live-verified end-to-end, and both have mock tests. They query real instances and stay version-sensitive: if a server's schema differs, the enricher fails open (no enrichment, no crash). Use vex doctor --probe to confirm connectivity. pycti is a possible future fallback if OpenCTI's GraphQL schema drifts.
• AI: Anthropic and Ollama are live-verified end-to-end; OpenAI shares the same code path (mock-tested). Without a provider, --explain falls back to a deterministic template.
• Secondary enrichers run on investigate, not triage. A triage --explain gets no AbuseIPDB / Shodan / MISP / OpenCTI context by design.
• STIX TLP:CLEAR maps to the TLP 1.0 WHITE marking id by default — set enrichment.stix_tlp_version: "2.0" to switch to TLP 2.0 ids.
• The VirusTotal free tier allows roughly 4 requests/min, so large batches are quota-bound — see Scale.

Docs

Full manual: docs/ — getting started, every command/flag, the enrichment model, output formats, the barb/sift pipeline contracts, and configuration. Built-in guide: vex manual (and vex manual ai / pipeline / config). Changelog: CHANGELOG.md.

Author

Christian Huhn — building security tooling for SOC/DFIR workflows.

• GitHub: @duathron
• LinkedIn: Christian Huhn

License

MIT