warehouse-context-mcp
An MCP server that gives AI agents trustworthy, governed context about a data warehouse: what each table means, where it comes from, how fresh it is, and a way to query it that cannot write, cannot run away, and cannot leak personal data.
Coding and analytics agents are good at SQL and bad at knowing which table to trust. Schema alone does not tell them that fct_voyage_economics is the governed source for TCE, that stg_voyages is staging, that contact_email is personal data, or that a table stopped updating two days ago. This server puts that context one tool call away, and puts guardrails around everything else.
Tools
| Tool | What the agent gets |
|---|---|
list_tables |
Every table with its documented purpose and owner |
describe_table |
Columns, types, descriptions, PII flags, grain, row count, undocumented columns |
table_lineage |
Upstream sources and downstream consumers, cycle-safe, depth-limited |
table_freshness |
Last update, age, and whether it meets the documented expectation |
sample_rows |
A few example rows, PII masked |
run_query |
One read-only SELECT, row-limited, with PII protected |
Backends
| Backend | Status | Native context it reads | Read-only connection layer |
|---|---|---|---|
| DuckDB | v0.1 | none (YAML catalog only) | file opened read_only |
| Snowflake | v0.2 | table/column comments, pii object tags |
a SELECT-only role (WCM_READER in the demo script) |
| Databricks | v0.2 | Unity Catalog comments, pii column tags |
a principal with only USE + SELECT grants |
Comments and tags stored in the warehouse are merged with the curated YAML catalog: curated values win, native ones fill the gaps, and a PII flag from either source sticks.
Guardrails
Every query an agent sends is treated as written by an attacker, since agents can be prompt-injected by what they read. Protection comes in independent layers, each tested on its own:
- An allow-list query policy. SQL is parsed with sqlglot and must be exactly one SELECT built only from reviewed constructs and functions. Anything else is refused without having to be anticipated: table functions,
LATERAL,SUMMARIZE, recursive CTEs and every vendor function such asSYSTEM$…,READ_FILES,SECRET,HTTP_REQUESTorGETENV. - Resolution against the real schema.
*is expanded and every column must resolve to a real column of a known table, through aliases, CTEs and subqueries; a whole row used as a value is refused. - PII masked inside the SQL. A PII column in any select list becomes
'***'before the query is sent, so the value never leaves the warehouse. It can be counted (COUNT(DISTINCT email)), but filtering, sorting, grouping or computing on it is refused, so its values cannot be guessed one test at a time. - A locked-down connection. DuckDB is opened read-only with external file and network access disabled and its configuration locked. Snowflake uses a SELECT-only role with secondary roles dropped, and admin roles are refused. Databricks uses a principal with only
USEandSELECTgrants. - Bounded execution and results. Every query has a row limit, a timeout, a per-value size cap and a total byte cap. Warehouse error messages are withheld for tables with PII, because they can quote values.
Scope: only tables in the configured schema; names are compared after the dialect's own case rules and every table is fully qualified in the SQL that runs.
PII tags stored in the warehouse (Snowflake tags, Unity Catalog column tags) are merged with the curated catalog, must be readable at startup (fail closed), and are refreshed every 10 minutes. For production data, also use warehouse-native masking (masking policies or column masks): the server's masking is defence in depth.
The queries an independent review used to break an earlier version live in tests/attacks/ and run on every commit. See the threat model, ADR 0004 and SECURITY.md.
Quick start
Try it without cloning (needs uv); --demo serves a bundled, fully synthetic shipping warehouse that is built on first run:
uvx warehouse-context-mcp --demo
Also on PyPI, as a container image (ghcr.io/andremuraro/warehouse-context-mcp), and in the MCP Registry as io.github.AndreMuraro/warehouse-context-mcp. Releases carry build provenance; see SECURITY.md.
Use it from your MCP client
Clone the repository and it is already configured: .mcp.json (Claude Code), .vscode/mcp.json (VS Code) and .codex/config.toml (Codex) each start the demo server. Each client asks before trusting a project's servers.
To add it everywhere instead:
| Client | Command or config |
|---|---|
| Claude Code | claude mcp add --scope user warehouse -- uvx warehouse-context-mcp --demo |
| Claude Desktop | claude_desktop_config.json: "warehouse": {"command": "uvx", "args": ["warehouse-context-mcp", "--demo"]} under mcpServers |
| VS Code | user mcp.json: "warehouse": {"type": "stdio", "command": "uvx", "args": ["warehouse-context-mcp", "--demo"]} under servers |
| Codex | codex mcp add warehouse -- uvx warehouse-context-mcp --demo |
| Any client, over HTTP | docker compose up, then point it at http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp |
Claude Code plugin and agent skill
The repository is also a Claude Code plugin marketplace. The plugin bundles the server and a warehouse-context skill that teaches the agent the workflow (find, describe, check freshness, query, cite the executed SQL) and how to respond to refusals:
/plugin install warehouse-context --marketplace AndreMuraro/warehouse-context-mcp
The same skill is checked in for project use: .claude/skills/ (Claude Code), .agents/skills/ (Codex) and both are read by VS Code. Or copy plugins/warehouse-context/skills/warehouse-context/ into your personal skills folder.
Replace --demo with --backend snowflake or --backend databricks (and the settings below) for a real warehouse.
Then ask: "Which vessel class had the best average TCE last quarter, and is that table fresh?"
Development
Requires uv; it installs Python 3.14 if missing.
uv sync --all-extras # creates .venv from uv.lock
uv run pytest
Snowflake or Databricks
uv sync --extra snowflake # or --extra databricks, or --all-extras
cp .env.example .env # fill in your own values; .env is git-ignored
# run examples/snowflake_demo.sql (or databricks_demo.sql) once in the warehouse
uv run warehouse-context-mcp --backend snowflake --catalog path/to/catalog.yaml
Settings come from SNOWFLAKE_* / DATABRICKS_* environment variables or ./.env; real environment variables win, and blank values count as unset. Key-pair auth for Snowflake: uv run scripts/snowflake_keypair.py prints the one ALTER USER statement to run.
Sharing a Snowflake CLI connection
If you use Snowflake CLI, point the server at one of its connections instead of repeating the account and sign-in details:
# connections.toml (~/.snowflake/, or %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\snowflake\ on Windows)
[wcm]
account = "orgname-accountname"
user = "you"
authenticator = "SNOWFLAKE_JWT"
private_key_file = "~/.snowflake/snowflake_key.p8"
snow sql -c wcm -f examples/snowflake_demo.sql # one-time demo setup, as an admin role
SNOWFLAKE_CONNECTION_NAME=wcm SNOWFLAKE_ROLE=WCM_READER uv run warehouse-context-mcp --backend snowflake
The connection supplies the account and sign-in; any SNOWFLAKE_* value you set overrides it, and this package's defaults never do. After connecting, the server adopts the session's actual database and schema, and refuses admin roles (ACCOUNTADMIN, SYSADMIN, …), so a CLI connection kept for admin work cannot bypass the SELECT-only role.
Live tests run the demo expectations against a real warehouse and are skipped otherwise:
WCM_LIVE=snowflake uv run pytest -m live
On Windows the same commands work in PowerShell; set the variable with $env:WCM_LIVE = "snowflake".
On the Databricks Free Edition the personal access token belongs to the workspace admin, so the read-only connection layer is not available there; the query policy still applies. In a real workspace, use a service principal with only USE and SELECT grants.
Python versions
| 3.14 | 3.15 | |
|---|---|---|
| Core, DuckDB | ✓ | ✓ |
| Databricks extra | ✓ | ✓ (lz4 and thrift build from source) |
| Snowflake extra | ✓ | not yet: no 3.15 wheels, and the source build fails; the extra is skipped by an environment marker |
HTTP transport and containers
By default the server speaks MCP over stdio: the client launches it. With --transport http it runs as a long-lived Streamable HTTP service instead, with stateless JSON responses and a /healthz endpoint:
uv run warehouse-context-mcp --demo --transport http --port 8000
claude mcp add --transport http warehouse http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp
The HTTP transport has no authentication. DNS-rebinding protection stays on even when bound to every interface: only requests whose Host header names localhost, or a name passed with --allowed-host, are served. Publish it on loopback, or put an authenticating proxy in front.
Docker
docker compose up --build # demo warehouse at http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp
docker run --rm -i warehouse-context-mcp:local # or stdio, for clients that launch a command
The image is built from uv.lock, runs as a non-root user, and contains every backend plus the synthetic demo warehouse. Compose runs it with a read-only filesystem, no Linux capabilities and no-new-privileges, and publishes ports on 127.0.0.1 only.
For a real warehouse, fill in .env and start a profile. Credentials reach the container as secret files under /run/secrets, not as environment variables:
docker compose --profile snowflake up --build # :8001, key-pair sign-in (no browser in a container)
docker compose --profile databricks up --build # :8002, token from DATABRICKS_TOKEN
- Snowflake uses
SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT,SNOWFLAKE_USERand the key file atSNOWFLAKE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH; Snowflake CLI connection names are a host-only convenience. - Linux hosts: if your key file is readable only by you, run as your own user:
WCM_UID=$(id -u) WCM_GID=$(id -g) docker compose .... - Version tags publish the image to
ghcr.io/andremuraro/warehouse-context-mcp.
CI builds the image, checks the stdio transport, brings the Compose service up until healthy, calls a tool over HTTP, confirms a foreign Host header is refused, and verifies the container is non-root and read-only.
The catalog
Meaning lives in a YAML file reviewed in Git like code (the demo's catalog):
tables:
fct_voyage_economics:
description: Time-charter-equivalent economics per voyage.
owner: freight-analytics
grain: voyage_id
upstream: [stg_voyages]
freshness_column: computed_at
expected_freshness_hours: 12
columns:
tce_usd_per_day: { description: TCE in USD per day. }
In production it would be generated from dbt docs, Unity Catalog comments or a data catalog.
Architecture
src/warehouse_context_mcp/
├── demo/ the bundled synthetic warehouse and its catalog
├── domain/ catalog, result models, namespace, errors (no I/O beyond YAML)
├── guardrails/ QueryPolicy: parse, scope, PII rules, row limit; result masking
├── warehouses/ Warehouse protocol + DuckDB, Snowflake, Databricks adapters
├── service.py WarehouseContext: combines the three; no MCP dependency
├── server.py MCP transport: six read-only tools, stdio or Streamable HTTP
├── settings.py pydantic-settings for connection config and secrets
└── cli.py entry point
Dependencies point inwards: the transport knows the service, the service knows the domain, guardrails and the Warehouse protocol, and nothing in the domain knows about MCP or any driver.
- Typed end to end. Tool results are frozen pydantic models, so MCP clients receive a JSON schema for every output. Tool arguments carry their bounds (
depth1–5,max_rows≤ 1000) in the input schema. DB-API drivers are reached through aCursor[P]protocol generic over the driver's paramstyle, so binding positional parameters to a named-style driver is a type error. - Errors as data. Guardrail refusals come back as
{"ok": false, "error": ...}so the agent can repair its query; programming errors and unknown tables raise. - Warehouse-agnostic core. Adapters only describe where metadata lives; fetching, caching, allow-listing and catalog assembly are shared in
DbApiWarehouse.
See docs/adr for the decisions behind the guardrails and the toolchain.
Development
uv run ruff format # format
uv run ruff check # lint: every ruff rule, with a short documented ignore list
uv run ty check # type check, strict rules
uv run pytest --cov # tests with branch coverage
CI runs the same on Python 3.14 and 3.15 (Linux) and 3.14 (Windows), and builds and smoke-tests the wheel.
Roadmap
- v0.1: DuckDB adapter, catalog, six tools, three-layer guardrails, tests, CI
- v0.2: Snowflake and Databricks Unity Catalog adapters, native comments and PII tags, schema scoping
- v0.3: Python 3.14+, uv, ruff and ty; layered package; typed tool inputs and outputs; table names qualified by the policy
- v0.4: Streamable HTTP transport, hardened container image and Compose setup, Snowflake CLI connections, zero-setup
--demo, client configs, PyPI and MCP Registry release pipeline - Catalog import from dbt
manifest.json - Evaluation: 20 analyst questions answered with and without the server, scored for correctness and table choice
- Per-tool audit log
License
MIT
Metadata
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